The recent electoral defeat of Viktor Orban has drawn widespread attention, with most commentary focused on its implications for Europe and the Russia-Ukraine war. Yet this emphasis overlooks a broader strategic consequence: the potential disruption of China’s approach to Europe.
For more than a decade, Hungary under Orban has functioned as a pivotal node in Beijing’s strategy, using its position within the EU and the union’s unanimity rules to dilute collective action on China.
His departure, therefore, raises a more fundamental question: whether China can continue to rely on internal EU divisions to sustain its influence.
China’s long-term strategy toward Europe is one of “divide and conquer,” aimed at preventing coalition formation. At the macro level, Beijing has sought stable economic ties with the EU as a whole, positioning itself as both a partner and an indispensable market.
At the micro level, however, it has cultivated bilateral relationships with select member states, particularly those willing to deviate from the Brussels consensus.
Hungary under Orban exemplified the latter approach. His government’s authoritarian political orientation, combined with the EU’s institutional design — especially the requirement of unanimity on key foreign policy decisions — created an opening that Beijing exploited.
Over time, this relationship evolved into something more than routine diplomacy. Orban’s Hungary became a reliable interlocutor for China within the EU, often acting as a brake on collective European responses to sensitive issues.
On multiple occasions, Budapest blocked or softened EU statements critical of China, including those related to Hong Kong and human rights concerns.
Similarly, Hungary resisted efforts to impose stricter trade measures, such as anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Hungary’s role as the rotating EU presidency from July to December 2024 further amplified its influence on China-related matters.
Economically, Hungary was the first European country to join the Belt and Road Initiative. China has strategically leveraged Hungary’s EU membership and central European location as a gateway for Chinese products to enter the EU market.
From Beijing’s perspective, this dynamic offered clear advantages. Rather than confronting a unified European front, China could engage a more fragmented landscape, leveraging internal divisions to its benefit. Hungary’s role was especially valuable because it combined political alignment with economic interdependence.
Hungary became a key site for Chinese manufacturing and infrastructure projects. Investments in battery production, electric vehicles and transport links were not only commercially significant but also strategically calibrated to anchor China’s presence within the European market.
In return, Orban also reaped tangible benefits. He viewed China as a valuable partner not only for its political alignment but also for its economic utility.
Beyond the ideological affinity between Hungary’s illiberal governance model and China’s authoritarian system, Hungary has relied on Chinese investment and economic engagement to stimulate domestic growth and consolidate Orban’s political base. China is Hungry’s largest trading partner outside Europe and its leading source of foreign direct investment.
Under the Belt and Road Initiative, China has made substantial investments in Hungarian infrastructure and key sectors, including electric vehicles and battery production, creating more than 20,000 jobs.
In December 2024, Chinese automaker BYD announced plans to build a new electric vehicle production base in Szeged, in southeastern Hungary — the first passenger car factory established by a Chinese company within the EU.
Under Orban’s leadership, China-Hungary relations were significantly strengthened. This was evident during Xi Jinping’s visit to Hungary in May 2024, when Orbn warmly received him.
During the visit, the two sides signed 18 bilateral cooperation agreements and jointly announced the elevation of their relationship to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” — a rare designation in Chinese diplomacy.
This dual logic — political leverage through institutional veto points and economic entrenchment through targeted investment — helped sustain China’s influence even as the EU’s overall posture toward Beijing hardened.
In recent years, Brussels has increasingly framed China as a “systemic rival,” alongside its roles as a partner and economic competitor. Yet the translation of this framing into concrete policy has often been uneven, in part because of internal divergences among member states.
Hungary under Orban stood out as one of the most consistent sources of such divergence.
Orban’s defeat, therefore, raises an immediate question: What happens when this node of resistance weakens or disappears? The rise of Peter Magyar, who is widely seen as more aligned with the EU mainstream, suggests the possibility of a recalibration in Hungary’s external posture.
While it would be premature to assume a wholesale reversal of policy, even incremental shifts could have meaningful consequences. If Hungary becomes less willing to block EU initiatives or more inclined to align with Brussels on China-related issues, the balance of decision-making within the EU could change.
One likely outcome is greater cohesion in EU policy toward China. Without a reliable veto player, efforts to coordinate responses on trade, technology and human rights may face fewer obstacles.
This does not mean the EU will suddenly adopt a uniformly hardline stance since divisions among member states will persist due to differing economic interests and strategic priorities. However, the removal or even attenuation of a particularly active spoiler could lower the threshold for collective action.
For China, this would represent a less favorable operating environment. The strategy of leveraging institutional fragmentation depends on the availability of actors willing and able to exercise veto power.
If Hungary becomes less cooperative in this regard, Beijing may find it harder to replicate past successes in delaying or diluting EU measures. In practical terms, this could translate into more consistent enforcement of trade defenses, firmer language on political issues and greater alignment between EU institutions and key member states.
That said, it would be a mistake to overstate the extent of the shift. China’s engagement with Europe has never been reducible to a single country, however important.
Other member states may still resist aspects of a more confrontational approach, particularly where economic interests are at stake — France and Germany foremost among them. For example, Beijing has leveraged France’s Gaullist tradition of strategic autonomy to weaken EU consensus on key China-related issues such as Taiwan and economic decoupling.
Moreover, the structural incentives that underpinned Sino-Hungarian cooperation — such as the appeal of Chinese investment for domestic development — have not disappeared. Even a more pro-EU Hungarian government may seek to preserve elements of this relationship, especially in sectors tied to growth and employment.
This points to a more nuanced implication of Orban’s defeat. Rather than marking a clean break, it may initiate a period of adjustment in which both China and the EU reassess their strategies.
For Beijing, this could involve diversifying its network of partners within Europe, placing greater emphasis on countries where economic ties can translate into political influence.
For the EU, the moment presents an opportunity, but not a guarantee, of greater strategic coherence. If member states can capitalize on the reduced risk of internal vetoes, they may be better positioned to articulate and implement a more consistent approach to China.
This would likely involve balancing economic engagement with concerns over security, technology and values — an equilibrium that has proven difficult to sustain in practice.
Ultimately, the significance of Orban’s defeat lies less in any immediate policy reversal than in the potential reconfiguration of the strategic landscape. For years, Hungary functioned as a critical hinge between China and the EU, enabling Beijing to navigate — and at times exploit — the union’s internal divisions.
As that hinge loosens, the dynamics of interaction may shift in consequential ways. Whether this leads to a more unified European stance or simply a different pattern of fragmentation will depend on how both sides respond.
What is clear is that China’s Europe strategy, long predicated on a coalition-prevention strategy, will need to adapt to a context in which one of its most dependable partners within the EU is no longer assured.
Linggong Kong is a PhD candidate in political science at Auburn University, where his research focuses on international relations, China’s grand strategy and Northeast Asian security. His commentaries have been published or republished in The Conversation, The Diplomat, Asia Times, China Factor and Newsweek Japan, among others.
Hungary becomes a major battery manufacturer (biggest in Europe) from nothing. The author neglect to mention this.
Sometimes but seldom China does produce dummies like this author. You get a few anywhere.
What Hungary did was look after it’s own national interest. It didn’t do any favours for China unlike what this author would claim.
Now if it’s in their interest to align with Europe with no benefits in return, then Orban is back at next election cycle. The Hungarians will have learnt a valuable lesson.
There is no money following Europe. Their dummies that have kneecapped the whole continent
No worry, China still have Slovenia Spain Portugal and Greece