If Iran gets the bomb, expect Saudi Arabia to acquire one next. That’s at least what Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman insinuated in a late September interview when asked what Riyadh would do if Iran declared it has developed a nuclear weapon.
“We will have to get one,” the prince quipped when queried on how his kingdom would respond.
This month, Breaking Defense reported that Saudi Arabia is pushing for nuclear power assistance as part of a US-brokered pact with Israel, a wish that if delivered could spark a Middle East nuclear arms race.
Breaking Defense notes that Saudi Arabia is seeking US support to jumpstart a domestic nuclear program with the same capabilities granted by the West to Iran under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The report mentions that Saudi Arabia wants US support to enrich uranium with the option to develop a nuclear weapon later. It also says that the Biden administration wants to get the Israel-Saudi deal done to give the president a foreign policy win heading into the 2024 elections.
If the US and Saudi Arabia disagree on nuclear limits and security commitments, Riyadh may turn instead to China and Russia for help building the capabilities needed to restore the balance of power with Iran.
The Biden administration has been negotiating a new nuclear deal with Iran to replace the one signed in 2015, which former US president Donald Trump scrapped in 2018.
Such US flip-flopping may have led Saudi Arabia to doubt its American security guarantees, causing it to take nuclear matters into its own hands, including by seeking out alternative partners.
It was not the first time bin Salman had made such a provocative statement. In a March 2018 interview for CBS, bin Salman said, “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”
Saudi Arabia has long been perturbed by its longtime arch-rival Iran’s nuclear program. In a March 2022 article in the peer-reviewed Research Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Somayeh Sadat Moosavian and other writers mention that Saudi Arabia actively opposed Iran’s nuclear activities during Iran’s Ahmadinejad administration.
However, Moosavian and others note that despite progress achieved by the succeeding Rouhani administration in international talks on Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia shifted its position to a balance of threat and military coalition.
Furthermore, Al Jazeera reported in August 2020 that Saudi Arabia has built a uranium yellowcake processing plant in a remote desert location near Al Ula with China’s aid, raising concerns about the kingdom’s nuclear program and potential nuclear weapons development.
Al Jazeera says that the Saudi Energy Ministry denied the facility was built but acknowledged contracting with Chinese entities for uranium exploration within Saudi Arabia, having signed an agreement in 2012 to cooperate on the peaceful development of nuclear energy.
The Al Jazeera report notes that Saudi Arabia has constructed a research reactor and invited bids for building two civilian nuclear power reactors. Saudi Arabia said on Monday this week it has decided to end light-touch oversight of its nuclear activities by the UN’s atomic watchdog and would switch to full-blown safeguards, a change the agency has been demanding for years, Reuters reported.
Moreover, in a March 2023 Stimson article, Ludovica Castelli points out that Saudi Arabia’s vast energy reserves cast doubt on its intentions to pursue a nuclear energy program. Castelli also highlights Saudi officials’ statements that “all bets are off” if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, which aligns with bin Salman’s pronouncements.
In addition, Saudi Arabia also has an active ballistic missile program, which can act as a delivery system for nuclear weapons if needed.
In an August 2021 article for the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Mark Fitzpatrick notes that Saudi Arabia has relied on Chinese DF-3 missile imports since the late 1980s, with the country seeking indigenous production capability in recent years.
Fitzpatrick notes Saudi Arabia acquired more advanced DF-21 missiles from China in 2007, although Riyadh has never acknowledged the purchase. He also says that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) approved Saudi Arabia’s acquisition because they were modified not to carry nuclear warheads.
However, the inaccuracy of those missiles means that they are only suitable for large targets such as cities and would be ineffective with anything less than a nuclear warhead.
Asia Times reported in December 2021 that Saudi Arabia is reportedly building its ballistic missiles with China’s assistance, according to US intelligence. As seen in satellite images, Saudi Arabia has expanded the Al Watah missile base to include facilities for producing and testing rocket engines.
The talks between Saudi Arabia and China have progressed to a point where Riyadh is now looking to acquire crucial hardware required to produce ballistic missiles. Such moves, Fitzpatrick notes, contribute to Saudi Arabia’s ambiguous deterrent posture if Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Saudi Arabia’s ambiguous posture may cause Iran to accelerate its nuclear program. In a March 2023 Atlantic Council article, Kelsey Davenport mentions that Iran had enriched uranium up to 84% this February, just a few points below the 90% needed for nuclear weapons.
Davenport notes that since January 2021, Iran has been enriching uranium up to 60%, with that increase in enrichment potentially leading to a “breakout time” to produce weapons-grade uranium in less than a week, with Iran’s stockpiles of 60% and 20% enriched uranium providing enough material to produce four nuclear weapons in less than a month.
However, there are compelling counterarguments for why Saudi Arabia will not pursue nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.
In a Center for New American Security (CNAS) study, Colin Kahl and other writers note that Saudi Arabia’s embarking on a crash program to develop nuclear weapons would risk worsening its strategic situation by creating new threats to domestic and regional stability, damage critical ties with the US, incur huge reputational risks and possibly even invite international sanctions.
Kahl and others mention that Saudi Arabia will likely conclude that the US nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence guarantees are more effective and credible, given the US’s critical interests in Saudi Arabia and its overwhelming conventional and nuclear capabilities.
They also mention that in conjunction with US security guarantees, Saudi Arabia can take steps to strengthen its defenses against conventional or unconventional attacks from Iran while maintaining a nuclear hedging strategy that entails creating a civilian nuclear capability that could theoretically be weaponized while taking care to avoid international sanctions or rupturing ties with the US.