Andy Burnham walked into 10 Downing Street last week as Britain’s seventh prime minister in ten years. He takes over a country still absorbing the aftershocks of the Iran conflict, with the Royal Navy stretched thin as it escorts tankers through the Strait of Hormuz.
It says something that in his first audience with King Charles, the former mayor of Greater Manchester, a politician who built his career on buses, housing and the North-South divide, chose to raise the security of a shipping lane 4,000 miles away.
Even Britain’s most domestically minded leader in a generation has grasped that geography and commerce offer no hiding place. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair anticipated the crisis. In May, he bluntly stated that a ruling party without a clear strategy for a rapidly changing world is taking unnecessary risks.
Two months later, Keir Starmer departed, becoming the shortest-serving Labour prime minister on record, partially due to a defense-funding dispute that had already led to the resignation of his defense secretary in June.
Blair’s focus was not on party politics but on statecraft — the traditional skill of aligning domestic resources with external ambitions — especially as technology and geopolitics are redefining the boundaries of what is possible.
The besetting weakness of Western strategy – and, to be sure, America is not exempt – is the gap between what governments say and what they can field: competitive economies, secure energy, a technological edge and ships and aircraft that exist beyond planning documents. Britain is the cautionary tale of the moment.
At The Hague last year, London endorsed NATO’s new target of 3.5% of GDP on core defense by 2035, with a further 1.5% for resilience. It currently spends about 2.3%. Its latest defense investment plan reaches 2.7% by 2028 and then goes silent on how the endorsed target will ever be reached.
Bridging that gap would cost upwards of £30 billion ($40 billion) a year, and the new prime minister managed to rattle the gilt markets before he had even taken office. The rhetoric is Atlanticist; the arithmetic is not.
Washington faces major challenges as US dominance coexists with a rising China and, soon, India. In this changing environment, robust alliances are essential to sustain American influence.
Britain continues to be important due to its naval strength and financial markets; France provides nuclear and expeditionary capabilities; Germany leads with Europe’s strongest industrial base.
When these nations fail to meet their commitments, Washington risks overextension and losing influence to Beijing, whose reach grows across supply chains, technology standards, and Gulf geopolitics.
Candor has its limits. In Burnham’s first week in office, President Trump called Britain a “poverty-stricken disaster.” Successful alliances depend on mutual expectations, and no government can expect allies to provide support while insulting them.
For Washington to encourage Europe to invest, it must make cooperation worthwhile, whether through transactional means or consistent commitments.
The reality could differ. For decades, European delivery has fallen short of Europe’s ambitions; Britain’s absence from the 3.5% goal is common, not rare, and alliances of middle powers tend to dissolve just as quickly as they form.
If capability gaps remain, it will lead to increased American burden and resentment. Effective planning should begin with this risk in mind rather than ignoring it.
The first area of focus is domestic renewal, which is essential for maintaining American strength. This includes not only producing energy at levels that outpace adversaries, but leading in technology through secure supply chains, and practicing fiscal discipline to support credible defense budgets over the long term.
Allies should undergo similar evaluations, with clear, time-bound NATO milestones instead of vague goals set for the 2030s. For instance, Burnham’s early indication of reopening North Sea oil production is a practical step that Washington should recognize and support.
The second strategy focuses on forming coalitions centered around capabilities. This involves collaborative maritime security efforts in the Gulf, which Burnham has already backed, as well as creating shared technology standards with Britain, France, and Gulf countries.
Such actions would clarify roles and make it more difficult for Beijing to gain ground. Importantly, this approach should enhance, not replace, the current bilateral influence over China.
The third approach involves integrating middle-power performance into regional strategy. In the Middle East, American strategic assets, supported by European naval and diplomatic influence, can ensure energy routes remain open and counter Iranian disruptions under Chinese influence.
As ad hoc solutions formed during a crisis can lead to lost advantages, contingencies need to be prepared. Since 2016, seven prime ministers have demonstrated how rapidly a country’s flexibility diminishes when its domestic base becomes fragile.
The United States has an opportunity in the coming years to revitalize domestic stability and transform middle powers from mere dependents into active contributors. However, if domestic renewal falters or international partners fail to follow through on their promises, no diplomatic effort will be sufficient to stand up to China.
Statecraft depends on power rather than ideology. It prioritizes aligning tools with objectives over time, with current evaluations based on tangible, measurable tests.
Questions arise about whether Burnham’s initial budget genuinely supports NATO’s goals, if Royal Navy escorts still operate in Hormuz amidst shifting media focus, and how Washington perceives a fragile alliance, whether to strengthen or mock.
Britain’s stance implies that pulling out of a complex global landscape isn’t the solution; instead, it calls for understanding and skillfully managing it with fewer commitments supported by real resources.
Eric Alter is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a former UN civil servant.
