Should the Ukraine war stretch much farther into the future, the dynamics of any settlement – if there is a settlement – will be much different than if a settlement were reached tomorrow.
Ukraine will soon be faced with a choice: whether to go on fighting, trying to prolong the war – or to make a deal while it can.
If Ukraine opened diplomatic discussions with Russia today it would still retain full control of its five most important cities: Kharkiv, Kiev, Dnipro, Odesa and L’viv. Its army would still remain viable.
Ukraine, in a settlement, could produce significant agricultural output and exports, raising revenue for the country (assuming Russian cooperation). Much of the self-exiled population might decide to return. That would depend on how much of Ukraine’s infrastructure remained after a settlement.
A longer war means the obliteration of more of the industrial backbone of the country.
Should the war be prolonged, the chance for the return of refugees is less likely. Many of the most skilled will find work elsewhere and integrate into local populations.
If the war continues, Ukraine cannot be assured of keeping control of key cities, holding together its armed forces, restoring its economy or maintaining an independent government.
Ukraine also cannot depend on Western help for much longer. Nor can it be sure that the supposed billions for reconstruction will really be forthcoming. With Western countries in a recession and budgets tightening, if the war continues the cost of reconstruction will surely rise to very high levels and take decades to carry out, if at all.
The reasoning behind these analyses of the short-term and long-term fortunes of Ukraine is based on the current war results, which are turning severely negative for Ukraine.
Today, Ukraine is entirely dependent on outside assistance to keep fighting and to pay its government workers and offset social costs. Even with this help it has become clear that Ukraine’s military is facing massive problems it cannot solve.
These problems include diminishing manpower (and the problems of replacement),
- the lack of airpower (which a handful of F-16s won’t fix),
- the increasingly capable Russian forces equipped with modern weapons and
- an infrastructure steadily under attack by long-range Russian missiles, drones, FAB bombs etc.
The army cannot protect its citizens from Russian attacks. It cannot protect workplaces from destruction.
Compounding Ukraine’s problems is that its sponsors are running out of supplies they can afford to send to Ukraine.
The supply problem raises multiple issues. The first is that the home defenses of NATO countries have been severely weakened by weapons transfers.
The second is that the supplier countries cannot enter the war on behalf of Ukraine – not only because doing so would touch off a general European war, but also because they no longer have the wherewithal to fight a war, especially a land war well beyond their borders.
Even before the Ukraine war, RAND and other think tanks and Pentagon-run simulations have shown that defending Europe from a Russian attack would be very difficult and could fail. Now that NATO is literally out of bullets, the situation is far worse.
Thirdly, the Ukraine war is damaging NATO’s credibility globally, especially as some of the best Western technology, often boasted of as game changers, has not delivered sufficient punch to change the war’s results.
Finally, the war’s cost and results are harming the ability of the United States to stabilize both the Middle East and eastern Pacific. In this sense, the Ukraine NATO expansion, promised since 2008 and not yet realized fully, is a country too far, as it has energized Russia far beyond what the war’s planners expected, and created a genuine risk of the NATO alliance’s collapse.
The US promotion of a Greater NATO and with it the EU idea of a Bigger EU are mostly based on the geopolitical theory of Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski proposed a version of Mackinder’s “strategic bible.”
The key notion is that the US must exercise power over the Eurasian landmass. Ukraine, in this context, is the pivot. Beyond Ukraine, the US also is eyeing replacing Russia in central Asia (the ‘stans) and, if an alliance with Iran is possible as the Biden administration hopes, pushing Russia out of the Caucasus. Notably, the US has managed to convince Armenia, long a Russian client, to change directions and align with the US and NATO.
Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (1999) has had a profound influence among Washington policymakers of both major political parties. Essentially it is what many commentators describe as the outlook of the so-called neocons. Zbig is still very relevant.
Russia understands exactly what the US is trying to achieve. Washington’s first focus is on Ukraine, but Moscow is aware that US military, diplomatic, NGO, and CIA undertakings in its neighborhood represent a significant challenge. Russian counter-strategy is to break NATO just as the US is trying to bring about regime change in Russia and weaken Russian power.
Ukraine, of course, is fighting to regain areas in its country where millions of Russians live. Instead of trying to lure Russian speakers back into the Ukrainian fold, Ukraine has been carrying out a systematic purge.
It has ruled out the use of the Russian language in schools and government offices, including healthcare providers. It has barred the teaching of Russian literature. It has arrested Russian Orthodox priests and occupied Russian monasteries and churches.
Russian cultural sites, statues and other symbols of Russian achievement are being systematically destroyed, allegedly by so-called vigilantes. The purging of Russians in Ukraine leaves no road back and no possibility of reconciliation.
There are still parts of Ukraine that have important concentrations of Russian speakers. Odesa, for example, with a population of 1.02 million is 62% Ukrainian and 29% Russian, a significant minority. Jews once composed 32% of the Odesa population, but thanks to the Nazi extermination of Jews, today the Jewish population is less than 1.2%. There have been calls in Russia for its army to take over Odesa.
Speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi on October 5th, Russian President Putin outlined Russia’s war aims.
He said that Russia is focused on protecting the people of Donbass and Crimea in the conflict with Ukraine, rather than “looking for new territories.”
Putin’s statement does not mean that if the war is prolonged that Russia will content itself with only protecting the areas already mostly under Russian control. It is also the case that Russia’s war aims include equally important goals, not the least of which is excluding NATO from Ukraine. Russia’s desire to keep NATO out of Ukraine applies to any war settlement in which Ukraine concedes it has lost the war.
If Ukraine carries on the war, the outcome for it will be far worse assuming current trends on the battlefield continue. A longer war could lead to civil conflict in Ukraine, a change in military leaders or the overthrow of the government. While some see the war going on for a few more years, it is unlikely that Ukraine’s army can hang on that long.
Washington policymakers would be wise to try and settle the Ukraine conflict rather than prolong it. While some think Biden, who has pledged to continue the war as long as it takes, needs the war for his re-election campaign, shifts in public opinion suggest that strategy is wrong.
While Congress still favors funding Ukraine at some level, it is unlikely that Ukraine will get enough support to change the outcome, other than exacerbating battlefield casualties. This is even more reason for Ukraine’s government to ask the Russians for terms, while it can.
A Ukraine war settlement soon will be to the benefit of Ukraine, the US and NATO.
Turning the question around
A good and dear friend, a very senior retired military leader, read the preceding. He asked me “Why do you believe Putin has the incentive to negotiate?”
It is a fair question and I replied to him as follows:
I think Putin has a number of reasons he would be open to negotiations now. Here they are (in no particular order). I think you raised a good question and I hope my responses below are helpful”
1. Putin, in my opinion, neither wants a bigger war nor wants to risk NATO’s doing something that would lead to a bigger war. The Russians let the British know earlier this week when London proposed British boots on the ground in Ukraine that Russia would retaliate. The British defense minister’s move was a trial balloon on behalf of the Biden administration. Incidentally the British and NATO reaction was extremely negative. I think that tells us a lot about what Putin is thinking and even more about how desperate the UK and US are.
2. Putin does not want to be seen as trying to expand Russia beyond the rather legalistic claims Russia is making about a Russian population in Ukraine that needs to be protected. This is important because Russia has international ambitions and does not want to be seen as an expansionist neocolonial power. This is one of the reasons why Russia’s territorial ambitions are, as Putin says, limited.
3. Putin wants to stay in control of the SMO (Special Military Operation) and not see it taken over by either reckless generals or politicians (think Prigozhin or think Medvedev), which would inevitably lead to the use of weapons of mass destruction.
4. Putin understands that the war is very costly and not easy. A bigger war would exceed Russia’s abilities industrially, financially and domestically in terms of political support. Even a much longer war, not expanded, would still pose the same problem for Russia. Russia is on a war footing right now industrially. It can’t sustain that indefinitely.
5. Putin’s main ally, China, wants the war over and done with. The Chinese think a longer war will encourage the US to be more ruthless and even put heavy sanctions on China. Certainly, the Chinese have told Putin about their anxiety over a prolonged war in Ukraine, and they are pushing their own peace agenda.
6. Russia is anxious to restore positive relations with Germany, for economic and strategic reasons. Putin understands that the reunification of Germany was a big risk for Russia, as Putin served in the KGB in the GDR (East Germany) and speaks German fluently. Putin thinks a settlement will open the door to diplomatic, political and economic restoration of relations with the Germans – and this will instantly compromise NATO, which is a Russian objective (just as the US is trying to wreck Russia and get regime change there).
7. Putin sees the Ukraine war mainly as an Anglo-Saxon war that has dragged along the other Europeans. Settling the war on his terms would be a massive triumph for Putin who is nearing the end of his career.
8. Putin wants very much to keep the confidence of the Russian army. This is critical to the war effort. The Russian army is improving significantly and is re-energized, but it also could be dangerous. Ending the Ukraine war will slow down ambitions within the military.
9. Settling the war would significantly improve Russia’s finances mainly from exports and the import of Western technology and manufacturing. Russia needs access to western technology, especially with the emergence of nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other exotic capabilities.
10. Russia, watching China, can’t be too sure that China is stable or that the US might not be drawn into a conflict with a China that is floundering economically and socially. Putin needs to hedge his bets, and settling the Ukraine war would help him do that.
In short, I think there are major advantages for Putin to negotiate a deal now. However, he does not control the situation. It is clear that Zelensky and Biden have to want to make a deal. Zelensky is in a trap of his own making. Whether he can crawl out and find his voice, remains to be seen.
Stephen Bryen is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. This article was originally published on his Substack, Weapons and Strategy. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.