MANILA – “The Philippines is an important partner of Indonesia,” declared President Joko Widodo during a high-profile visit to Manila, one of his last major diplomatic trips before stepping down from office later this year.
“Many Indonesian defense equipment products are purchased by the Philippines and investment there is also quite significant,” the two-term leader added before leaving for Manila as part of a broader regional tour.
Though Jakarta billed Widodo’s trip as an exercise in proactive trade diplomacy, the visit to Manila clearly had a defense dimension. Shortly before Widodo’s trip, his foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, met her Philippine counterpart, Enrique Manalo, in Manila to discuss bilateral cooperation including on regional crises such as the South China Sea disputes.
The top Indonesian diplomat made it clear that her country is “ready to work together with all ASEAN member states, including the Philippines” to finalize the long-running negotiations over a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
In one of its final acts as the outgoing chairman of ASEAN, Indonesia corralled foreign ministers from across the region to issue an unprecedented stand-alone statement on the maritime disputes amid growing concerns over a potential military confrontation between the Philippines, a founding bloc member, and China, a major trading partner of association members.
Recognizing the limits of ASEAN, which operates on a de facto unanimity-based decision-making process, regional leaders are doubling down on bilateral and minilateral cooperation on sensitive geopolitical issues.
Widodo’s trip to Manila came shortly before Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s own planned to visit Vietnam, another key ASEAN state with contested claims in the South China Sea, to upgrade bilateral relations.
The ultimate aim is to create a robust set of partnerships among core Southeast Asian states in order to more effectively preserve regional peace and security as well as uphold a semblance of “ASEAN centrality.”
Delicate balancing act
In his final years in office, Widido successfully placed Indonesia on the global geopolitical map through subtle yet proactive diplomacy.
As the president of the influential Group of Twenty (G20) nations in 2022, Southeast Asia’s most populous nation flexed its diplomatic muscle by organizing a vital summit between US President Joe Biden and Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping in Bali.
This went hand in hand with Indonesia’s efforts to mediate the conflict in Ukraine by maintaining robust communication channels both with Russia, which attended the G20 events, as well as key European capitals.
Worried about the fallout of the conflict on global food and energy markets, Indonesia corralled fellow emerging powers to pressure Russia not to target the transport of vital commodities out of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.
Its successful G20 presidency set the tone for Indonesia’s rotational chairmanship of ASEAN the following year. “ASEAN unity is needed to formulate the way forward,” Widodo declared during the first major ASEAN meeting in 2023 on the island of Labuan Bajo, emphasizing the need for more decisive action.
At the same time, however, he acknowledged that intractable issues such as the crisis in Myanmar “must not hinder the accelerated development of the ASEAN community, because this is what we have been waiting for.”
Widodo underscored the importance of greater intra-ASEAN coordination while also acknowledging the limits of cooperation under a consensus-based decision-making process.
If anything, Indonesia expressly emphasized the importance of economic growth and connectivity as the central theme of its ASEAN chairmanship. Nevertheless, Widodo introduced two important elements vis-à-vis the South China Sea disputes.
First, it advocated for the first-ever, all-ASEAN naval drills in the North Natuna Sea, an energy-rich area that partly overlaps with China’s expansive nine-dash line claim over the majority of the South China Sea. Predictably, Beijing-leaning member states cried foul, warning that the drills threatened to provoke regional tensions vis-à-vis China.
Intent on pressing ahead with the all-ASEAN exercises, however, Indonesia slightly adjusted the location of the drills, to the South Natuna Sea, and eschewed any “live-fire” exercises. The five-day non-combat drills saw key regional states such as Malaysia and Singapore in attendance, setting a new bar for intra-ASEAN naval cooperation.
Limited exercises
Indonesia’s second important intervention was the stand-alone ASEAN statement issued in the final hours of 2023, in which regional foreign ministers expressed their “concern [with] the recent developments in the South China Sea that may undermine peace, security and stability in the region.”
Crucially, they expressed “unity” as well as “solidarity” with the Philippines in what ASEAN foreign ministers described as “our maritime sphere”, thus subtly rejecting any suggestion that China or any major power should dominate the South China Sea basin.
Jakarta’s interventions were music to Manila’s ears. After all, at least two regional leaders had earlier publicly expressed skepticism about the Philippines’ increasingly assertive stance against China in the disputed waters under the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration.
This had only reinforced well-entrenched views in the Philippines about ASEAN’s ineffectualness and seeming pro-China leaning.
During his visit to Manila, Widodo discussed the latest developments in the South China Sea with his Filipino counterpart.
”President Widodo and I had a fruitful and honest discussion on regional events of mutual interest such as the developments in South China Sea and ASEAN cooperation and initiative,” Marcos Jr said in a joint press conference with his Indonesian counterpart in Manila.
“The Philippines and Indonesia affirmed our insistence on the universality of UNCLOS, which sets out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and in the seas,” he added, emphasizing the alignment of views between the two founding ASEAN members.
Indonesia is also pushing for tighter bilateral security cooperation with the Philippines. Under the Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC), which was concluded in 2022 and is led by Philippine and Indonesian foreign ministers, the two sides aim to implement a series of vital cooperative initiatives, including joint border patrols and counter-terrorism exercises.
The two sides are also doubling down on their maritime security cooperation. The Philippines has been a top client for Indonesia-made warships, namely the Strategic Sealift Vessels (SSVs) BRP Tarlac and BRP Davao Del Sur.
The two neighbors are also weighing another major defense deal in the sale of six light aircraft from state-owned PT Dirgantara Indonesia to the Philippine Air Force.
By proactively engaging the Philippines, Widodo has sought to not only overcome deficiencies under the ASEAN mechanism but also set the bar higher for both his successor as well as this year’s rotational ASEAN chairman, Laos, on regional maritime cooperation issues.
For his part, Marcos Jr has not only welcomed closer strategic partnership with Indonesia but is also intent on doubling down on burgeoning ties with Vietnam, which shares Manila’s concerns about China’s rising assertiveness in the South China Sea.
Later this month, the Filipino president is expected to visit Hanoi in order to finalize new maritime security cooperation agreements and project a more united front within ASEAN.
While the regional body has often been paralyzed by indecision amid major crises, key member states are actively tapping new spaces for bilateral cooperation among themselves.
Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X, formerly Twitter, at @Richeydarian