Chinese leader Xi Jinping arrived in Saudi Arabia last month to preside over three summit meetings with the host country, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the heads of 21 of the 22 Arab League members (Syria was absent). During the visit, memoranda of understanding totaling US$50 billion were signed with the host kingdom, along with plans for increased Sino-Arab cooperation in a wide range of strategic sectors.
What was meant to be a celebration of Chinese multilateralism and engagement in the Middle East in the face of rising tensions between the US and its Arab Gulf partners was marred by an unusual episode involving China and Iran.
China and the GCC jointly released a statement that was taken to be a direct criticism of Iran. The statement underscored the need to address its nuclear program, its involvement in destabilizing activities in the region, and its claims to disputed Persian Gulf islands. The Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a stern rebuke in response, summoning the Chinese envoy for clarification.
For years, Beijing has gone to great lengths to stay out of the Middle East’s complex political quagmires, touting cordial relations with all of the region’s feuding factions.
For instance, during his first trip to the region in 2016, Xi made sure to sign a Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and since then, China has held separate military drills with Iran and Saudi Arabia a few weeks apart in 2017 and 2019. Did China break the mold?
According to some analysts, China’s priorities have changed, and it no longer seeks to treat Iran and its Arab neighbors equally. Indeed, a cursory look at the numbers reveals categorically that at most, China’s relations with Iran is comparable to other regional countries. Trade and investment between China and Iran have stalled over the past decade, as Chinese banks and businesses have become wary of secondary sanctions.
The erroneously oft-cited $400 billion figure for Chinese investments in Iran under the terms of the 25-year Comprehensive Partnership Plan, which was signed in March 2021, remains unsubstantiated. The most striking example of Iran’s position in China’s pecking order is the fact that it only has a few thousand Chinese citizens, whereas the United Arab Emirates alone has 400,000 PRC nationals.
However, it would be premature to conclude that balanced diplomacy has been abandoned. Since the joint statement, China has made special efforts to allay Iran’s misgivings.
In the same month as Xi’s Saudi visit, China ceremoniously established its first consulate in the country, in Bandar Abbas; the Chinese deputy premier met with President Ebrahim Raisi; and China voted against Iran’s removal from the UN Women’s Commission.
Senior PRC Foreign Ministry officials praised the strategic relationship and clarified their commitment to Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in statements and interviews with Chinese and Persian media.
For good measure, they threw in the usual accusations against the US as the sole responsible party for the failure of the nuclear talks. At the same time, China lauded Iran’s “sincere efforts” and emphasized that the talks should not be linked to “other issues,” such as terrorism and extremism.
One more thing was left out of the overall analyses of the Saudi visit. The Chinese version of the joint statement differs slightly from the Arab one.
Unlike the GCC version, which called for “addressing the Iranian nuclear file and destabilizing regional activities, etc,” the Chinese version called for “addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, destabilizing regional activities,” and so on. The additional comma in the Chinese readout suggests that the Iranian nuclear program is simply one of several regional issues that must be resolved but does not hold Iran responsible for the subsequent litany.
Furthermore, despite the sanctions, China believes Tehran has enormous potential, which it intends to harness in due course.
With 85 million highly educated citizens and a strategic location on the Persian Gulf at the crossroads of the Arab, Turkish, Russian and Indian dominions, this country is an ideal candidate for Belt and Road construction projects and investments. And while China is the world’s largest energy consumer, Iran has some of the world’s largest proven oil and gas reserves.
Although the ostensibly secular Communist party-state surely finds Iran’s Islamic fundamentalism unsavory, it is a potent regional force in the struggle against American hegemony.
It shares a millennia-long history with China as a proud ancient civilization-nation, and nowadays, both hold an authoritarian approach to governance. Since the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, it has become clearer that Iranian elite wish to to “look East.”
The joint statement from China and the GCC, as well as the fanfare surrounding Xi’s trip to Saudi Arabia, therefore, do not necessarily portend a change in policy. At their most extreme, they represent ways to engage in what Wu Bingbing of Peking University terms “positive balancing” to nudge the bilateral relationship in China’s favor.
According to Wu, the essence of China’s balanced diplomacy remains “first, not taking sides,” and “second, not making enemies.” The “positive” aspect of the balance implies that by pursuing positive cooperation with one camp, the opposing camp becomes the odd man out, incentivizing it to “match and raise” its bets on China. It has been suggested that such positive incentives toward Iran made China critical to the success of the JCPOA in 2015.
Wu and other Chinese Middle East scholars have noted that while China signed the 25-year agreement with Iran, it did not pursue a similar agreement with the Arab Gulf countries. This has driven Arab countries to institutionalize their cooperation with China, such as Qatar, which had signed a massive 27-year deal to supply China with natural gas just before Xi’s visit.
The notion that China is displeased with Iran’s active participation in Russia’s war in Ukraine because of its supply of drones and missiles, as some have suggested, is puzzling. Xi Jinping is a man who can look Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin straight in the eye and say un-ironically that “China stands ready to join hands with Russia and all other progressive forces around the world” to “uphold international fairness and justice.”
The only explanation for Beijing’s potential dissatisfaction is that these actions made a return to the JCPOA even less likely, but that’s immaterial. China’s strategic apathy toward Russia is comparable to its indifference for Iran, which exports terrorism, armaments and extremism throughout the region, as it blackmails the international community with nuclear saber-rattling.
Worse, China has been providing an economic lifeline to the Ayatollahs’ regime. Since US President Joe Biden took office, China has purchased no less than $47 billion worth of oil from Iran, in both overt and covert resistance to the US-led sanctions regime. Speak nothing of the techno-authoritarian tools it supplies Tehran to oppress its captive population, its outright support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the laundering of its money.
To conclude, by continuing its strategic partnership with Iran, China is putting itself in position for several scenarios. First off, it dangles economic carrots in the form of maximizing economic potential with Iran’s rivals, as if telling it “this could be us.” Additionally, it hopes that by playing the good cop, Chinese banks and businesses will be welcomed in once (or if) the sanctions are lifted.
On the other hand, Beijing needs to keep rogue regimes afloat lest they collapse and spark a regional catastrophe with far more dire consequences for China’s growing interests in the Middle East. In the worst-case scenario, a regime change in Tehran could result in the formation of a liberal administration, which Washington could then use in its “crusade” against the party-state.
Any views expressed in this article, as well as any errors, are solely those of the author.