North Korea’s missile test from its new Choe Hyon destroyer signals a shift toward a more flexible sea-based nuclear deterrent, as the regime compensates for submarine limitations.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that North Korea test-fired two strategic cruise missiles and three anti-ship missiles from its new 5,000-ton destroyer Choe Hyon as part of operational efficiency trials, with Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un overseeing the launches from a pier alongside senior military officials.
The missiles were launched over waters off the country’s west coast, flying along preset trajectories for extended durations—cruise missiles for more than two hours and anti-ship missiles for about half an hour — before striking targets with what North Korea described as “ultra-precision” accuracy.
The tests were conducted to assess the destroyer’s integrated weapons command system, enhance crew skills, and validate the upgraded navigation and anti-jamming features. North Korea’s state mouthpiece, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), described the weapons as “strategic,” as Kim reiterated that strengthening the country’s nuclear deterrent remains a top priority.
The launches mark the first publicly disclosed anti-ship missile firing from the vessel and come amid broader efforts to expand North Korea’s naval power, including plans for at least two additional destroyers and indications of a growing fleet rather than isolated platforms.
According to an April 2025 Beyond Parallel analysis by Joseph Bermudez Jr and others, the Choe Hyon is North Korea’s largest and most sophisticated warship. They assess it as about 144 meters long and built as a multi-mission destroyer.
They say that it features a substantial missile architecture, including 44 vertical launch cells (VLS) for surface-to-air missiles and 30 larger cells for cruise or surface-to-surface missiles. They note that it is armed with close-in weapon systems (CIWS), electronic warfare suites, a 127-millimeter gun, and a helicopter/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) deck.
They also state that it incorporates the Russian Pantsir-M air defense system and is assessed to support anti-air, anti-ship, anti-submarine and anti-ballistic missile roles, as well as potential hypersonic cruise and tactical ballistic missile strike capabilities.
Russian assistance appears evident in the ship’s design. In a June 2025 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) video, naval analyst Mike Plunkett says building such a ship in roughly 13 months would be “impossible” without outside assistance, citing strong design similarities with Russia’s Grigorovich-class frigates.
WSJ also notes that Russia may have supplied the Pantsir-M air defense system, while Plunkett suggests Kim’s 2023 Russia visit functioned as a “sales pitch” for naval technology transfers.
Choe Hyon is likely to serve as North Korea’s primary maritime platform for nuclear signaling, crisis response and sea-based strike operations.
Previously, Asia Times reported on North Korea’s purported nuclear submarine, Hero Kim Ok. The program is ambitious but technically immature, raising doubts about its near-term credibility. Key challenges include mastering reactor design, acoustic quieting and long-term sustainment.
North Korea’s Soviet-era Romeo-class submarines suffer from noise, limited endurance, command and control challenges, and vulnerability to anti-submarine warfare, likely confining them to coastal “bastion” operations and limiting their deterrent value. True sea-based second-strike capability may be years away, reflecting a gap between strategic intent and deployable capability.
Taken together, Choe Hyon acts as a stopgap sea-based deterrent, buying time while North Korea’s submarine leg remains technically immature. At the doctrinal level, Choe Hyon highlights evolving tensions in North Korea’s nuclear command structure.
Notably, North Korea’s 2022 Law on Nuclear Forces states that they obey the “monolithic” command of Kim Jong Un, but also states that if the country’s nuclear command and control (NC2) is in danger of attack, a nuclear strike shall be launched “automatically and immediately” – showing a tension between highly personalized central command and preplanned automaticity.
An August 2022 US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) report suggests North Korea may adopt a hybrid NC2, combining centralized political control with limited delegation to improve survivability and responsiveness.
The report says Kim would retain sole launch authority over strategic, long-range nuclear weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), while limited delegation would apply to tactical systems deployed to frontline units.
It says that approach reduces the vulnerability to a single-point command failure, avoids the political risks of full devolution, and supports a shift toward a regional nuclear warfighting strategy by enabling faster, decentralized use of lower-yield weapons under specific conditions.
In practice, Kim likely retains sole control over intercontinental deterrence, while Choe Hyon’s cruise missiles serve as theater nuclear assets aimed at regional targets under tightly controlled but potentially preplanned release conditions.
The DTRA report notes that submarine-based nuclear operations would require pre-assembled weapons and procedural controls, though vulnerability may necessitate early deployment or delegated launch conditions in a crisis.
However, the report mentions that North Korea’s submarines may be too vulnerable for such a task, and that their real value is mainly psychological, complicating US and South Korean decision-making.
Strategically, Choe Hyon may enhance survivability by dispersing nuclear assets at sea, but it also introduces escalation risks, particularly as its cruise missiles could carry either nuclear or conventional warheads. The destroyer also signals closer ties with Russia, potentially reducing dependence on China while reshaping regional alignment dynamics.
While Choe Hyon adds limited naval power on its own, it deepens nuclear ambiguity, complicates crisis decision-making and heightens the risk of miscalculation in any future conflict.