Having seen its high-end air defenses shredded in last year’s war, Iran is now signaling a shift toward a cheaper, more survivable way of blunting future US and Israeli pressure.
This month, the Financial Times reported that Iran has secretly agreed to a roughly US$591 million arms deal with Russia to acquire thousands of Verba man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). This move suggests Iran is rethinking how it plans to survive the next war.
The contract, signed in Moscow in December 2025, covers 500 launch units and 2,500 9M336 missiles to be delivered in tranches from 2027 to 2029, with the possibility that some systems have already arrived. The missiles were requested by Iran days after Israeli and US strikes degraded Iran’s integrated air-defense network and enabled Israel to establish air superiority.
The infrared-guided, man-portable Verba is designed to target cruise missiles, drones and low-flying aircraft, allowing dispersed, mobile teams to operate without vulnerable fixed radar, and includes night-vision sights.
The deal was negotiated by Rosoboronexport and representatives of Iran’s defense ministry, including an official previously sanctioned by the US, and comes amid signs of ongoing military cargo flights and recent deliveries of Russian helicopters.
The transfer would be a cost-efficient way for Russia to support Iran without weakening its own stocks, unlikely to transform Iran’s overall air defense against the US or Israel, but potentially raising risks for helicopter and low-altitude operations, while underscoring deepening Iran-Russia military co-operation despite renewed western sanctions pressure.
According to the US Army’s ODIN database, the Verba has a range of about 6 kilometers and a flight ceiling of roughly 4.5 kilometers, using a three-band electro-optical seeker designed to resist countermeasures such as flares, and carrying a 1.5-kilogram warhead.
Defense Security Asia notes that the system reflects a doctrinal emphasis on distributed, mobile air defense elements able to respond quickly to high-volume threats—an approach that fits Iran’s postwar shift away from vulnerable, high-value air defense sites and toward dispersed, survivable air denial.
Iran’s acquisition of Verba MANPADS may mean more than just a frantic attempt to rebuild its shattered air defense network. During the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, Israeli airpower destroyed many of Iran’s Russian-made S-300 batteries, reflecting the vulnerability of large air defense sites. The Verba addresses this vulnerability by shifting air defense from fixed, high-value sites to infrared-guided missiles operated by dispersed, highly mobile teams.
Infrared missiles can be fired with no warning, potentially catching targets by surprise. While these MANPADS may be ineffective against stealth aircraft such as the F-22, F-35, and B-2, they can still threaten low-flying aircraft, such as helicopters supporting special operations forces in Iran. Downing a special operations helicopter and capturing personnel could give Iran a bargaining chip against the US and Israel.
Russia’s alleged assistance to Iran – even if possibly last-minute – presents a stark contrast to its relative lack of support to the late Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria and the Nicolas Maduro regime in Venezuela.
For one, Iran is a productive partner for Russia in its Ukraine war effort, having supplied the latter with drones, ballistic missiles and artillery ammunition – unlike Syria under Al-Assad and Venezuela under Maduro, which were military liabilities to Russia.
After sustaining heavy losses, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has been largely confined to port, sharply limiting its ability to project power into the Mediterranean and support Syria. At the same time, its focus on Ukraine has left little equipment to spare for Venezuela.
However, from Russia’s geopolitical perspective, Iran is a vital node in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which extends from Russia and Azerbaijan through the Caspian Sea to Iran and out to the Persian Gulf.
The INSTC is a “sanctions evasion corridor” that helps Russia and Iran bypass Western-controlled maritime chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, facilitating trade in oil and gas, electronics, machine tools and other goods.
From Russia’s perspective, US-enabled regime change in Iran would threaten the INSTC, deepening Russia’s economic isolation and bottlenecking its access to Asian markets.
Hence, Russia’s possible limited support for Iran may be justified by the relative geographic ease of supporting Iran compared to Syria or Venezuela, keeping a militarily productive partner and asset afloat, bypassing economic sanctions, and deepening alignment with a like-minded authoritarian partner.
In the broader strategic picture, Iran’s approach is not to defeat US or Israeli airpower outright, but to “win by not losing”—by ensuring regime survival.
Airpower alone does not win wars. Despite the US enjoying overwhelming air superiority over Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, a massive ground presence was still needed to occupy those countries and force regime change, which led to protracted, politically unpopular and controversial wars ending in a catastrophic withdrawal and fragile state, respectively.
In the case of Iran, the US may be banking on the combined effects of airstrikes and mass protests on the ground to topple the theocratic regime.
Still, as long as Iran’s regime institutions remain intact and loyal, it can still plausibly declare victory by simply surviving. Should that happen, the survival of Iran’s regime would clearly demonstrate the limits of US hard power against a regime with significant coercive power and one that has shown its willingness to use lethal force against its population if its survival is imperiled.
Also, it doesn’t follow that if Iran’s theocracy collapses, its successor would be democratic, or, at the very least, willing to compromise with the US. Should Iran’s theocracy fall, one of its successors may be the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which could conceivably be more hardline and belligerent than its predecessor.
More importantly, Iran’s regime survival or replacement could lead to another “forever war” in the Middle East. Although the US and Israel have degraded Iran’s missile forces, proxies and nuclear program, it’s unclear if any have been destroyed, spent, or are still operational.
Whether Iran’s theocracy survives or collapses, the US may still face a long, resource-draining contest. Regime survival would underscore the limits of airpower against a coercive authoritarian state.
In contrast, regime collapse could plausibly usher in a harder, IRGC-dominated successor rather than a pliant democracy. Either outcome risks keeping US military assets, attention and munitions tied down in the Middle East, rather than enabling any sustained strategic pivot to the Pacific to challenge China.