US turning B-52 bomber into long-range China ship killer

While the US is arming its long-serving B-52 with potent ship-killing missiles to take on China’s expanding navy, severe munition constraints and operational vulnerabilities could undermine its strategic impact.

This month, multiple media outlets reported that the US Navy plans to award a sole-source contract to Lockheed Martin to integrate the AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile onto the US Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress fleet, according to a Naval Air Systems Command notice.

The effort will encompass missile software updates, flight testing, test-asset repairs, and separation clearances from both internal launchers and wing pylons, enabling the heavy bomber to carry up to 20 stealthy, autonomous anti-ship cruise missiles.

Derived from the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) already deployed on the aircraft, the LRASM uses onboard sensors, electronic support measures, and infrared terminal guidance to strike heavily defended naval targets beyond 320 kilometers without relying on GPS or active radar emissions.

The integration program rounds out maritime strike upgrades across the US Air Force’s strategic triad following previous deployments on the B-1B Lancer and recently disclosed launches from the B-2A Spirit.

US Department of Defense (DoD) planners aim to leverage the B-52’s intercontinental range and immense payload capacity to mass standoff firepower against enemy warships across the Indo-Pacific, creating a persistent maritime strike deterrent that reduces operational risks for carrier strike groups (CSGs) facing sophisticated Chinese air defenses.

The rationale for the US using strategic bombers such as the B-52 for maritime strike is that these assets provide an asymmetric, cost-effective counter to China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Western Pacific.

In an April 2025 report, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that the PLAN has become the world’s largest naval force by hull count, surpassing the US Navy in battle force ships between 2015 and 2020.

Citing DoD estimates, the CRS report says that the PLAN now exceeds 370 battle force platforms—excluding roughly 60 missile-armed patrol combatants—and projects it will expand to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 by 2030, driven primarily by surface combatants.

Against China’s naval numerical superiority, US bombers such as the B-52 provide intercontinental range, rapid transit speeds, and massive payload capacity, and can launch multiple LRASMs from multiple unpredicted azimuths outside hostile air defenses.

Such a capability may also address a potential anti-ship firepower gap in the US Navy. In a February 2023 article for the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), Dmitry Filipoff notes that the Harpoon missile, the US Navy’s main anti-ship weapon, cannot fit into more than 9,000 vertical launch cells across the fleet.

Filipoff points out that destroyers and cruisers carry only eight Harpoon missiles each, forcing vulnerable carrier air wings to mass salvos within hostile air defenses – a burden that is amplified by the Harpoon’s relatively short range of 128 kilometers for most variants.

That vulnerability, he notes, could leave the US Navy virtually unable to mass modern anti-ship cruise missile strikes.

Beyond the B-52, the LRASM is already deployed on B-1B and B-2 bombers, is being integrated with the F-35, and operates from allied aircraft such as Australian F/A-18s and P-8 maritime patrol aircraft. These options create multiple ways to expand US and allied maritime strike coverage.

Furthermore, bombers can return to base and rearm within hours, generating high sortie salvos that saturate naval formations without placing vulnerable US carriers at risk. In contrast, surface combatants such as destroyers and cruisers face acute replenishment delays.

Under the US Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) operational concept, air-based anti-surface fires disperse launch platforms to confound adversary targeting while concentrating massed effects against enemy warships. By striking beyond enemy ranges, these aviation assets secure the localized sea control required for joint power projection.

Still, the LRASM isn’t a wonder weapon. It might be effective against isolated PLAN ships, but such cases are probably rare. Daniel Rice mentions in a July 2024 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that PLAN CSGs organize fleet air defense in three concentric rings.

According to Rice, the outer defense zone, spanning 185 to 400 kilometers, uses carrier-borne J-15 fighters to intercept airborne hostiles. He describes the middle zone, extending 45 to 185 kilometers, with Type 052D destroyers and Type 054A frigates equipped with radars, HQ-16 missiles, and HHQ-10 interceptors. Finally, Rice describes an inner zone reaching 45 kilometers that relies on terminal defense systems.

A US-China conflict over Taiwan would use vast precision-guided munitions like the LRASM, incurring high costs and potentially outpacing US manufacturing capacity.

As Seth Jones points out in a May 2026 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the US could expend between 450 and 1,000 LRASMs within just the first week of a conflict over Taiwan.

Jones adds that while LRASM is considered highly effective against Chinese naval targets, it carries a steep price tag of roughly US$3 million per munition and a two-year production lead time.

Beyond munition limits, US kill chains – the assets, sensors, and processes guiding munitions from launch to target – face severe vulnerabilities. Heather Penney notes in a May 2023 Mitchell Institute report that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plans to strike high-value nodes like Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, jam datalinks like Link-16, destroy reconnaissance satellites, and induce operational chaos.

Without long-range assets, US bombers armed with LRASMs may need to find PLAN targets with onboard radars, lowering standoff distance and risking PLA missiles and fighters.

Compounding these network vulnerabilities, forward US airfields across the Pacific remain acutely exposed to preemptive destruction before bombers can even take flight. Specifically, the PLA seeks to eliminate US aircraft on the ground through coordinated, multi-axis salvos of ballistic and cruise missiles, naval fires, and special forces targeting Indo-Pacific airbases.

Exploiting an acute lack of US hardened shelters, the PLA plans to crater runways and taxiways to trap bombers and fighters on open ramps, inflicting the vast majority of US aircraft losses before sorties can launch.

While the US may aim to mitigate that vulnerability by rapidly moving aircraft throughout its Pacific airbases, that approach assumes that the US can generate aircraft sorties faster than the PLA can close kill chains.

Such vulnerabilities can force the US to conduct bomber maritime strike missions launched from the US mainland. However, that approach may not suit time-sensitive targets such as PLAN CSGs, and it depends on a potentially fragile aerial tanker refueling chain that could be vulnerable to attack.

Significantly longer distances could further strain airframes and increase maintenance costs. More flying hours could strain pilots and support crews, increasing the risk of accidents and losses from fatigue and human error.

Ultimately, while integrating LRASMs onto the B-52 provides the US with a potent, asymmetric counter to China’s expanding naval fleet, its strategic value will depend on whether the US can sustain costly missile stockpiles and safeguard the vulnerable airbases, aerial tankers, and targeting networks required to deliver them.