A new book by Dr Levente Horváth, Director of the Eurasia Centre at Budapest’s John von Neumann University – “Chinese Geopolitical Thinking – The Belt and Road Initiative from a Chinese Perspective” – presents a nuanced (and unorthodox) interpretation of the ideas that motivate China’s foreign policy, including its much-bruited Belt & Road Initiative (BRI).
Horváth makes a solid case that present-day China is more the product of 5,000 years of Chinese history and pedagogy than it is of messianic Marxism-Leninism, an ideology that is unprecedented in Chinese history, dates only to 1949 and is now running on fumes.
For this reason, he repeatedly takes the West to task for its burgeoning Sinophobia, which he suggests is tinged with paranoia over the prospect of having to play second fiddle to a rising power viewed as not clubbable.
He explains that Beijing’s foreign policy reflects its ancient wisdom and scholarship, which is more about stability through economic exchange and business relations than it is about war, conquest and subjugation.
Horváth’s thesis should play well across Eurasia and the so-called Global South, while garnering brickbats from many of the China mavens who work in our think tanks, universities, and newsrooms.
The author, a fluent Mandarin speaker with extensive in-country experience, questions the tendency of Western academics to view Beijing’s strategic engagement with the outside world through the lens of a one-dimensional and linear analytical framework, which all too often fails to grasp the impact China’s history and ancient scholarship have had on the country’s foreign policy.
To be sure, their analyses commonly fall short of unveiling the deep motivations that underpin China’s external relations. The author doesn’t shrink from describing his academic colleagues in unflattering terms: “In Hungary,” he says, “a large number of China experts lack any knowledge of Chinese [language and see Beijing’s] geopolitical aspirations [through the lens of] hostile American and Western European research and articles.”
“In [my] book,” he continues, “I try to compensate for the aforementioned professional shortcomings by drawing on my familiarity with [Mandarin] language, culture and ways of thinking,” which he acquired by living twelve years in situ.
More Tao, Less Mao
Horváth describes how China’s ancient philosophy and the concept of yin and yang – the view that seemingly contradictory forces in nature are, in fact, interwoven and interdependent – is at work in its foreign policy.
“‘Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.’
And when the moment is right and all circumstances right, in the words of the ancient Chinese sage, tianshi dili renhe, then it is the time to step up and begin the fight in the spirit of Tao and bring the world into balance, into the right yin and yang, to restore the world order.”
Horváth repeatedly quotes from Chinese classic texts such as the “Tao Te Ching”: “Those who lead people by following the Tao, don’t use weapons to enforce their will. Using force always leads to unseen troubles.” He believes this attitude permeates Chinese foreign policy.
The book argues that the thinking of China’s “strategists and sages (Sun Tzu, Guan Zhong, Confucius, Lao Tzu, Meng Tzu, etc.)” is embedded in the Chinese mind at all levels of society. Horváth also questions Western claims that the BRI is “a pre-planned program of the Chinese Communist Party.”
Horváth would not agree with the observation of noted China hand and cable news fixture Gordon G Chang in “How China Is ‘Sino-Forming’ the Planet“: “What could be the most dangerous combination of beliefs today? China’s tianxia [“(all) under heaven”] and Chinese territorial aggression.” Horváth does not buy the notion that China is out to forcibly grab territories beyond its borders the way the 19th Century colonial powers did.
That does not mean he believes the Chinese establishment is made up of peace-loving altruists. On the contrary, he suggests that some form of economic supremacy is China’s end game rather than political hegemony achieved through military confrontation and subjugation.
Horváth says that what Henry Kissinger once wrote remains relevant: “… other nations had to recognize the emperor’s sovereignty, but China did not make any territorial claims and its ships did not travel the world for colonial purposes.”
Testifying to its enduring indifference to colonial adventures, China maintains a mere 200-plus marines overseas even though its economy has grown exponentially over the past 20 years.
For the author, China under President Xi Jinping is not the USSR reincarnate, nor the Mongol horde, nor the Galactic Empire in Star Wars. It is not itching to sell its nearly US$900 billion worth of US Treasury bills in one fell swoop to torpedo the US economy and inflict its fire-breathing, draconian ambitions on the world.
Horváth illustrates China’s approach versus the West’s with a metaphor: “while in the Western world the most popular strategic game is chess, in China weiqi is more popular. In chess, the aim is to annihilate the opponent with a checkmate; in weiqi, the object is not to destroy the other player, but to gain territory and surround him.”
