Gotland has been a popular holiday destination for decades, but this week Swedish Commander-in-chief Mikael Bydén has claimed that Russian president Vladmir Putin “has his eyes” on the Baltic Sea island.
After Russia on Tuesday published an official document proposing to redefine the maritime borders in the Gulf of Finland, Bydén issued a reminder on Wednesday that Moscow’s ambitions extend much farther into the Baltic than the gulf. Events had already shown Gotland to figure large in those ambitions.
The draft decree by the Russian defense ministry, which was taken offline on Wednesday without explanation, proposed that Russia revise its borders based on a resolution adopted by the Soviet Union’s council of ministers in 1985 and expand its territorial waters.
Gotland holds a strategically important location in the middle of the Baltic Sea, halfway between the Swedish mainland and Estonia and only 300km from Kalingrad, the main base of Russia’s Baltic fleet.
Sweden’s joining NATO and giving the alliance access to Gotland significantly increased NATO’s ability to deploy and sustain its forces in the Baltic Sea region. This could make a decisive difference in the defense of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland.
Because of the island’s strategic importance, for most of the Cold War Sweden maintained a large military presence there. But Gotland was demilitarized in 2005, for the stated purpose of promoting peace and cooperation in the Baltic region.
This gesture of goodwill was immediately tested as Russian men who did not fit the usual Gotland tourist profile began regularly visiting the island.
Then, on March 29, 2013, two Tupolev Tu-22M3 nuclear bombers came within 24 miles of Gotland on dummy bombing runs. Sweden’s part-time air force had the weekend off on account of the Easter holiday, leaving the country wide open to that demonstration of Swedish military weakness and Gotland’s vulnerability to Russia.
After Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, Sweden took significant steps to protect itself, reintroducing 150 permanent troops on the island in 2016. By 2018, Sweden had expanded the number of permanently placed troops to 400, equipping them with CV90 armored vehicles and Leopard 2 tanks. Air defense systems were also reactivated by 2021.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to additional reinforcements, exercises and investment in Gotland’s defense totaling $160 million. On the island in April 2023, Sweden held its biggest military exercise in 25 years alongside Polish and British troops.
For Swedish Commander-in-chief Bydén, the reasons for increasing defenses in Gotland are clear. Gotland is both a major strategic asset and a potential liability, and therefore must be protected in order to prevent greater Russian threats from the sea to NATO countries.
Geographical distances in the Baltics are small, and if Russia seized Gotland in a crisis it could dominate the Baltic Sea region. This would make it very difficult for the West to provide reinforcement to the Baltic states by sea or by air.
Sweden is not the only country that is concerned. Lithuania borders both the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad – which itself has become increasingly militarized – and Belarus. Lithuania is concerned that it could be attacked, and would then be physically isolated from the rest of the Baltics.
When the online document about changing Russian maritime borders was spotted in the West, the Kremlin in usual Moscow fashion denied that it had any plans to do so. But there was no explanation from Russian officials of why the ministry proposal was removed from the government’s portal.
As leaders of the Baltic countries sought clarification, Lithuania warned that this was, at the very least, another Russian intimidation tactic. Estonia’s prime minster, Kaja Kallas, went farther, claiming that Russia is engaging in a “shadow war” with the West.
Shadow war in the Baltic
Before the border-changing issue resurfaced, the Baltic Sea already was experiencing heightened tensions. Russian ships have stoked hostilities due to their increasingly brazen and careless behavior, breaching maritime rules and sailing old and uninsured oil tankers, which could potentially cause an environmental catastrophe.
Russian shadow tankers – registered and insured outside the G7 countries and used to evade sanctions – have been present in Sweden’s exclusive economic zone off the eastern coast of Gotland, and have loitered off Gotland’s east coast. Russia’s fleet consists of about 1,400 ships that are not officially part of Russia’s army.
Many of these shadow tankers refuse pilotage, the practice of directing the movement of a ships by using visual or electronic observations, even when navigating Denmark’s narrow Great Belt. It appears they are engaging in forms of brinkmanship.
These provocations all take place just outside the 12 nautical mile limit defining the country’s territorial waters, making it impossible for Sweden to do anything about it as these commercial tankers are not part of Russia’s official navy. The Swedish navy has warned that Russia is likely to be using these oil tankers to engage in sabotage, reconnaissance and espionage.
Because of these developments, the Swedish prime minister informed citizens in March that they needed to be prepared for war.
In the past, Gotland was a deterrent against Soviet expansion. But Russia today under Putin seems less easily deterred and more risk-acceptant. What’s not clear is if these provocations are part of a Russian psychological war to divide and terrorize the west, or if this is a prelude to an actual war, which certainly would begin if Russia attacked Gotland.
As Sweden is now a member of NATO, all members must come to Sweden’s defense should it face an attack. On its own, Sweden has a world-class and modern submarine fleet and air force and a technologically advanced defense industrial base.
Given Sweden’s military capabilities, it’s hard to predict if this is enough to deter conflict with Russia. For now, it seems, Russia is determined to create suspense around its intentions in a region that holds some of NATO’s greatest assets and vulnerabilities. As a result, the Baltic Sea region has become a playground in Russia’s shadow war.
Natasha Lindstaedt is a professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.