NEW YORK – China joined Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members in a joint December 9 statement that qualified Iran as a supporter of regional terrorist organizations.
The statement called on participants “to address the Iranian nuclear file and destabilizing regional activities, address support for terrorist and sectarian groups and illegal armed organizations, prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles and drones, ensure the safety of international navigation and oil installations, and adhere to UN resolutions and international legitimacy,” according to a summary published by MEMRI.
The GCC-China and Arab-China summit closing statement also declared “that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory, rejecting Taiwan’s ‘independence’ in all its forms, and supporting the Chinese position in the Hong Kong file and supporting the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to maintain national security and develop and perfect democracy in Hong Kong within the framework of one country, two systems.”
China, in turn, supported the UAE’s claim to three islands held by Iran but claimed by the UAE. According to Iran’s Ana News Agency, “Nasser Kanani, the spokesperson of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that strong displeasure was expressed regarding the statement of China and Saudi Arabia about Iran’s three islands. The Chinese ambassador also said that we respect Iran’s territorial integrity and that our president’s visit to Riyadh was to help peace and stability in the region.”
Contrary to some Western media reports, there hasn’t been “a change of direction in China’s policies toward the region, especially in the wake of a reduced US presence there,” as Nikkei’s Tala Taslimi wrote on December 13.
Almost a decade ago, I wrote of “A Pax Sinica in the Middle East,” concluding: “Without attributing any geopolitical intention to Beijing, the visible facts make clear that China has the capacity to exercise strategic influence in the Middle East, and it has an unambiguous interest in maintaining stability.”
Last week’s joint statement with the GCC does not denote the arrival of China as the new great power in the region—far from it. But it does make clear that China cannot act as a global economic power without exercising strategic influence.
Chinese officials insist that nothing has changed. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said December 12, “The GCC countries and Iran are all China’s friends, and neither China-GCC relations nor China-Iran relations are targeted at any third party. China supports the GCC countries in improving relations with Iran based on the principle of good-neighborly friendship, conducting win-win cooperation with Iran, and jointly promoting development and stability in the Persian Gulf. China is willing to continue to play a constructive role in this regard.”
China may not have changed, but the world has, and China is adapting in its own reluctant, recondite fashion. After America’s disorderly withdrawal from Afghanistan and the emergence of a jihadist regime in Kabul, China cannot ignore the threats to its oil supply from the Persian Gulf, and the risks to its Belt and Road Initiative.
As the largest foreign investor in Ukraine, the first nation to sign on to the Belt and Road Initiative, China views the Ukraine war as a failure of Russian policy as much as a result of Western arrogance. The prospect of a Russian-Iranian rapprochement that might give Tehran access to more sophisticated weapons, including nuclear technology, does not sit well in Beijing.
In November, President Xi Jinping used the opportunity of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing to warn Putin not to use nuclear weapons. Two months earlier, Xi warned Putin against interference in Kazakhstan.
In 2014, then-president Barack Obama complained that China was a “free rider” in the Persian Gulf, allowing the United States to bear the cost of a blue-water fleet that protected its oil supplies. The charge was fair: Although China has dramatically increased its military spending, it has only one small base in the region, at Djibouti, and deploys forward only 200 marines, according to the Pentagon’s latest assessment of Chinese military capacity.
It has only about 14,000 special forces soldiers, compared to America’s 75,000, and only 40,000 marines, while America has over 200,000 including reserves. Its expeditionary capacity is small, sufficient to conduct rescue operations for Chinese citizens, but not to intervene as America has. Although China is building a blue-water navy, it has eschewed past invitations to patrol the Persian Gulf.
In 2015, I attended a private seminar in Beijing organized by the Israeli foundation SIGNAL (Sino-Israel Government Network and Academic Leadership). A Chinese strategist detailed China’s weapons sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially intermediate-range missiles, the most devastating weapon available to both sides. Iran bought more missiles, but Saudi Arabia had access to more advanced ones, the Chinese analyst explained, as China did its best to maintain the balance of power.
A great deal has changed since then. Iran’s obstreperous self-isolation has shut off its access to world oil markets, and its purchases from China have fallen from US$1.5 billion a month in 2016 to only $500 million in 2022. Saudi Arabia’s imports from China, by contrast, have risen from about the same level of $1.5 billion a month n 2016 to $3.5 billion a month today.
While China’s economic relations with Iran have atrophied, its ties to Turkey—Iran’s long-term rival for influence in Central Asia—have strengthened. China’s exports to Turkey jumped to $3.5 billion a month in October, from just $1.5 billion before the Covid epidemic.
Turkey, meanwhile, has nearly tripled its exports to Russia. Although China carefully avoids overt infringement of US sanctions against Russia, its economic backing for Turkey indirectly supports Russia’s economy.
China’s soft-power success in the region extends to Israel, whose imports from China nearly doubled since the Covid epidemic – at least according to Chinese official statistics.
For various reasons, Israel’s relations with Turkey have improved markedly, with the posting of a Turkish ambassador to Jerusalem in October for the first time in four years. Turkey had withdrawn its envoy when the Trump administration recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.
Turkey earlier patched up relations with the United Arab Emirates—which Turkish President Erdogan blamed for the 2016 coup attempt against his government. The UAE is a major investor in Turkey, alongside China. And China’s telecom giant Huawei is building broadband systems for both the UAE and Turkey. Turkey’s stock market doubled in value in US dollar terms during 2022, the best performance of any major stock market in the world.
This isn’t a Pax Sinica in the sense of a 19th-century Pax Britannica or a 20th-century Pax Americana, supported by a “far-flung battle line” that wields “dominion over palm and pine.” American strategists imagine that China wants to project power globally because they think that China is as stupid as they are.
As noted, China’s forward military deployment consists of a couple of hundred marines cooling their heels in Djibouti. Nonetheless, China’s soft power is reshaping the Middle East, and Beijing is loath to let spoiler regimes like Tehran ruin everyone else’s good time. Its diplomacy is cautious, reticent and unimaginative—but fully alert to threats to its long-term interests.