Trump’s Hormuz coalition call puts NATO in costly dilemma

Trump warned in an interview with the Financial Times that “If there’s no response or if it’s a negative response (to his proposed Hormuz naval coalition), I think it will be very bad for the future of Nato…We have a thing called Nato. We’ve been very sweet. We didn’t have to help them with Ukraine. Ukraine is thousands of miles away from us…But we helped them. Now we’ll see if they help us. Because I’ve long said that we’ll be there for them but they won’t be there for us. And I’m not sure that they’d be there.”

The ominous innuendo is that Trump could potentially stop “helping [NATO] with Ukraine”, which could take the form of no longer selling them arms for transfer to that country, if they don’t participate in his proposed Hormuz naval coalition and “knock out some bad actors that are along the [Iranian] shore.”

This throws NATO into a dilemma since its goal is to perpetuate the Ukrainian conflict until a new anti-Russian administration comes to power in the US, but it also doesn’t want to risk military losses to Iran.

The conflict can’t continue if the US drops out, but the killing of troops in a distant warzone – especially a mass-casualty event like Iran sinking one of their ships – could provoke unrest and doom the careers of those who approved it during the next elections.

There’s another layer to this dilemma: not helping the US reopen the strait keeps oil prices higher for longer, thus upsetting more voters, but it might also lead to the US extending its temporary sanctions waiver on Russian oil that the EU opposes.

NATO, therefore, must choose between helping the US secure the strait at the risk of military losses to Iran, possible unrest and dooming the careers of those who approved it, or refusing, risking a US cutoff of arms to Ukraine and a possible extension of the Russian oil sanctions waiver.

The first choice entails military and political costs, while the second entails economic costs (higher oil prices for longer) and reputational ones (including worsening ties with the US and a possible Russian victory in Ukraine).

Objectively speaking, the US is not expected to entirely withdraw its military forces from Europe if NATO doesn’t join Trump’s proposed Hormuz naval coalition, so that dimension of the second scenario’s costs is manageable.

The economic ones are too, but only if Europe musters the political will to discredit its own anti-Russian energy rhetoric by scaling up purchases of Russian oil and possibly requesting the reopening of its pipelines. The only significant cost is therefore a possible Russian victory in Ukraine.

While it was earlier thought that Trump would not want to hand Russian President Vladimir Putin such a victory for reasons of ego and legacy, he might do so if Putin helps him achieve some of his goals in Iran via diplomacy and to punish NATO for not joining his coalition.

Putin could improve the odds by sweetening the terms of his proposed resource-centric strategic partnership between Russia and the US after the Ukrainian conflict ends. This scenario, therefore, cannot be ruled out.

NATO should therefore brace for that possibility if it rejects joining Trump’s coalition. But even if it joins the Iran war, Russia could still exploit the expected redirection of Western arms away from Ukraine to more effectively pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into complying with its demands.

Unlike before the Iran war, when it appeared that Putin would have to compromise on some of his demands, he now has a greater chance of achieving more of them — whether by force or with Trump’s indirect support.

This article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished here with editing for clarity, fluency and updates on Trump’s response on Friday. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber here.