(FILES) In this file photo taken on March 05, 2017 A convoy of US forces armoured vehicles drives near the village of Yalanli, on the western outskirts of the northern Syrian city of Manbij. - The United States is preparing to withdraw its troops from Syria, US media reported on December 19, 2018, a major move that throws into question America's role in the region. (Photo by DELIL SOULEIMAN / AFP)

When US President Donald Trump declared last month that American forces in Syria would return home immediately, Turkey was one of the few countries to cheer. Some in Ankara even declared “victory.” After all, America’s main partners on the ground against ISIS have been Kurdish forces that Turkey considers terrorists linked to the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK).

With the US out of northeastern Syria, Kurdish forces there will no longer be able to rely on an American deterrent against a Turkish invasion. The Turkish military, which already has a significant military presence in northwestern Syria, saw that the only obstacle for the same in the northeast was soon to be cleared.

But what a difference a month can make. Now, instead of an easy path to domination in the entirety of northern Syria, Turkey faces the prospect of the Kurds digging in. So, what changed?

First, there has been, of course, confusion over the troop withdrawal. Some military equipment appears to have been removed from Syria last week, but when will US personnel follow? Or, are we to believe national security adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who have reassured regional allies that a pullout only will happen once ISIS is decisively vanquished and the Kurds’ safety assured? In other words, contrary to Trump’s assertion, not so soon.

Unsurprisingly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was not impressed. Speaking to members of his party, he said, “It’s not possible for me to swallow this. We have reached an agreement with President Trump.”

But that is not the only thing that will have left him irate. In addition to disappointment with Washington, there are two other developments that are fueling new Turkish concerns about the Kurds in Syria.

The first is growing diplomatic and military contacts between Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s regional rivals, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Israel. Last October, Saudi Arabia provided US$100 million for stabilization projects in the territories that were held by ISIS but are now under Kurdish control. Now, these countries also seem interested in contributing militarily to help the Syrian Kurds.

Recently, reports of coordination meetings between the Kurds and intelligence officials from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Israel have been circulating in the Turkish media.

As long as Ankara continues its support for the Muslim Brotherhood – an organization Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE consider a terrorist group – helping the Kurds will be an effective countermeasure

The logic of Turkey’s rivals is simple. As long as Ankara continues its support for the Muslim Brotherhood – an organization Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE consider a terrorist group – helping the Kurds will be an effective countermeasure. The same applies to Israel’s frustration with Erdogan over his support for Hamas.

The other development that has arisen to irk Ankara is Russia’s increasingly good relations with the Kurds. Moscow never declared the PKK a terrorist organization and is open to discussion about Kurdish autonomy in Syria.

As a result, the Kurds have submitted a proposal to Moscow that would allow the Syrian government to restore its overall sovereignty over the vast area of Syria taken over by the Kurds since 2012. In return, the Kurds want Damascus to grant them a degree of autonomy, allowing them to continue their experiment in self-governance.

Ankara would, without any doubt, object to any form of Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. Thus it should come as no surprise if we soon see channels of communication open up between Ankara and the Bashar al-Assad regime, aimed at negotiating over the Kurdish situation in northern Syria, as well as the fate of the rebel enclave in Idlib under Turkish protection.

Erdogan is a proud man who rarely admits failure. He is still reluctant to recognize officially that the Syrian civil war failed to dethrone Assad and that Ankara has to engage him. But make no mistake, he would much prefer a centralized and autocratic Syria than a Syria where Kurds enjoy autonomy near the Turkish border. Ankara will have to come to terms with reality very soon and accept that Assad is here to stay.

Once again, Russia will be in a winning position. Moscow wants normalization between Damascus and Ankara. President Vladimir Putin, as the only leader talking to all the players involved in the Syrian conflict, is best placed to mediate between Erdogan and Assad. Increasingly irritated by Washington, Erdogan is scheduled to visit Moscow this month, probably to start the reconciliation process with Damascus.

Whatever it was that Trump sought to achieve with his December announcement, who can possibly tell except him? But it is fair to say that his key aides understand the ramifications and have been scrambling to repair the possible damage.

What they can’t do, however, is change the direction of travel in the relationship between an ally and a foe, as Erdogan is increasingly pulled into the Russian orbit. Moscow’s long-term strategic goal is to weaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Trump’s latest move in Syria is pushing the weakest link of the trans-Atlantic alliance further from Washington.

This article was provided to Asia times by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.

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