One Chinese citizen was killed and several others injured yesterday (November 4) when an artillery shell fired by the Myanmar military apparently missed its intended target and landed on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border.
The strike had targeted the city of Laiza on the Myanmar side of the border, home to the headquarters of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), one of the largest and most powerful of dozens of ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) fighting against the State Administration Council (SAC) military junta that seized power from a democratically elected government in a February 2021 coup.
According to a Laiza-based Kachin activist known as David who closely monitors the conflict in the area, the artillery shell that landed on the Chinese side hit a house and injured three people, including at least one fatal injury. He told Asia Times that three shells landed on a nearby mountain this morning (November 5) but that the area wasn’t inhabited and there was no harm to any individuals or property.
The risk of more casualties on the Chinese side has been mitigated as residents have evacuated from the border town of Naban, which is connected to Laiza as part of the same urban area. However, residents of Laiza on the Myanmar side don’t have many feasible escape routes and have been seeking shelter outside of their homes, including in trenches along the river separating the two countries.
A prominent blogger following the conflict named Nicholas cited “local news” sources as saying there were a total of four Chinese national casualties resulting from the errant artillery attack, even though the KIA has issued an order to local media not to release news about the recent attacks.
Nicholas’ widely followed, pro-Spring Revolution Twitter feed posted pictures of smoke rising from the China side of the barbed-wire fence that China constructed along large sections of the China-Myanmar border several years ago.
A high-level KIA official told Asia Times after yesterday’s bombing on the condition of anonymity that the attack was “approved” by China, without elaborating how he knew this was the case.
At the time of publication, the Chinese government had not yet made any official statements about the Chinese citizen who was killed and the others who were harmed, which is unusual considering that China is ordinarily keen to show the world— and particularly the Chinese public—that it steadfastly protects Chinese citizens abroad and takes swift, bold countermeasures whenever Chinese citizens are harmed.
The lack of a swift statement could either mean that China is somehow hoping the information doesn’t become public or that Beijing is still formulating its response at a time when Beijing’s Myanmar policy is becoming increasingly muddled.
That apparent policy flux reflects the fast-changing nature of the conflict since the astounding success of “Operation 1027,” a massive and multi-pronged military campaign launched on October 27 by a unified group of resistance forces known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance comprised of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA) in northern Shan state in areas near the Chinese border.
Yesterday’s military artillery barrage on Laiza was unprecedented because the city was previously considered off-limits as a target, on the grounds that any attack on Laiza would most likely harm Chinese individuals or property on the Chinese side. As such, there has long been an understanding between the Chinese government and the SAC that Laiza itself would not be targeted, although surrounding areas have been.
That may have changed as the SAC seeks to punish the KIA for supporting the Three Brotherhood Alliance, whose members have reportedly received training, supplies and protection from the KIA.
According to Ryan Libre, a visual artist who has been living in KIA-controlled areas for 13 years and monitors the conflict closely, yesterday’s artillery barrage is part of a new campaign that the SAC launched on October 9, when the junta dropped a powerful bomb on a displaced persons camp 3 kilometers north of Laiza and less than 100 meters from China’s border.
Analysts say the camp was deliberately targeted as part of the SAC’s campaign to terrorize civilians and demoralize the anti-coup Spring Revolution. The fact that the bomb was dropped so close to the border indicates that Beijing had either tacitly approved of the new military campaign or that the SAC gambled that Beijing would accept the attack as a fait accompli.
Another interpretation of the SAC’s decision to launch a new campaign near Laiza is that the junta is now less concerned about angering China amid recently deteriorating bilateral relations. This theory holds that China is starting to realize that it bet on the wrong horse when it threw its weight behind the junta late last year and thus Beijing is now changing towards a more middle position on the conflict.
Indeed, Beijing may have recently concluded that it earlier miscalculated the strength and resolve of Myanmar’s resistance movement comprised of EROs and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) formed in response to the coup.
It’s also clear that Beijing believes the SAC is incapable of addressing the rampant cyber-scam problem in Myanmar’s border areas. These illicit operations are a collaboration between junta-appointed allied militia groups and Chinese gangs and involve luring unsuspected people including Chinese nationals to “call center” compounds with promises of good jobs, after which they are often literally enslaved and forced to scam compatriots in their home nations.
