There once lived an odd little man – 175 centimeters tall and barely 65 kilograms sopping wet – who rocked the US lecture circuit and the nation itself. For all but a few activist insiders and scholars, US Marine Corps Major-General Smedley Darlington Butler is now lost to history. Yet more than a century ago, this strange contradiction of a man would become a national war hero, celebrated in pulp adventure novels, and then, 30 years later, as one of America’s most prominent anti-war and anti-imperialist dissidents.

Raised in West Chester, Pennsylvania, and educated in Quaker (pacifist) schools, the son of an influential congressman, he would end up serving in nearly all of America’s “Banana Wars” from 1898 to 1931. Wounded in combat and a rare recipient of two Congressional Medals of Honor, he would retire as the youngest, most decorated major-general in the USMC.

A teenage officer and a certified hero during an international intervention in the Chinese Boxer Rebellion of 1900, he would later become a constabulary leader of the Haitian gendarme, the police chief of Philadelphia (while on an approved absence from the military), and a proponent of Marine Corps football.

In more standard fashion, he would serve in battle as well as in what might today be labeled peacekeepingcounterinsurgency, and advise-and-assist missions in Cuba, China, the Philippines, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, France and China (again).

While he showed early signs of skepticism about some of those imperial campaigns or, as they were sardonically called by critics at the time, “Dollar Diplomacy” operations – that is, military campaigns waged on behalf of US corporate business interests – until he retired he remained the prototypical loyal marine.

But after retirement, Smedley Butler changed his tune. He began to blast the imperialist foreign policy and interventionist bullying in which he had only recently played such a prominent part. Eventually, in 1935 during the Great Depression, in what became a classic passage in his memoir, which he titled War Is a Racket, he wrote: “I spent thirty-three years and four months in active military service…. And during that period, I spent most of my time being a high class muscle-man for Big Business, for Wall Street, and for the Bankers.”

Seemingly overnight, the famous war hero transformed himself into an equally acclaimed anti-war speaker and activist in a politically turbulent era. Those were, admittedly, uncommonly anti-interventionist years, in which veterans and politicians alike promoted what (for America, at least) had been fringe ideas. This was, after all, the height of what later pro-war interventionists would pejoratively label American “isolationism.”

Nonetheless, Butler was unique (for that moment and certainly for our own) in his unapologetic amenability to left-wing domestic politics and materialist critiques of American militarism. In the last years of his life, he would face increasing criticism from his former admirer, president Franklin D Roosevelt, the military establishment, and the interventionist press.

This was particularly true after Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany invaded Poland and later France. Given the severity of the Nazi threat to mankind, hindsight undoubtedly proved Butler’s virulent opposition to US intervention in World War II wrong.

Nevertheless, the long-term erasure of his decade of anti-war and anti-imperialist activism and the assumption that all his assertions were irrelevant has proved historically deeply misguided. In the wake of America’s brief but bloody entry into the First World War, the skepticism of Butler (and a significant part of an entire generation of veterans) about intervention in a new European bloodbath should have been understandable.

Above all, however, his critique of American militarism of an earlier imperial era in the Pacific and in Latin America remains prescient and all too timely today, especially coming as it did from one of the most decorated and high-ranking general officers of his time. (In the era of the never-ending “war on terror,” such a phenomenon is quite literally inconceivable.)

Smedley Butler’s Marine Corps and the US military of his day was, in certain ways, a different sort of organization than today’s highly professionalized armed forces. History rarely repeats itself, not in a literal sense anyway.

Still, there are some disturbing similarities between the careers of Butler and today’s generation of forever-war fighters. All of them served repeated tours of duty in (mostly) unsanctioned wars around the world. Butler’s conflicts may have stretched west from Haiti across the oceans to China, whereas today’s generals mostly lead missions from West Africa east to Central Asia, but both sets of conflicts seemed perpetual in their day and were motivated by barely concealed economic and imperial interests.

