China’s conversion of obsolete fighter jets into attack drones points to a shift toward mass attrition warfare in a Taiwan contingency — one that tests the limits of sustainability as much as firepower.
China has stationed obsolete J-6 fighter jets converted into attack drones at six air bases near the Taiwan Strait, five in Fujian, and one in Guangdong, according to commercial satellite imagery and open-source intelligence analyzed by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Reuters reported.
According to Mitchell Institute Senior Fellow J. Michael Dahm, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has deployed 200 or more of the jets-turned-drones to support the opening phase of any assault on Taiwan, where they would be used less like remotely piloted aircraft than as cruise-missile-like weapons to strike Taiwanese, US or allied targets in large numbers.
The J-6 has a maximum speed of Mach 1.3, a 700-kilometer range, and a 250-kilogram payload, according to the South China Morning Post (SCMP).
Taiwanese officials and external analysts observed that the primary aim of the drones is to drain Taiwan’s air defense resources by compelling defenders to deploy expensive missiles against outdated but swift targets, creating a costly dilemma.
Taiwan’s defense ministry has outlined plans to acquire a new generation of counter-drone systems swiftly. The Reuters report situates these converted aircraft within China’s wider military expansion in preparation for a potential Taiwan conflict.
Tactically, these repurposed fighters could be deployed as part of a multi-vector attack against Taiwan’s air bases and air defenses.
Tianran Xu mentions for the Open Nuclear Network that in 2025, Taiwan’s long-range air and missile defense consists of 21 advanced batteries: nine Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2/3 Patriot batteries and 12 Tien Kung-2/3 batteries, replacing the older HAWK units, with 12 bases planned for construction by the end of 2026.
Xu identifies approximately 380 PAC-3 Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI) interceptors dedicated to anti-tactical ballistic missile capabilities, around 200 PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM) missiles with limited ballistic missile capabilities, at least 400 Tien Kung-3 missiles, and over 400 Tien Kung-2 missiles, with each Tien Kung-2/3 battery operating mixed loads rather than single missile types.
Interceptor costs underscore the imbalance. Kelly Grieco and Hunter Slingbaum, in a Stimson Center article this month, note that a PAC-3 interceptor costs US$3.7 million, and a Tien Kung-3 interceptor costs US$620,000 per round.
In contrast, China built over 4,500 J-6 fighters between 1958 and 1986 and 2,400 J-7 fighters between 1993 and 2013, providing a ready reserve of airframes that could be converted into decoy or attack drones at relatively low cost.
Jerome Brahy, in an article this month for Army Recognition, notes that if China launches 700-1,000 J-6 drones in a short period and adopts a two-shot interceptor doctrine for Taiwan, Taiwan will require 1,400-2,000 missiles to fully engage.
Brahy estimates that with Taiwan having 1,200 to 1,800 interceptor missiles, saturation will occur when the number of targets exceeds what Taiwan’s air defenses can effectively detect, track, and intercept.
He also states that, with an 80% interception rate in Taiwan, an attack involving 1,000 J-6 drones could result in 200 successful penetrations, carrying about 50,000 kilograms of payload.
Brahy estimates such a wave could be launched at 100–250 aircraft per hour over 4–8 hours, potentially degrading Taiwan’s defenses within a day, as an air defense radar cannot reliably distinguish between a J-6 drone and a modern fighter such as the J-16.
But this approach has limits. For one, while China has vast stores of obsolete aircraft ready for drone conversion, those stocks are finite.
Russia’s experience in Ukraine illustrates the risks of relying on refurbished equipment for sustained attrition. As documented by the Oryx open-source intelligence site, since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has sustained 4,346 visually-confirmed tank losses from January to March 2026.
Counting the toll on Russia’s newer tank models, Oryx mentions that Russia has lost 1,800+ T-72 series tanks (across B, B3, and other variants), about 1,200+ T-80 series tanks (including BV, BVM, and others), and roughly 200+ T-90 series tanks (primarily T-90A and T-90M).
Russia has increasingly turned to older tanks such as the T-54/55, T-62, and T-64, with Dylan Malyasov noting in an October 2025 Defense Blog article that before Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it had 313 T-54/55s, 1,897 T-62s, and 752 T-64s in storage.
This reflects Russia’s growing reliance on outdated tanks. Malyasov notes that as of October 2025, Russia has only 137 T54/55s, 933 T-62s, and 653 T-64s remaining, with none in decent condition—all in poor or worse shape.
As Russia taps deeper into its tank reserves, better-conditioned vehicles are likely to be refurbished first, with costs and time increasing as it tries to reactivate increasingly deteriorated vehicles.
Over time, Russia’s tank stocks could become too low to mount a major combined-arms maneuver warfare offensive in Ukraine – forcing a reliance on attrition warfare, strategic bombing, and small-unit infiltration tactics.
The same dynamic may apply to China. Taiwan could pursue a similar strategy of attrition, as seen in Iran’s ability to absorb an initial US-Israeli salvo of 5,197 munitions across 35 types in the first 96 hours of the US-Israel-Iran war.
Following Iran’s example, Taiwan could improve resilience by following the Western mission command concept – delegating authority to lower-ranking officers and enabling them to fight independently, despite decapitation attempts at high-level leadership, communications breakdowns and sustained bombardment.
China’s munitions system faces structural constraints. A January 2026 Heritage Foundation report mentions that China’s munitions procurement and manufacturing remain concentrated in state-owned enterprises and discrete geographic nodes, creating exposure to disruption.
The report says distribution relies heavily on fixed rail corridors, presenting “single points of failure” in the event of an attack, while multi-echelon stockpiles increase the complexity of redistribution and create interdiction risks.
It also adds that sustained production is further constrained by reliance on uninterrupted supplies of specialized energetic materials and imported critical minerals, with stockpiles assessed as insufficient to offset prolonged supply disruptions or degraded throughput.
Ultimately, while China’s massed drone strategy may deliver a sharp initial shock, its effectiveness will hinge less on the opening salvo than on whether China can sustain tempo faster than Taiwan can adapt and impose costs over time.