As the US keeps fighting in Iran, China is watching not only what the US can destroy, but how quickly it can replace what it fires. Yet depleted US stockpiles do not make an invasion of Taiwan any less perilous for China.
Multiple media outlets reported that the US launched multiple waves of airstrikes targeting over 140 military sites inside Iran on Sunday, triggering a sweeping drone and missile retaliation by Iran against US bases and Gulf Arab allies that has pushed a fragile interim ceasefire to the brink of collapse.
The heavy exchange of fire followed an Iranian attack on a Cyprus-flagged container ship in the strategic Strait of Hormuz on Saturday, which Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) subsequently declared closed until further notice.
Under orders from US President Donald Trump to preserve freedom of navigation and lower global energy prices, US Central Command struck Iranian drone launchers, missile networks, and naval assets, notably on Qeshm Island and in Bandar Abbas.
Iran retaliated by firing projectiles against Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, and Oman, causing minor shrapnel injuries in Qatar and hitting border posts and an offshore oil platform in Kuwait.
The sudden escalation imperils a mid-June memorandum of understanding intended to permanently end the war, as Iran’s new supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, vowed further vengeance, while US officials insisted the international waterway remains open.
This escalation could further imperil already precarious US munitions stockpiles, threatening deterrence in other theaters, such as the Pacific.
Mark Cancian and Chris Park note in an April 2026 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the US expended roughly 32% of its estimated pre-war inventory of 3,100 Tomahawk missiles.
They add that the US used between 53% and 80% of its estimated 360 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors and between 41% and 61% of its estimated 2,330 Patriot interceptors.
Rebuilding those stocks will take time. Seth Jones noted in a January 2023 CSIS report that producing a Patriot PAC-2 or PAC-3 interceptor takes 15-20 months, while replacing a Tomahawk cruise missile takes about 25 months.
Cancian and Park warn that a conflict with China over Taiwan would consume substantially more US munitions, as penetrating China’s extensive air defenses would require large numbers of standoff weapons, while defending against its missile forces would demand many interceptors.
Even so, depleted stocks do not necessarily mean that US deterrence in the Pacific has collapsed.
Michael O’Hanlon and Michael Poznansky argue in a June 2026 Brookings Institution article that, despite steep drawdowns in defensive interceptors, the US retains largely untouched stocks of anti-ship missiles, submarine-launched torpedoes and stealth-delivered precision weapons capable of devastating Chinese maritime infrastructure.
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) limited amphibious lift remains another major constraint. Jason Wang and his co-authors note in a June 2026 Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) article that China’s principal sealift weakness is a critical shortage of dedicated gray-hull amphibious ships.
A November 2025 Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessment estimates that the PLA could deploy about 20,000 troops in an initial landing wave — far fewer than would be required for an invasion.
The assessment adds that civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries and cargo ships could raise that figure to about 60,000, though those vessels lack the protection and rough-weather capabilities of dedicated amphibious warships.
Timothy Heath and his co-authors note in a June 2023 RAND report that Taiwan has 88,000 troops and 800 tanks available to resist an invasion—far more combat power than China could carry across the strait in an initial assault wave. China could also encounter determined public resistance: a March 2026 Academia Sinica poll, cited by the Taipei Times, found that 58% of respondents would resist at all costs, even without US military assistance.
The US also possesses capabilities that could disrupt Chinese command and control during an invasion. Kevin Pollpeter and his co-authors note in a May 2025 China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) report that the US Space Force could use its Counter Communications System (CCS) to block hostile satellite transmissions completely and reversibly.
Pollpeter and his co-authors add that the CCS, first deployed in 2020, is a dedicated satellite-communications jammer capable of targeting link, ground and on-orbit segments, potentially severing the network architecture underpinning China’s regional military power projection.
Economic costs may further strengthen deterrence. Dan Grazier and his co-authors warn in an August 2025 Stimson report that an invasion of Taiwan would disrupt shipping through the Taiwan Strait and Strait of Malacca, threatening China’s US$3.41 trillion in exports and its access to Taiwanese integrated circuits.
Grazier and his co-authors add that redirecting domestic resources toward war would undermine China’s efforts to address existing economic problems. They also warn that sanctions against high-technology industries and disruptions to staple imports such as soybeans could intensify industrial and food-security pressures.
This is the Taiwan trap for China: even an initially successful assault could leave the country facing a prolonged war, economic isolation, military escalation and a domestic political crisis.
A failed invasion could also threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) hold on power. Joel Wuthnow warns in an October 2024 Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) report that a severe military defeat could fracture the CCP elite and trigger domestic instability.
Wuthnow adds that leaders blamed for failure could be branded “national traitors” by a public mobilized for victory. Facing removal, he says those leaders might become increasingly risk-acceptant, escalating militarily or demonstrating strategic weapons to reverse battlefield losses, appease domestic critics and preserve the regime.
Above these conventional, economic and political constraints sits the ultimate barrier: nuclear deterrence. James Acton and Ankit Panda argue in a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) article this month that US nuclear deterrence remains intact despite China’s rapid nuclear expansion and the possibility of deeper China-Russia coordination, because the US and China remain mutually vulnerable.
Acton and Panda add that China still relies primarily on economic and conventional power and that neither side can meaningfully limit the catastrophic damage of a retaliatory nuclear strike. That vulnerability, they argue, preserves the underlying stability of nuclear deterrence.
Going forward, US deterrence will depend less on aggregate military superiority than on how quickly the US can replenish the precision-strike and air-defense weapons most relevant to Taiwan.
China may therefore intensify blockades, military pressure and other coercion below the threshold of invasion, seeking to exploit US overstretch without triggering the military, economic and political dangers of the Taiwan trap itself.
