According to what Bloomberg News describes as a US intelligence report, Chinese authorities discovered that some of their missiles’ fuel tanks were filled with water – and that this was a marquee example of corruption whose unraveling led to Chinese President Xi’s recent military purge.

Bloomberg reported that it got the information from unnamed people who were “familiar with” a US intelligence assessment and that those US sources also said that  new Xinjiang missile field silos were fitted with lids that were not installed properly and would not work – taken as another example of corruption.

Pentagon officials and “experts” are telling the press that the import of the twin tales is that China is weak and cannot fight. Yet the sources “familiar with” the intelligence say they cannot validate the information they provided Bloomberg.

The leaked “intelligence” that Bloomberg cites as its ultimate source leads inexorably to major questions. Under close examination the claims cited in the report seem to be fake.

The story is technically naive when it comes to China’s missiles. China does not keep its liquid-fueled rockets filled with propellant. This means they are empty sitting in silos. If fuel was stored in a rocket booster the internal tanks and plumbing would soon be ruined by corrosion. The military fuels them if there are warning conditions requiring loading the missiles with fuel.

There would be no reason to put water in the missiles unless it was deliberate sabotage.  If it was deliberate sabotage China would not just be purging this or that official, they would have been arrested, tried and shot.  Sabotage or destruction of strategic nuclear missiles is a very serious crime and would be met by the harshest measures. The idea that some officials would just be dismissed from their job is not a response to anything of this level of criminal significance. Those guilty of such crimes would be subjected to the harshest measures.

The second part of the story apparently is focused on the Hami missile field.  The claim is that the lids of the silos are not fitted for operation. But if there were no missiles yet for these silos, there would be no reason to fit them to function with installed missiles. Unfortunately, we do not know the status of these missile fields at present, although the Pentagon may know.

We do have photos of work being done on these silos in 2021, but the excavated areas are covered by tented structures (DOD experts call them domes), so you can’t see the covers or anything else.  It would not be unreasonable to think the domes could still be there until the missiles are ready for installation. (Some of the silos are likely to never be filled with real missiles, but will be decoys.)

Identical shelter domes seen at Hami, Yumen, and Jilantai. Image: Federation of American Scientists

It is now well known that Xi Jinping uses corruption probes to root out his competitors and anyone that he thinks is a threat to his leadership. The purge of military and defense officials goes beyond just the Rocket Force and reaches into the PLA and as far up as the two previous defense ministers. It also includes some in the army, the submarine force and the Air Force.

Not just generals and ministers are being purged but also officers at the working level. Reaching down far into the ranks would seem odd unless the military officers are tied to politicians Xi wants to eliminate.

Water in missiles and bad silo lids comprise a fake story covering up the real political reasons behind Xi’s purge.

If the intelligence fellows cannot confirm the story, then “someone” told them. The only people who would try and sell this story are the Xi clique. Without their imprimatur, an effort would be made on the US side to confirm the information. I think US intelligence got it straight from the Chinese, who sought to explain to the Americans why Xi was cracking down on the military.

As I understand it from a number of serious China experts, the corruption stuff is the accusation being used in the ongoing power struggle. I think Xi is in some trouble.

Although the Chinese say the purges are because of corruption, that is almost impossible to believe. Most of the people purged are not put on trial, and one of the reasons is that there isn’t evidence.

The Pentagon could see a problem with the silo lids through overhead photography.  But photography apparently has nothing to do with this story. Instead, it seems, the intelligence guys and their DOD customers just swallowed the whole fish: Well, you know, China is corrupt and this is the evidence.

You don’t get convictions with second-hand unattributed information, nor do you base your defense strategy around hokum.  

Let’s conclude with a few facts that we actually know to be facts.

Known knowns

It is true that since 2021 China has been constructing a new missile launch site in eastern Xinjiang province at a place called Hami.

It is one of three silo-based launch sites in China.  The others are at Yuman and Jilantai, although the Jilantai site is regarded as a training base.  The Pentagon has been laser-focused on the new Hami site because it represents potentially a significant increase in China’s long range strategic rocket forces and could possibly signal a change in China’s nuclear doctrine.

Altogether, China “has 120 silos under construction at Yumen, another 110 silos at Hami, a dozen silos at Jilantai, and possibly more silos being added in existing DF-5 deployment areas, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) appears to have approximately 250 silos under construction,”  according to the Federation of American Scientists. Given that China has only around 20 DF-5s in service, it will take many years before these silos can be filled.

In 1966 China established its Second Artillery Corps with responsibility for its emerging strategic rocket forces. For many years the Second Artillery Corps was directed technologically by the National Defense Science and Technology Commission. In recent years that guidance was shifted to the General Armaments Department. Under Xi Jinping the Second Artillery Corps became the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, the 4th Branch of the People’s Liberation Army. It is responsible for all nuclear and conventional missiles.

Leaders of the Rocket Force serve in the National People’s Congress. Recently, nine high-ranking PLA officers have been purged from the Congress, removing legal protections from prosecution, one of the benefits of membership in the body. The majority of those purged reportedly came from the rocket force.

China’s long-range strategic nuclear missiles are almost all still liquid-fueled, although China is shifting to solid-fuel rockets. Some of China’s rockets are road-mobile, meaning they are not in silos or confined to launch fields. These rockets are mostly solid-fueled but most of them are not intercontinental in range.

The most important of China’s strategic rockets is the DF-5 (Dongfeng 5 or East Wind 5). The DF-5 is a two-stage intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 7,000 to 10,000 km. The most recent version of this missile, the DF-5B, is said to have a MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) warhead, although it is not known if this has been implemented on many installed systems.

As of 2017 there were about 20 of these missiles in service. The DF-5 reportedly is still in production although it is slated to eventually be replaced by the DF-41.

Reportedly it takes 30 to 60 minutes to fuel a DF-5. China’s DF-4 and DF-5 boosters use unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine instead of liquid oxygen for fuel because it is easily stored. At present, and prior to China actually having an intercontinental solid-fueled strategic rocket capability, China does not have a true launch-on-warning system, although defense experts believe they are moving in that direction, developing new long-range solid-fuel missiles such as the DF-31 and DF-41. The DF-41 is intended as a road-mobile system. The DF-31 carries only a single warhead.

Stephen Bryen, who served as staff director of the Near East Subcommittee of the
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as a deputy undersecretary of defense
for policy, currently is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute.

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