Nonetheless, whereas America’s imperial campaigns of the first third of the 20th century generated a Smedley Butler, the hyper-interventionism of the first decades of this century hasn’t produced a single even faintly comparable figure. Not one. Zero. Zilch. Why that is matters and illustrates much about the US military establishment and contemporary national culture, none of it particularly encouraging.

Why no anti-war generals

When Smedley Butler retired in 1931, he was one of three USMC major-generals holding a rank just below that of only the Marine Corps commandant and the army chief of staff. Today, with about 900 generals and admirals currently serving on active duty, including 24 major-generals in the USMC alone, and with scores of flag officers retiring annually, not a single one has offered genuine public opposition to almost 19 years’ worth of ill-advised, remarkably unsuccessful American wars.

As for the most senior officers, the 40 four-star generals and admirals whose vocal anti-militarism might make the biggest splash, there are more of them today than there were even at the height of the Vietnam War, although the active military is now about half the size it was then. Adulated as many of them may be, however, not one qualifies as a public critic of today’s failing wars.

Instead, the principal patriotic dissent against those terror wars has come from retired colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and occasionally more junior officers (like me), as well as enlisted service members. Not that there are many of us to speak of, either. I consider it disturbing (and so should you) that I personally know just about every one of the retired military figures who has spoken out against America’s forever wars.

The big three are ex-secretary of state Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, retired Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson; Vietnam veteran and onetime US Military Academy history instructor, retired Colonel Andrew Bacevich; and Iraq veteran and Afghan War  whistleblower, retired Lieutenant-Colonel Danny Davis. All three have proved to be genuine public servants, poignant voices, and – on some level – cherished personal mentors.

For better or worse, however, none carry the potential clout of a retired senior theater commander or prominent four-star general offering the same critiques.

Something must account for veteran dissenters topping out at the level of colonel. Obviously, there are personal reasons individual officers chose early retirement or didn’t make general or admiral.

Still, the system for selecting flag officers should raise at least a few questions when it comes to the lack of anti-war voices among retired commanders. In fact, a selection committee of top generals and admirals is appointed each year to choose the next colonels to earn their first star. And perhaps you won’t be surprised to learn that, according to numerous reports, “the members of this board are inclined, if not explicitly motivated, to seek candidates in their own image – officers whose careers look like theirs.” At a minimal level, such a system is hardly built to foster free thinkers, no less breed potential dissidents.

Consider it an irony of sorts that this system first received criticism in our era of forever wars when General David Petraeus, then commanding the highly publicized “surge” in Iraq, had to leave that theater of war in 2007 to serve as the chairman of that selection committee. The reason: He wanted to ensure that a twice-passed-over colonel, a protégé of his – Donald Trump’s future national security adviser, H R McMaster – earned his star.

General David Petraeus testifies at a US Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the situation in Afghanistan in 2011. File Photo: Reuters

Mainstream national-security analysts reported on this affair at the time as if it were a major scandal, since most of them were convinced that Petraeus and his vaunted counterinsurgency or “COINdinista” protégés and their “new” war-fighting doctrine had the magic touch that would turn around the failing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, Petraeus tried to apply those very tactics twice – once in each country – as did acolytes of his later, and you know the results of that.

But here’s the point: It took an eleventh-hour intervention by America’s most acclaimed general of that moment to get new stars handed out to prominent colonels who had, until then, been stonewalled by Cold War-bred flag officers because they were promoting different (but also strangely familiar) tactics in the country’s wars. Imagine, then, how likely it would be for such a leadership system to produce genuine dissenters with stars of any serious sort, no less a crew of future Smedley Butlers.

At the roots of this system lay the obsession of the American officer corps with “professionalization” after the Vietnam War debacle. This first manifested itself in a decision to ditch the citizen-soldier tradition, end the draft, and create an “all-volunteer force.” The elimination of conscription, as predicted by critics at the time, created an ever-growing civil-military divide, even as it increased public apathy regarding America’s wars by erasing whatever “skin in the game” most citizens had.

