The snowed-over Khunjerab Pass, at 4,934 meters, stands eerily silent on a freezing late autumn morning.
On the Pakistani side, a wooden house serves as a small customs office fronted by “the highest ATM in the world” – though you try a foreign credit card at your peril. The Chinese side boasts an intimidating, metal-plated James Bond-esque structure with no humans in sight.
This is ground zero of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the point where the revamped, upgraded Karakoram Highway – “the eighth wonder of the world” – snakes away from China’s Xinjiang all the way to Pakistan’s Northern Areas and further south to Islamabad and Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea.
From here it’s 420 kilometers to Kashgar and a hefty 1,890 km to Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. But going south is where the fun really begins.
Traveling the Karakoram from Gilgit, the capital of the Northern Areas, to the Khunjerab and back is an exhilarating road trip along CPEC and its spin-offs. And it’s a crazy carousel.
Psychedelic Pakistani trucks, Chinese container road warriors – some trying to subdue the Khunjerab without chains on their tires – packed minivans plying the Hunza-Xinjiang route, Silk Road motels, the smell of curry interfacing with the best apricot juice in the world, roadside butchers, shacks advertising themselves as “Silk Road Investment & Credit Society Ltd,” many a Pak China Gateway Hotel, checkpoints consisting of a roadside table and a bunch of papers kept from flying away by pebbles, stashes of yuan crisscrossing rupees and dollars and messy, multi-level “people to people exchanges.”
It’s one of the greatest road trips on earth. And in geopolitical terms, it may be the greatest.
Mind the yaks
Karakoram North starts at the environmentally protected Khunjerab National Park, where yaks roam freely on the road and ibex and marmots are easily spotted nearby. But there are no Marco Polo sheep, much less snow leopards. (Though local Ismailis insist a few dozen reside in the park.)
The first serious pit-stop in the Karakoram is Sost, which used to be the Pakistani border in the old days – as when I traveled the road, twice, 20 years ago by jeep from Kashgar. Now, the bustling trade entrepot is the HQ of the Silk Road Dry Port Sost. Chinese lorries unload their cargo and Pakistani trucks take up the relay to transport the merchandise all across the nation. It appears modern and well-organized. Everything proceeds smoothly.
Snaking south, we pass right under the spectacularly receding Passu Glacier. In a nearby village, a funeral is in progress, with the crowd taking over the road alongside yaks and buffalos and interrupting traffic at will.
The upgraded Karakoram is an apotheosis of Pak-China Friendship Tunnels – all exhibiting the obligatory commemorative billboard extolling a geopolitical friendship soaring “higher than the highest mountain.”
This is CPEC in effect. It is astonishing when compared to the recent past. Between the Hunza and Gilgit rivers flowing parallel to impeccable asphalt worthy of an autobahn, a fiber optic cable runs all across the Northern Areas.
Chinese engineering has performed miracles. Around 160km south of the Khunjerab we drive around Attabad Lake, which totally submerged the road after a landslide in January 2010. For over five years there was simply no China-Pakistan overland trade, although some went via Kashgar-Gilgit flights. The solution by the China Road and Bridge Corporation had to be a tunnel – completed in 2015.
Trade along the Karakoram is bound to pick up – after years at less than 10% of total China-Pak trade, which tends to flow especially from Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces, not Xinjiang. Some stretches of the highway remain prone to constant landslides, rockslides or floods, which require a number of 24/7 rescue and maintenance teams. These are Pakistani, while the SUVs of the police in the Northern Areas have been supplied by China.
The heart of the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects are road and railway lines. These do not cost a fortune per se; the expense is in the construction costs for bridges and tunnels. Russia spent over $4 billion on its Kerch Strait bridge to the Crimea. New Silk Road costs will be exponentially higher. Tunnels can be way more expensive than bridges.
Where the Himalayas rise
From the Karakoram it’s sometimes possible to catch a glimpse of the formidable Nanga Parbat – Kashmiri for “Naked Mountain,” later nicknamed the “Killer Mountain.” It has never been climbed in winter, and is actually a series of ridges which anchors the western Himalaya range, culminating in an ice crest at 8,126 meters above sea level. That is the ninth highest peak in the world and the second in Pakistan after K2.
As we approach Gilgit, the road signs – in English, Mandarin and Russian – say 468 km to Abbottabad (site of the Osama bin Laden endgame) and 583 km to Islamabad. Way down south, in less mountainous terrain, I’m told the odd rockslide gives way to occasional floods.
South of Gilgit, the Chinese once again are in frantic building mode, attacking the road starting from the Karakoram to the strategic Mecca Skardu. The road, according to local Ismailis, should be ready before 2020.
