On December 26, five North Korean drones penetrated South Korean airspace, with one or more flying around the northern part of the South Korean capital, Seoul. Despite the fact that the South Korean air force scrambled jets and helicopters and reportedly chased the invaders, not one was shot down.
If the information available is correct, the scramble drill by the South Korean air force went on for five hours. But known North Korean drones do not have the range or the endurance to stay in the air for much more than an hour, and they could easily outrun their ground-based controllers. Drone crashes in 2013 and 2017 attest to that.
These, then, were different. But how different?
In the 1990s, North Korea began working on a drone arsenal that included surveillance and attack models from Russia, China and, oddly, the United States. The US drone was not a gift, of course. It likely came to North Korea from Syria. But while it had some useful features, 30 years later it is obsolete and of little value.
China provided some commercial drones that North Korea used to collect intelligence on South Korea. The drones were not very good, however, and at least two of them crashed over South Korean territory.
These days the Chinese have to be very careful about supplying drones to countries that are under sanction, including North Korea. While they might smuggle some components to the regime, the economic and political consequences of being caught are ones that China’s leaders are keen to avoid.
Russia seems an unlikely supplier. So where is North Korea getting drones these days? Iran? Perhaps.
North Korea has a long military and strategic relationship with Iran. Pyongyang has provided missile technology and there is reason to believe it continues to be involved in Iran’s nuclear weapons programs.
On September 6, 2007, Israeli air force F-15s and F-16s, supported by special Elint aircraft, destroyed a North Korean-Iranian-Syrian nuclear complex at al-Kibar in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate in Syria. The reactor, which could process plutonium, was based on North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor.
The Ryongchon train explosion in 2004 that killed a dozen or more Syrian technicians may also have been linked to the reactor project.
The link there is clear, and Iran was in a position to supply North Korea having amply demonstrated its drones in action with proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, Gaza and Yemen, as well as having supplied them to Russia for the Ukraine war.
Iranian drones offer North Korea the same benefits they offer Russia. There are kamikaze drones, including the Shahed-136, and combined surveillance-attack drones similar to Mohajer-6. There are a number of other drones and variants in Iran’s arsenal.
There is no direct proof that North Korea is fielding Iranian drones. However, the Shahed-136 has sufficient range (1,800 to 2,500 kilometers) and endurance (6 to 8 hours) while an unclassified report says that there is a reconnaissance version of the Shahed-136.
As a kamikaze drone, it can be programmed to operate autonomously, relying on the Russian GLONASS GPS or on the US GPS system. It may also be capable of using China’s BeiDou GPS.
If operating as a reconnaissance system, it would either store imagery and other data onboard, or transmit data back to its ground controller. The Shahed-136 has a radio range of around 150 kilometers. It is made of plastic and therefore hard to detect on radar.
Judging from reports about the drone incursions into South Korea, it appears the unmanned aerial vehicles were given different waypoints from which they were possibly collecting data and photos. Given the difficulty the South Korean air force had in tracking them, it also seems that the flight paths were changed in flight.
South Korea is now searching for ways to counter North Korea’s new drone threat. Not only is this important for its own security, but it has implications for American bases and strategic assets in South Korea.
There is reported interest by South Korea’s military in Sky Spotter, a sophisticated electro-optical system manufactured by Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.
Sky Spotter is a passive detection system that cannot be jammed. Apparently, it can detect low radar cross-section targets, meaning it could pick up stealth-like drones made of plastics or composites.
Sky Spotter is also able to distinguish targets using built-in artificial intelligence so that it is not fooled by birds, a problem that the South Korean air force encountered.
But finding intruders is not sufficient. Beyond Sky Spotter, South Korea will need effective kill systems, which could include air defense missiles and guns, radars, lasers, jammers and more.
All the parts have to be integrated to optimize responses to future incidents over South Korean airspace. Using fighter aircraft to chase drones is wasteful, expensive and mostly ineffective.
If it turns out that North Korea is relying on Iranian drones, then US sanctions on Iran’s drone makers recently announced by the Biden administration, and effective control of drone technology exports, could impact not only Iran and Russia but also North Korea.
Stephen Bryen is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. Follow him on Twitter @stevebryen.
Shoshana Bryen is senior director of The Jewish Policy Center and Editor of inFOCUS Quarterly. She has more than 30 years experience as an analyst of US defense policy and Middle East affairs, and has run programs and conferences with American military personnel in a variety of countries.