This article first appeared on Pacific Forum and is republished with permission. Read the original here.
On May 30, 2018, US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis announced that, “in recognition of the increasing connectivity, the Indian and Pacific Oceans, today we rename the US Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command.” His logic was solid. China’s strategic competition does not end at the Strait of Malacca, the Timor Sea or Tasmania.
US defense doctrine embraced the changes easily and continues to build upon a more holistic approach to the Indian and Pacific Ocean basins. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), an outgrowth of cooperation and communication born after the 2004 tsunami, became a strategic force during President Donald Trump’s first term.
President Joe Biden overlaid the Quad framework with the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) strategic framework. The problem with both formulations, however, is that they tended to focus upon the eastern Indian Ocean, where the threat of Chinese expansionism was most apparent.
Given Chinese “salami-slicing” in the South China Sea and China’s growing belligerence toward Taiwan, such a focus might be understandable. Chinese ambition, however, is pan-regional if not global.
On August 1, 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, just a few miles from Camp Lemonnier, home to the US Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and the primary base of operations for US Africa Command.
While Chinese strategists have often talked about China’s “String of Pearls” as peaceful and economic in motivation, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) permanent presence in Djibouti suggested a greater ambition.
With a logistics hub in Djibouti, the PLAN can access the entirety of the Indian Ocean basin, operating in the eastern Indian Ocean from its South Sea Fleet headquarters in Zhanjiang and its subsidiary based in Yulin and Longpo, and in the Western Indian Ocean and Red Sea from its Djibouti base.
The willingness of Cambodia to give China access to the Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand also furthers China’s reach, as does Mauritius’s increasingly warm ties to China.
In this context, the British transfer of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius is strategically incongruent, especially as history and cultural links do not support Mauritius’ claim. Even British officials are hard-pressed to explain why Prime Minister Keir Starmer reversed London’s position to support Mauritius’ claim.
What might have been his virtue signaling to a progressive, anti-colonial base could have profound ramifications in the strategic balance of the Indian Ocean, as it makes the future of the joint US-UK military base on Diego Garcia in question, especially if China continues to increase its influence in Mauritius, India’s airfield in Agalega notwithstanding.
With China expanding its reach, neither the US nor India can any longer afford to take the western Indian Ocean and its littoral African states for granted. The second term Trump administration has given lip service to a more expansive Indo-Pacific Strategy.
The November 2025 National Security Strategy, for example, called on India to be more proactive in Indo-Pacific security and declared “keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open, preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes” to be a goal of US strategy.
However, the fact that the Strategy treated Red Sea navigation almost as an afterthought and then addressed it only in the context of Middle East challenges suggests continued incoherence. After all, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland are African; their postures and security can impact freedom of navigation as much as Yemen and Saudi Arabia do.
On Jan. 23 the Pentagon released its new National Defense Strategy. Its importance is not only about what it says but also what it omits. While the Strategy mentions China almost two dozen times, it does not explicitly mention India. It sidelines Africa, with its few references relegated to counterterrorism.
It does, however, continue a broad focus on the Indo-Pacific Region and calls upon the US to “deter China in the Indo-Pacific” and to “set the military conditions required to achieve the [2025] NSS goal of a balance of power” in the region.
Absent a more sustained focus by the US or its chief strategic allies, Washington will forfeit that balance of power. Trump’s tariff policy and his embrace of Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief of staff, have shaken US-India bilateral ties. New Delhi essentially has a choice: it must be proactive in the western Indian Ocean to deny space to China or it must coordinate with the US to the same end goal.
New Delhi must determine how to outcompete Beijing not only in Mauritius and South Africa, but also in Kenya and Tanzania. While India commissioned the INS Jatayu in 2024 on Mincoy Island in the Lakshadweep Islands, it should push its military footprint further.
That would not only expand its military footprint in Agalega but also replicate it should China use its investments in Mauritius to leverage India out. India should also expand its presence in northern Madagascar and use its considerable, if underutilized, diplomatic and financial power to establish its own permanent naval base on Zanzibar or in Mombasa.
Indian politicians – especially old-guard officials with a more left-of-center outlook – might scoff at such military expansion, but the goal is not presence, but rather the growth and soft power ties that security can bring. An Indian base in Mombasa or Zanzibar would naturally attract follow-on Indian investment that would quickly become a hub for deeper commercial penetration in Africa.
If the Democratic Republic of Congo holds US$24 trillion in untapped minerals, metals and rare earths, there is no reason why New Delhi and Washington should cede the field to Beijing. Indeed, Trump’s second-term efforts to make peace in Africa’s Great Lakes region are predicated on an ability to tap Congo’s strategic resources.
This might also represent a formula for US-Indian cooperation in Africa, with the US taking the lead in the interior and India developing its resources along the coast, all toward a common aim based in trade, free markets, regional development, and security.
India’s initial refusal to recognize Somaliland seems a strategic own goal on the part of its Ministry of External Affairs. The Ministry’s statement explaining, “India has longstanding ties with Somalia. We continue to underline the importance of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country,” suggests ignorance of history and law.
Somalia and Somaliland represent a failed confederation akin to the United Arab Republic and Senegambia. In both those cases, India reverted recognition to their constituent parts as the federations failed.
India’s endorsement of Mogadishu, too, stands in direct contradiction to the precedent it set when it recognized Bangladesh’s independence. For India to embrace Somaliland, alone or in conjunction with the US, would signal that India will protect its interests across the entirety of the Indian Ocean Basin and compete with China.
Simply having a presence would raise costs to China and force Beijing to recalculate its interests and outlays. For India to control a naval base while the US controls the nearby airfield could help develop interoperability and cooperation long after the current bilateral tensions dissipate.
Even if India does not want to enter Somaliland – though the US might do so regardless – Mozambique remains a fertile ground for strategic development. Rwanda has largely defeated the Ansar al-Sunna/Islamic State-Mozambique insurgency.
A social factor behind the initial eruption of insurgency was the traditional underdevelopment of northern Cabo Delgado. But it is gas-rich and Pemba has a natural deep-water harbor.
Given the traditionally warm ties between New Delhi and Maputo, India might be the perfect investor to develop the region to mutually benefit of India, Mozambique and the local people in Cabo Delgado.
The US can issue National Security Strategies and National Defense Strategies and believe it is countering China, but rhetoric alone will not counter Beijing’s ambitions, nor will a narrow focus on the Indo-Pacific region, which in practice excludes everything west of Kanyakumari (Cape Comorin).
If the White House is going to counter or roll back Chinese influence, it must first choose whether to do so alone or to repair its frayed ties with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government to work in partnership.
If the latter, then there needs to be a discussion about division of labor: Will India take the lead on the littoral states and the US focus on the interior? Should the US and India, as democracies, embrace Somaliland? What new military bases are needed and where?
With the Chinese already entrenched in Djibouti, security in the Indian Ocean will not begin and end with threats from the South China Sea or a Chinese presence in the Bay of Bengal.
Michael Rubin (MRubin@AEI.org) is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.