And then, on a bend of the revamped highway, the intersection of the Karakoram, the Hindu Kush and the Himalayan mountain ranges – bordering the confluence of the Gilgit River with the Indus, now flowing south all the way to the Arabian Sea – spreads before us. Nearly 85% of the Indus discharge happens between May and September, out of snow and glacial melt, propelling the monsoons. Abdul, the painter of the Karakoram, is applying the finishing touches to a white-clad viewing point.
The China-Pak embrace
The building of the original Karakoram – an engineering tour de force – took no less than 27 years and claimed the lives of over 1,000 Chinese and Pakistani workers.
The Karakoram Highway is much more than a road; it’s a rolling, graphic emblem of the China-Pakistan geopolitical embrace, surmounting all manner of economic, cultural, geological and security barriers over decades to the benefit of a strategic objective. And the strategic objective now is CPEC as the flagship BRI project.
At the recent opening ceremony of the China International Import Expo in Shanghai, where he was guest of honor, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan described CPEC, including the Karakoram highway, as a “vital link” for China and Pakistan with the Middle East and Central Asia. “CPEC is a mechanism to connect China, the Middle East and Central Asia that also opens ways for fresh investment and paves the way for new markets,” he said.
Khan also reassured his hosts – as well as domestic public opinion – that his new government is engaged in deep, meaningful reforms to ensure transparency and accountability; virtual ghosts as far as Pakistani business is usually concerned.
“Pakistan has an array of resources, minerals and renewables amidst the most diverse landscape,” Khan said, adding that his country is a leading exporter of sports goods, medical instruments and IT products, and has promising, 100 million-strong human resources under the age of 35. So, the potential is immense.
Islamabad is all in on completing CPEC up to 2030, with projections of up to 3% added to annual GDP growth, as industrial output is bound to rise with more electricity courtesy of CPEC investments and more production coming from Chinese-style Special Economic Zones.
The big plan
CPEC’s Long-Term Plan (2017-2030), released one year ago, defines four priorities in Pakistan: Gwadar Port; energy projects; transport infrastructure (as in upgrading of the Karakoram); and industrial cooperation. Imran Khan’s government (see Part 1 of this report) is aiming for Pakistan to position itself, via CPEC, as the key hub uniting the overland Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road.
This implies, geopolitically and economically, an even stronger, trans-regional, China-Pakistan alliance in contraposition to India and Washington. The US reaction to BRI in 2018 was to unleash a whispering campaign to try to discredit it. Beijing, for its part, expects India and Pakistan to at least discuss their political differences inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
From now on, China’s far west and south – Xinjiang and Yunnan – have to become the top drivers of the Chinese economy. Upgrading their road, rail and energy infrastructure and closely linking them to South Asia and Southeast Asia is essential for China to keep growing – all that boosted by crucial energy connectivity via a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, an oil pipeline from the Caspian in Kazakhstan, further massive gas shipments from Siberia, and, further down the road, a possible gas pipeline from Gwadar port to Xinjiang parallel to the Karakoram.
Will it work? The Karakoram, Hindu Kush and Himalayas have seen it all come and all go over multiple millennia. So why not? The upgrading of the greatest geological and geopolitical road trip on earth is a start.
Too much honey coating of cpec project. Have a look around other projects undertaken by China in srilanka, Malaysia, Djibouti and in Kenya. Sri Lankans were promised state of the art Port, able to snatch half of the business from Singapore ports. Despite in better strategic location they managed to attract only Chinese fishing trawlers. As a result defaulted installment on their loan, lost that port for 99 years. To put that in perspective, srilanka’s economy is much stronger than Pakistan’s economy. Apparently that port was not deep enough for big ships. Thanks to Chinese engineers to assess it before project started. Djibouti, Kenya are under Chinese debt upto their nose and lost their ports to China. Malaysia cancelled all their projects with China, followed by Maldives. Let alone what what US says about Cpec there are numerous examples to draw some wisdom around the world.
Too much honey coating of cpec project. Have a look around other projects undertaken by China in srilanka, Malaysia, Djibouti and in Kenya. Sri Lankans were promised state of the art Port, able to snatch half of the business from Singapore ports. Despite in better strategic location they managed to attract only Chinese fishing trawlers. As a result defaulted installment on their loan, lost that port for 99 years. To put that in perspective, srilanka’s economy is much stronger than Pakistan’s economy. Apparently that port was not deep enough for big ships. Thanks to Chinese engineers to assess it before project started. Djibouti, Kenya are under Chinese debt upto their nose and lost their ports to China. Malaysia cancelled all their projects with China, followed by Maldives. Let alone what what US says about Cpec there are numerous examples to draw some wisdom around the world.
Comrade, everyone loves and trusts the Chinese. And of course the Chinese only want to bring the same freedom & prosperity to Pak as E Turkmenistan enjoys…..
Did you take your imaginary Turkish wife on this imaginary journey.
Comrade, everyone loves and trusts the Chinese. And of course the Chinese only want to bring the same freedom & prosperity to Pak as E Turkmenistan enjoys…..
Did you take your imaginary Turkish wife on this imaginary journey.
Admirably well written constructive comment. Congrats!
Admirably well written constructive comment. Congrats!
An excellent (long) article, really enjoyed reading it.
An excellent (long) article, really enjoyed reading it.
An accurate description of CPEC by Pepe. This is the version discussed at high levels in Pak and China, and released to the Media. However, the view from the circle Pepe moves in is in sharp contrast from the street view.
After incessant reading about the New Silk Road and BRI for the last 5 years, I decided to experience the first Belt (CPEC) myself
first hand. In October this year I joined a “caravan” of Pak traders and ordinary visitors did the route from Islamabad to Kashgar and back via road a la Marco Polo and Ibn Batuta.
The perilous journey was a fascinating experience. I went from Islamabad to OBL-infamous Abbotabad to Mansehra to Gilgit to Hunza to Sost in Pakistan and then onwards to Khunjerab to Tashkurgan to Kashgar in China. Here are some troubling facts that Pak and Chinese governments should take note.
1. The northern locals are totally unprepared for the incoming onslaught of Chinese products and people when the New Karakoram Highway completes in 2 years. There are not enough hotels, restaurants, warehouses, service centers, medical facilities for traders, travelers, and visitors.
2. The goods traffic is mostly one way – from China to Pakistan. For Pak goods into china there are serious non-tariff barriers, mostly procedural. The Paks have neither the equipment nor skills to meet Chinese legitimate requirements of edible product fumigation etc.
3. On both sides of the border there is antipathy towards the other side. Paks do not trust the Chinese who have developed a reputation of cheating and overcharging (of which I was myself a victim). The treatment of Pak traders at Chinese Custom and Immigration is rough, demeaning, and insulting. The Chinese have a dim view of Pakistani visitors. Furthermore, the Paks of all social and economic classes take a dim view of Chinese love of drinking alcohol, sexual mores, and godlessness.
4. It is very difficult for a Pak to get Chinese visitor or trader visa; takes upwards of 6 months and costs $2000 in agent fees). By contrast a 7 years visitor multiple visa on my Canadian PP took 3 days and cost around $100. It may be fair to add that residents of Gilgit Baltistan need no visa to go to Xinkiang.
Unless Pak and China governments pay immediate attention to these irritants that can be removed via education, the whole BRI/CPEC/New Silk Road experience may turn out to be an ugly one. Since Pak and China bureaucrats mostly travel by air they may not be aware of the reality on the ground.
An accurate description of CPEC by Pepe. This is the version discussed at high levels in Pak and China, and released to the Media. However, the view from the circle Pepe moves in is in sharp contrast from the street view.
After incessant reading about the New Silk Road and BRI for the last 5 years, I decided to experience the first Belt (CPEC) myself
first hand. In October this year I joined a “caravan” of Pak traders and ordinary visitors did the route from Islamabad to Kashgar and back via road a la Marco Polo and Ibn Batuta.
The perilous journey was a fascinating experience. I went from Islamabad to OBL-infamous Abbotabad to Mansehra to Gilgit to Hunza to Sost in Pakistan and then onwards to Khunjerab to Tashkurgan to Kashgar in China. Here are some troubling facts that Pak and Chinese governments should take note.
1. The northern locals are totally unprepared for the incoming onslaught of Chinese products and people when the New Karakoram Highway completes in 2 years. There are not enough hotels, restaurants, warehouses, service centers, medical facilities for traders, travelers, and visitors.
2. The goods traffic is mostly one way – from China to Pakistan. For Pak goods into china there are serious non-tariff barriers, mostly procedural. The Paks have neither the equipment nor skills to meet Chinese legitimate requirements of edible product fumigation etc.
3. On both sides of the border there is antipathy towards the other side. Paks do not trust the Chinese who have developed a reputation of cheating and overcharging (of which I was myself a victim). The treatment of Pak traders at Chinese Custom and Immigration is rough, demeaning, and insulting. The Chinese have a dim view of Pakistani visitors. Furthermore, the Paks of all social and economic classes take a dim view of Chinese love of drinking alcohol, sexual mores, and godlessness.
4. It is very difficult for a Pak to get Chinese visitor or trader visa; takes upwards of 6 months and costs $2000 in agent fees). By contrast a 7 years visitor multiple visa on my Canadian PP took 3 days and cost around $100. It may be fair to add that residents of Gilgit Baltistan need no visa to go to Xinkiang.
Unless Pak and China governments pay immediate attention to these irritants that can be removed via education, the whole BRI/CPEC/New Silk Road experience may turn out to be an ugly one. Since Pak and China bureaucrats mostly travel by air they may not be aware of the reality on the ground.
A stoned cold winner article with great photos to BOOT!!
A stoned cold winner article with great photos to BOOT!!
a comprehensive report with lovely pictures
a comprehensive report with lovely pictures