The US-Iran “indirect” talks in Geneva on Tuesday, February 17, 2026, lasted between three and four hours. Omani diplomats acted as intermediaries. The US delegation did not meet directly with the Iranians. Thus suggestions were carried from one side to the other, and vice versa by the Omani intermediaries.
It appears, if the Iranian assessment is correct, that Witkoff agreed to a “framework” deal that is outside of the Trump-Rubio “pillars” of an Iran deal.
There have not yet been public comments from the US side on any results of the Geneva meeting.
Some reports suggest there may be further meetings in “a few days” – depending, of course, on what happens when envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner report to President Donald Trump. Trump will decide on next steps.
Iran claims there is now “broad agreement” on guiding principles based on the results of the Geneva meeting. This alleged agreement appears to center on the nuclear issue and uranium enrichment. Reports suggest that Iran is willing to discuss this topic to a degree, but no other matters such as Iran’s long range missile arsenal, treatment of dissidents (including executions) or Iran’s proxy forces elsewhere (Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza).
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has linked the talks on uranium enrichment to ending US sanctions on Iran. In other words, if a deal were to be made on enrichment it would require the US to remove sanctions (perhaps on an agreed schedule, but that is not stated).
If the Iranian assessment is correct, then it would leave Trump to decide whether to agree to continue the talks based only on the issue of uranium enrichment. Judging from the Iranian assessment, Witkoff and Kushner may have agreed to a substantial minimization of the Trump-Rubio pillars construct. Should that stick, and should Trump agree, he would face strong opposition inside and outside his administration.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has Rubio has doubled down on the demand that any Iran deal must extend far beyond the nuclear file. He stated that for negotiations to succeed, they must address:
- the nuclear program – ensuring a permanent block on weapons development;
- ballistic missiles – including the range and capabilities of Iran’s missile program;
- egional proxies – ending the sponsorship of armed groups across the Middle East; and
- human rights – addressing the Iranian government’s treatment of its own citizens and domestic repression.
Trump has been less explicit, but it appears he has endorsed Rubio’s position. On February 10, Trump used language very similar to Rubio’s “pillars,” stating that any agreement “gotta be a good deal – no nuclear weapons, no missiles, no this, no that.”
Witkoff would have to convince Trump that the only way forward is the “framework” that he is reported by the Iranians to have agreed to in Geneva. Witkoff would be in dangerous waters on this as he surely would be bucking Rubio – and, probably, Trump although this is less certain.
This would not the first time for Witkoff to appear to have agreed to some proposed deal, only to have it reversed and walked back by Trump. That happened on January 6 at a meeting on Ukraine in Paris. Witkoff was ready to sign a European proposal on Ukraine that, had he done so, would have ended any chance of talks with Russia. Apparently Trump told him not to sign.
War assets on the move
The US carrier Gerald R. Ford is en route to the Arabian sea but will not arrive on station until the first week of March. Meanwhile, other US war assets are moving to the region.
At present, Three full squadrons (approx. 36 aircraft) of F-15E Strike Eagles are operating out of Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. This includes the 494th Fighter Squadron from RAF Lakenheath (UK).
A significant movement of 5th-generation stealth fighters is underway. Six F-35As recently landed at RAF Lakenheath as a staging point. Others have moved to Morón Air Base in Spain, preparing to jump into the Middle East.
At least one squadron of A-10 Thunderbolt II (”Warthogs”) is active in the Gulf, recently seen conducting training exercises with the USS Santa Barbara in the Persian Gulf. One F-16 squadron is currently stationed in the region to provide versatile multi-role support.
“Dozens” of refueling tankers ( KC-135s & KC-46s ) have been moved to the UK and the Middle East to maintain a “tanker bridge” for 24/7 flight operations.
Meanwhile E-2D Hawkeye surveillance planes and MQ-9 Reaper drones are providing constant monitoring of Iranian troop movements and the Strait of Hormuz.
The US carriers each carry around 100 combat and surveillance aircraft including US Marines and US Navy F-35s and F-18 super hornets.
As of February 17, 2026, there are approximately 50,000 U.S. troops stationed across the Middle East.
This number reflects a significant surge ordered by the Trump administration to provide leverage during the current Geneva negotiations. This is an increase from the “baseline” of about 34,000-to-40,000 troops typically maintained in the region over the last few years.
At least eight Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are currently forward-positioned. Ships such as the USS Delbert D. Black are equipped with the Aegis Baseline 9 system, which can track and shoot down ballistic missiles while simultaneously fighting off drone swarms.
These ships carry the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), which can hit ballistic missiles in space (exo-atmospheric), and the SM-6, which provides “over-the-horizon” defense against maneuvering cruise missiles.
The US also has land-based THAAD and Patriot air defense systems. A full THAAD battery was recently confirmed via satellite at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. This system is the “high-tier” defense, capable of intercepting short-to-intermediate-range ballistic missiles as they re-enter the atmosphere. Additional THAAD units are stationed in Israel and reportedly in Saudi Arabia to provide regional coverage. Multiple batteries of Patriot are located at at Al-Udeid Air Base (Qatar) and Ali Al-Salem (Kuwait).
Patriot air defense missiles are in short supply. The US will be unable to provide them to Ukraine, Taiwan, Korea or elsewhere for up to two years.
Recent internal Pentagon assessments reveal that US stockpiles of Patriot interceptors have fallen to approximately 25% of the levels required for major theater operations.
THAAD interceptors also are limited. During Operation Midnight Hammer in June, 2025, the US Army reportedly fired between 150 and 250 THAAD interceptors to defend Israel and regional bases from Iranian ballistic missile volleys. This expenditure represented roughly 25% of the total THAAD inventory the US had ever purchased. Keep in mind that not all THAAD interceptors are fit for service.
The above does not count potentially available regional assets that include Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and others.
Should Trump not agree with the so-called “framework” agreement, he will probably agree to at least one more negotiating session as military operations can’t proceed full force without the arrival of the Gerald R. Ford carrier and the transfer of some long range bombers (B-2, B-52) closer to the region. This suggests that early March is when Trump would be able to kick off a military operation if that is what he decides.
Asia Times senior correspondent Stephen Bryen is a former US deputy under secretary of defense. Read this article and others on his Substack, Weapons and Strategy.