Survivors who have been rescued from these operations have said they were often forced to meet scam quotas and tortured if they didn’t reach their quotas or otherwise displeased their gangland bosses. Reports have indicated these scam centers are highly profitable but have also cost China enormously in diplomatic and reputation terms.
China may have recently concluded that the only way to address the cyber-scamming problem and other criminal activities is to tacitly support resistance forces, at least in Shan state where Beijing has a keen interest in maintaining the stability of the border areas, its investments and the parts of Shan state through which the Belt and Road Initiative-linked China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) runs.
Indeed, Operation 1027’s primary targets were in northern Shan state where the CMEC enters Myanmar and subsequently winds down the country and ends at the Indian Ocean, a trade and fuel shipment route that aims to mitigate China’s risk of a US blockade at the Malacca Strait maritime chokepoint in a conflict scenario.
Earlier this year, Chinese officials began publicly admonishing the junta to crack down on cyber-scamming operations but the junta hasn’t apparently cracked down, likely because it relies on the political and financial support of militia groups that control the “special crime zones” where these cyber-scams operate.
And even if the SAC had wanted to firmly crack down on scamming operations it wouldn’t have the wherewithal to take control of these crime zones, many of which are located in far-flung and geographically isolated border regions protected by heavily-armed militia groups and Chinese gangs.
According to Libre, yesterday’s unprecedented artillery barrage on Laiza that killed and injured Chinese citizens marks the latest phase of a military campaign in the area, one that began with the bombing of an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp on October 9. That assault killed 29 people, injured 57 and destroyed the camp along with a kindergarten and a church, outraging the international community. All of the causalities were reportedly civilians, including 13 children.
The IDP camp assault on October 9 was followed by a series of airstrikes over two days near Laiza beginning on October 31, which hit the former KIA headquarters on Alen Bum mountain and a nearby village called Ja Hta, which had already been abandoned after a previous attack but was still being accessed by former villagers seeking to hunt animals and attracted by fruit still growing in the village since it was abandoned.
The KIA moved its headquarters from Alen Bum mountain to Laiza city shortly after the conflict between the Myanmar military and KIA resumed in 2011. Thereafter, a school for displaced children was constructed on the mountain and it’s now occupied by civilians and houses the KIO’s offices. However, according to Libre, it’s unclear whether civilians were moved to the mountain as a deliberate tactical measure by the KIA.
Fortify Rights, an advocacy group in the region, posted a video on its Twitter feed taken by local residents who said that air-raid sirens went off on the China side to warn people in the area on October 31.
Fortify Rights said the airstrikes that began on October 31 near Laiza may constitute war crimes and should be fully investigated, noting that “It is a war crime to target civilian and civilian objects.” Fortify Rights further said that “UN member states should urgently deny the junta access to aviation fuel and hold it accountable for its crimes.”
Those remaining in Laiza have reportedly been hunkering down in trenches along a river dividing the China-Myanmar border or taking shelter outside the city. On November 1, The Irrawaddy news outlet quoted KIA spokesperson Colonel Naw But as saying that “Laiza is no longer safe because of shelling, airstrikes and drone attacks.”
The key question hanging over the SAC’s new campaign targeting Laiza and surrounding areas is whether China tacitly supported the attack or is at least officially turning a blind eye.
The notion that China may have given the green light for the assault is supported by the fact that people living in Naban, the town on the Chinese side of the border, had evacuated the area and the Naban market had been closed down before the junta’s attack.
Libre said the Naban market had never been closed since armed conflict between the KIA and the Myanmar military in the area resumed after years of ceasefire in 2011. Operation 1027 has been a stunning disaster for the SAC and the junta’s recent campaign against the Laiza area may be designed to punish the KIA for its role in supporting the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
However, Operation 1027 isn’t limited to these three groups operating in Shan State. The overstretched SAC is now scrambling to defend its positions across the country as various resistance forces have recently scored victories in Kachin, Karen, Karrenni states and the Sagaing region.
It’s impossible to verify the extent to which the attacks were coordinated or launched by armed groups seeking to take advantage of the chaos in other areas. Whatever the case, it’s clear that China is still trying to devise a new policy approach to a fast-evolving conflict situation that threatens to spill over its southern border and harm its nationals on Chinese soil.