More than just helping to squelch civilian anti-war activism, though, the professionalization of the military, and of the officer corps in particular, ensured that any future Smedley Butlers would be left in the dust (or in retirement at the level of lieutenant-colonel or colonel) by a system geared to producing faux warrior-monks.

Typical of such figures is current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Mark Milley. He may speak gruffly and look like a man with a head of his own, but typically he has turned out to be just another yes-man for another war-power-hungry president.

One group of generals, however, reportedly now does have it out for President Trump – but not because they’re opposed to endless war. Rather, they reportedly think that The Donald doesn’t “listen enough to military advice” on, you know, how to wage war forever and a day.

What would Smedley Butler think today?

In his years of retirement, Smedley Butler regularly focused on the economic component of America’s imperial war policies. He saw clearly that the conflicts he had fought in, the elections he had helped rig, the coups he had supported, and the constabularies he had formed and empowered in faraway lands had all served the interests of US corporate investors.

Though less overtly the case today, this remains a reality in America’s conflicts since September 11, 2001, even on occasion embarrassingly so (as when the Iraqi Ministry of Oil was in essence the only public building protected by American troops as looters tore apart the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, in the post-invasion chaos of April 2003). Mostly, however, such influence plays out far more subtly than that, both abroad and at home, where those wars help maintain the record profits of the top weapons makers of the military-industrial complex.

That beast, first identified by president Dwight D Eisenhower, is now on steroids as American commanders in retirement regularly move directly from the military on to the boards of the giant defense contractors, a reality that only contributes to the dearth of Butlers in the military retiree community.

For all the corruption of his time, the Pentagon didn’t yet exist and the path from the military to, say, United Fruit Company, Standard Oil, or other typical corporate giants of that moment had yet to be normalized for retiring generals and admirals. Imagine what Butler would have had to say about the modern phenomenon of the “revolving door” in Washington.

Of course, he served in a very different moment, one in which military funding and troop levels were still contested in Congress. As a longtime critic of capitalist excesses who wrote for leftist publications and supported the Socialist Party candidate in the 1936 presidential elections, Butler would have found today’s nearly trillion-dollar annual defense budgets beyond belief.

What the grizzled former marine long ago identified as a treacherous nexus between warfare and capital “in which the profits are reckoned in dollars and the losses in lives” seems to have reached its natural end point in the 31st century. Case in point: the record (and still rising) “defense” spending of the present moment, including – to please a president – the creation of a whole new military service aimed at the full-scale militarization of space.

Sadly enough, in the age of Trump, as numerous polls demonstrate, the US military is the only public institution Americans still truly trust. Under the circumstances, how useful it would be to have a high-ranking, highly decorated, charismatic retired general in the Butler mold galvanize an apathetic public around America’s forever wars. Unfortunately, the likelihood of that is practically nil, given the military system of our moment.

Of course, Butler didn’t exactly end his life triumphantly. In late May 1940, having lost 11kg because of illness and exhaustion – and demonized as a leftist, isolationist crank but still maintaining a whirlwind speaking schedule – he checked himself into the Philadelphia Navy Yard Hospital for a “rest.” He died there, probably of some sort of cancer, four weeks later.

Working himself to death in his 10-year retirement and second career as a born-again anti-war activist, however, might just have constituted the very best service that the two-time Medal of Honor winner could have given the nation he loved to the very end.

Someone of his credibility, character, and candor is needed more than ever today. Unfortunately, this military generation is unlikely to produce such a figure. In retirement, Butler himself boldly confessed that, “like all the members of the military profession, I never had a thought of my own until I left the service. My mental faculties remained in suspended animation while I obeyed the orders of higher-ups. This is typical….”

Today, American generals don’t seem to have a thought of their own even in retirement. And more’s the pity.

This article appeared previously at TomDispatch. Read the original here.

Copyright 2020 Danny Sjursen

Danny Sjursen is a retired US Army major and former history instructor at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York. He served tours with reconnaissance units in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has written Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge.