The US may send surface-to-air missiles (SAM) previously shipped to Taiwan to Ukraine to strengthen its faltering air defenses against Russia’s aerial onslaught and firm up prospects for Kiev’s stalling counteroffensive.
The Warzone reported this month that the US government plans to buy back recently retired HAWK missile systems from Taiwan, which the US would then transfer to Ukraine to bolster its war effort. The Warzone report says that US and Taiwanese authorities reached the agreement sometime last year.
The US has denied details of the potentially sensitive transaction, with a Pentagon spokesperson saying, “We will not discuss specific numbers related to production capacity or inventory, nor will we discuss the location or unit where Ukraine security assistance is drawn from… we will not discuss specific equipment before it is announced.”
Denials aside, The Warzone notes that, in November 2022, the US military allocated “funding to refurbish HAWK air defense missiles for inclusion in future Presidential Drawdown packages” as part of a larger aid package paid through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).
It notes that a “drawdown” means transferring material directly from US stocks, with the US Marine Corps being the last US military user. The report also notes that the US military said in February it would buy back two HAWK air defense firing units with USAI funds, without saying from where.
The Warzone says that Taiwan first acquired the HAWK in the 1960s and retired the last of the system in June 2023, with its Improved HAWK (I-HAWK) being the best maintained and most readily transferable to Ukraine.
It notes that the I-HAWK has Low-Altitude Simultaneous Hawk Engagement (LASHE) capability, allowing it to target multiple low-altitude threats simultaneously.
Ukraine’s air defenses have been battered by Russia’s successive missile and drone attacks, depleting Kiev’s critically limited missile stocks.
In an April 2023 article for Time Magazine, Sanya Mansoor notes that while Ukraine began the war with the largest SAM arsenal in Europe, excluding Russia, with the Soviet-era S-300 and Buk making up 89% of its air defenses, missiles for those systems are expected to have been depleted by mid-April or early May.
Mansoor notes that the Russian Air Force sustained heavy losses deep in Ukrainian territory at the start of the war, forcing Russia to use long-range cruise missiles that the S-300 and Buk have focused on intercepting.
However, Mansoor notes that if S-300 and Buk missile stocks run low, Russian aircraft will have more freedom to operate over the front lines, noting that Russia has a massive stockpile of bombs that must be delivered on aircraft flown above a target.
She asserts that Ukraine’s depleted SAM stockpiles could allow for the use of huge reserves of Russian bombs that could inflict quick damage.
With the possible depletion, or near depletion, of Ukraine’s SAM reserves, the Russian air force may start to play a more significant role in Ukraine war combat operations, with precision-guided munitions and attack helicopters taking out critical targets and key Ukrainian armor.
Adding to Ukraine’s air defense woes, Ian Williams notes in a June 2023 article for the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that Russia is not going to run out of missiles anytime soon, as it can reportedly manufacture 60 cruise missiles, five Iskander ballistic missiles and two Kinzhal hypersonic missiles per month.
Moreover, Asia Times reported in June 2023 that Russia and Iran plan to open a drone factory with a capacity of 6,000 drones in the coming years, with production scheduled to start in 2024.
Previously, Iran supplied its Shahed-136 loitering munitions to Russia via the Caspian Sea. Iran recently provided drone parts to Russia to speed up production in Russian factories using Iranian parts.
In an April 2023 Wavell Room article, Sergio Miller mentions that Ukrainian air defenses have no adequate response to Russian precision-guided munitions (PGMs) launched outside Ukraine’s territory.
Miller notes that Russia’s first recorded use of PGMs occurred between March 11-12 this year, in which ten Su-35S fighters launched as many as 11 glide bombs and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile hitting four settlements 10-15 kilometers away from the Russian border.
He says that Western-made air defense systems and missile storage sites were the possible targets of the attack, with the Russian jets operating comfortably outside the range of Ukraine’s air defenses.
In addition, Asia Times reported in June 2023 that Russia’s attack helicopter fleet, battered during the opening days of the Ukraine war, now uses new technology and tactics to blunt Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive by destroying tanks and other armored vehicles.
In one such incident, a Russian Ka-52 helicopter with Vitebsk-25 countermeasures evaded 18 missiles while on a combat mission in Ukraine, jamming the missiles, completing its mission and returning to base unharmed, according to reports.
Russia has also been deploying its Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters in hunter-killer teams, with their countermeasure suites complementing each other.
While the Ka-52 has countermeasures against infrared (IR) guided missiles, the Mi-28 has countermeasures against radar-guided missiles. Pairing the two models thus provides an all-around defense against both types of missiles.
While Ukraine has received top-of-the-line air defense systems such as the Iris-T from Germany and NASAMS from the US, the deliveries have been piecemeal while some units have reportedly been destroyed in combat.
On top of depleted SAM stocks, cranked-up Russian missile and drone production, improved Russian attack helicopter tactics and slow deliveries of Western air defense systems, the Russian Air Force still has plenty of combat power relative to the Russian Army.
In an Insider article this month, Christopher Woody mentions that, after 16 months of fighting, the Russian Air Force still has nearly all its combat aircraft, with Russia possessing 100 combat aircraft for every 15 held by Ukraine.
Woody says Russia could more readily exploit its air power advantage if Ukraine’s air defense network starts to falter. Still, he notes that Russia may have lost its small cadre of skilled pilots after more than a year of attrition warfare and Western sanctions may limit its ability to build and repair fighter jets.
But even if ex-Taiwanese and other Western air defense systems arrive in timely fashion in Ukraine, Russia has shown that it is willing to burn through manpower and materiel despite the staggeringly high costs to its big and powerful air force.