Thus, explains Horváth: “With the Belt & Road Initiative, the Chinese state has not created a unilateral [or unidirectional] policy [at the expense of others], but a common platform where participating states can negotiate and discuss, as equals, [paths to] the future development of countries, regions, and the world.”
This understanding of Chinese intentions is welcome in Budapest but anathema in Brussels, London, and Washington.
Horváth says that Chinese geopolitical thinking is Sino-centric, fixated on border protection, peaceful interaction with neighbors and win-win outcomes, whereas the Western powers seek hegemony often through territorial conquest and one-sided financial arrangements.
In this sense, Horváth would agree with David Goldman, a long-time China watcher and Business Editor at Asia Times: “We are now at the greatest turning point in Chinese history since its unification in the Third Century BC. China is turning outward—but doesn’t want to rule you. Like the Borg in Star Trek, it wants to assimilate you.”
Getting China Right
Horváth asserts that “the Atlantic Era is coming to an end; the era of Eurasia has begun, in which China is playing an increasingly important role.” If his view is correct, Sinologists need to revise their views on how to manage relations with Beijing.
Horváth’s views on the threat many believe China poses differ markedly from those of Chang. In a recent piece in Newsweek, Chang muses: “Is it now in the West’s interest for China to succeed or fail? We have no choice: We must make it fail. If Communist China succeeds, it will mean the end of the West.”
The opinion is indicative of an important strain in the thinking of the Western commentariat: China is a grave threat to the West because its values are inimical to ours, so let’s do them in rather than find a way to share the planet with them. That may be right or wrong, but Horváth sees the matter differently. He believes accommodation is possible.
While Chang may be excessively truculent in his views on China, Horváth may be excessively dewy-eyed: “The main goal of the Belt & Road Initiative is to [get countries to cooperate] in areas of common interest, which will in the future [bring about] a kind of new world order. [As this process unfolds], at least according to China’s rhetoric, [all countries] are equal; there are no superpowers who set the rules, but a system that is jointly designed, based on [the principles of] equality and peace.”
It borders on utopian to think that China would be content with a “jointly designed” system “based on equality.” As the new world system hasn’t emerged yet, we do not know how it will play out. But it’s hard to take Beijing’s disinterested tone seriously and what China understands by “equality” is anyone’s guess.
Indeed, China has shown it can be pitiless and quite ruthless in securing its place in the world and in maintaining national unity. The author tends to downplay this. Horváth barely mentions China’s treatment of minorities or the impact of its rollout of digital infrastructure on geo-economics.
Having said all this, Horváth points to this telling factoid: “More than 130 countries are participating in the BRI because they see the potential for economic development.” It would seem much of the world is betting that the BRI will not only succeed but prove mutually beneficial or they would not be playing ball with Beijing.
“In Beijing’s view,” the author notes, “given its economic achievements and global economic responsibilities, China is entitled to have a much greater say in shaping the world order than it does at present. That is why the BRI Initiative was launched.” It would seem Beijing is determined to put paid to the “Century of Humiliation” when the West lorded it over China – from the First Opium War of 1839 to the Communist seizure of power in 1949.
On maritime transport and trade, Horváth does not believe China’s engagement with the world will doom freedom of navigation even as it builds up its blue water navy. Moreover, he sees benefits to Eurasia in strengthening inter-continental integration. As such, he is no devotee of Mackinder’s “Heartland Theory,” which he rejects because, in his view, it hinders transnational economic development and trade.
Debt trap mythology
What’s more, Horváth challenges the Western narrative about “debt trap diplomacy”, which he sees as a “geo-economic tool of the West…designed to discredit the BRI” rather than a ploy to leave poor countries vulnerable to China’s geo-political ambitions, as many Western commentators allege.
Two recent studies on debt trap diplomacy, The Debt Trap is a Myth (The Atlantic) and Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt Trap Diplomacy’ (Chatham House), tend to back up Horváth’s analysis and are worth reading.
China is complex and oversimplification or a misreading of its foreign policy motives can have dangerous consequences. Western experts, policymakers, and diplomats concerned with getting China right could do worse than to read Horváth’s book. If nothing else, it could help them sidestep dubious narratives that could lead to unfortunate outcomes.
While the quality of Horváth’s analysis is high, the same cannot be said of the translation. There are awkward turns of phrase and some misused words, which detract from the case he makes. But it would be a shame if these infelicities were to prevent the book from reaching the audience it deserves, especially among Western policymakers.
Can’t find the book on Amazon