The new government in Bangladesh begins its tenure with an unusually crowded foreign policy inbox. The swearing-in of Tarique Rahman as prime minister on February 17, 2026, marks the end of a turbulent transition.
Following a commanding mandate in the February 12 general elections, held simultaneously with a landmark constitutional referendum, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) returns to power in a global economy and regional security environment far less forgiving than the one it faced when it last held office from 2001 to 2006.
The immediate temptation in Dhaka will be to signal a sharp break from the past, emphasizing “strategic autonomy” to distance the state from perceptions of overalignment with India that characterized the Sheikh Hasina years. For a middle power navigating intensifying great power competition, however, autonomy is a hard-won capacity, not merely a slogan.
This capacity will be tested by three inescapable realities: (1) an economy desperate for market stability; (2) a domestic political landscape where Islamists have emerged as the largest opposition bloc; and (3) a neighborhood where the most urgent threat is the chronic volatility along the Myanmar border.
Recalibrating India without triggering a spiral
It goes without saying that India remains Bangladesh’s unavoidable geographic reality and the BNP’s most delicate bilateral challenge.
New Delhi is currently adopting a wait-and-watch policy, eager to see if the new administration will maintain cooperation on counterterrorism, transit and border management or instead drift toward a more Beijing-centric orbit.
Within Bangladesh, years of accumulated grievances – from water sharing to border incidents – make India a convenient domestic foil for nationalist and Islamist forces competing for the mantle of sovereignty.
The stakes are defined by a ticking clock. The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty is due for renewal in December 2026. This deadline will either force a period of pragmatic bargaining or serve as a lightning rod for popular anger if negotiations fail or stall.
Furthermore, the politics of accountability surrounding the 2024 transition risk entangling domestic justice with diplomatic demands on India. BNP leaders must prevent judicial and diplomatic tracks from collapsing into one another. The most workable path forward is “quiet-first” diplomacy.
By utilizing established back channels and working groups for deliverables like border de-escalation and data sharing, paired with deliberate public restraint, Dhaka can avoid a performative confrontation with India that would only raise transaction costs in trade and energy.
China: infrastructure partner, strategic risk
China is deeply embedded in the nation’s development story, with Chinese capital funding the development of ports, transport links and special economic zones.
These projects are strategically legible to outside powers. Any perception that Dhaka is sliding into Beijing’s security orbit will trigger immediate counterpressure from rivals India and the United States.
This is not a theoretical concern for Bangladesh. Washington has already begun pitching defense alternatives to counter China’s rising regional influence, signaling that Dhaka is being viewed through an increasingly competitive geostrategic lens.
BNP’s challenge will be to steer Chinese investment toward productive sectors such as logistics and manufacturing while managing any defense-industrial cooperation so it doesn’t appear as strategic alignment.
By formalizing procurement transparency and diversifying lenders, the party can signal competence rather than hostility. In the current climate, institutional competence is the strongest form of autonomy.
US: trade realism and need for reform
Bangladesh’s export dependence makes Western market access central to its foreign policy. The garment sector remains the backbone of the economy, and recent breakthroughs have provided crucial breathing room.
On February 9, the US and Bangladesh signed a trade deal reducing US “reciprocal” tariffs on Bangladeshi-origin goods from 20% to 19% while creating a zero-tariff pathway (via a capped quota/eligibility mechanism) for select apparel and textiles that use US-origin cotton and fiber inputs.
Dhaka has also leaned into “purchase diplomacy,” as seen in Biman Bangladesh Airlines’ planned procurement of Boeing-made planes — 14 aircraft in the current package — as part of a broader effort to narrow the bilateral trade gap and signal alignment with the US administration’s trade agenda.
It’s not immediately clear how the US Supreme Court’s recent ruling against Trump’s authority to use the International Emergencies Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, to impose “reciprocal” tariffs will impact the Bangladesh deal, though the 15% blanket tariffs he imposed under a different statutory authority are lower than the 19% agreed in the pact.
The BNP’s relationship with Washington is still shaped by the 2021 US sanctions imposed over the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) rights abuses. Resetting ties will thus require measurable security-sector reform and accountability for past abuses.
If Dhaka demonstrates concrete improvements, it can convert geopolitical interest into higher-tech partnerships, steadier market access and improved trade terms.
Myanmar and the Rohingya: crisis without an exit
No issue combines security, morality, and fiscal stress like the Rohingya crisis.
UNHCR reports that Bangladesh hosts over 1 million registered refugees, primarily in the Cox’s Bazar district. The situation is deteriorating rather than stabilizing. Escalated conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine state reportedly drove nearly 200,000 new arrivals into Bangladesh in 2024 and 2025.
The border has become a hazard zone. In early 2026, landmine explosions along the frontier continued to claim lives and limbs, with at least 28 people injured in 2025 alone. This challenge is most likely to trigger a sudden escalation. While repatriation remains politically necessary to promise, it is practically elusive while Myanmar remains in civil war.
The BNP should pursue a “re-internationalized” burden-sharing strategy, working with the US (still the largest donor) to convene a broader coalition and stabilize multiyear funding while strengthening border security and intelligence cooperation to limit armed-group spillover.
In parallel, Dhaka should engage China and other regional stakeholders to press for expanded humanitarian access in Rakhine and conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified Rohingya repatriation.
The BNP’s primary foreign policy challenge is not choosing sides but preventing every partner from assuming that a choice has already been made. The path to “Bangladesh First” entails maintaining calm borders with India, pursuing transparent economic relations with China and implementing measurable governance reforms for the West.
The July National Charter referendum, which passed with 68% of the vote, provides a mandate for institutional overhaul. If the BNP can translate this mandate into stable policy frameworks, Bangladesh will be well-positioned to leverage its geopolitical advantages and market capacity to secure optimal strategic outcomes.
Should the party fail, the nation risks returning to the familiar cyclical trap where domestic polarization generates external skepticism, thereby intensifying the economic constraints and political divides that have long hampered the nation’s development and prosperity.
Md Obaidullah is a visiting scholar at Daffodil International University, Dhaka. He is also a graduate assistant at the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Mississippi. He has published extensively with Routledge, Springer Nature and SAGE, as well as with media outlets such as The Diplomat, East Asia Forum, The Business Standard and Dhaka Tribune.
Dr. Zobayer Ahmed is an associate professor at the Bangladesh Institute of Governance and Management (BIGM). He has over a decade of experience publishing research articles on Bangladesh-related economic development issues in international peer-reviewed journals.