India’s move to expand its Rafale fleet comes as it weighs recent combat lessons, urgent force-structure shortfalls, and longer-term strategic ties with France in a rapidly shifting regional security environment.
This month, the Indian Ministry of Defense and multiple media outlets reported that India has cleared the way for a landmark purchase of 114 French-built Rafale multirole fighter jets, with the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) granting initial approval in mid-February as part of a broader package of defense procurements estimated at 3.6 trillion rupees (US$39.6 billion), according to officials and industry reports.
The decision authorizes negotiations with Dassault Aviation on commercial and technical terms. It is intended to shore up the Indian Air Force (IAF), whose fighter strength has fallen to around 29–30 squadrons, down from a sanctioned 42, after the retirement of ageing MiG-21s, with MiG-29s, Jaguars and Mirage 2000s due to follow.
Under the plan, roughly 18-20 jets would be delivered in fly-away condition by around 2030, while the remainder—potentially about 96—would be built in India with Hindustan Aeronautics under the government’s “Make in India” push, including technology transfer and local integration of weapons.
India already operates 36 Rafales and has ordered 26 naval variants. Officials say expanding the fleet would boost air dominance, long-range strike, and deterrence as tensions persist with China and Pakistan, even as India balances offers from the US and Russia to preserve strategic autonomy.
India’s decision follows the loss of a Rafale to Pakistan’s J-10C jets during the May 2025 Kashmir engagement. Rather than undermining the jet’s capabilities, this incident has shifted focus to the need for effective systems and integration in modern aerial warfare.
As Justin Bronk argues in a June 2025 article for the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), India’s aircraft losses cannot be judged as a simple platform-versus-platform failure but must be understood through the wider aerial warfare ecosystem. Bronk stresses that outcomes depend on warning and cueing, noting that even old missiles can kill modern jets if crews are unaware or receive late alerts.
He highlights uncertainties over offboard intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the timeliness of launch warnings, and whether Rafale’s SPECTRA suite carried up-to-date threat libraries and countermeasure programs. Bronk also points to airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and possible Chinese orbital ISR and command-and-control (C2) support as factors that could enable a more effective, networked kill chain.
Dinakar Peri similarly contends that the Kashmir clash illustrates the importance of networked warfare. According to Peri, the outcome was shaped more by integrated sensor networks and air defenses than by the individual merits of the Rafale.
While India suffered losses, Peri notes that the broader campaign demonstrated the growing importance of beyond-visual-range combat, long-range precision weapons, and force multipliers—lessons also drawn from the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, tensions with China in the Himalayas and the Russia-Ukraine war.
Peri adds that India’s views on the May 2025 clash are obscured by an undue focus on specific platforms,” underscoring a shift toward system-of-systems thinking rather than platform blame.
Beyond combat lessons, structural pressures on the IAF also shape the Rafale decision. M. Rajesh argues in a March 2025 article in the peer-reviewed International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research that India faces a worsening airpower gap against China and Pakistan, lacks any fifth-generation fighters, and operates below authorized squadron strength as older aircraft retire.
Rajesh identifies the Rafale as India’s most advanced 4.5-generation platform and a stopgap to offset delays in the Tejas light fighter program and the long timeline for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), while noting that alternatives such as the US F-35 or the Russian Su-57 are costly and offer limited technology transfer.
Strategic considerations also weigh heavily. India’s procurement of French Rafales may reflect what is often called “fighter diplomacy”—the use of combat aircraft sales as a tool of statecraft rather than just commerce.
In the Indian case, Mathieu Droin and other writers argue in a July 2023 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the Rafale purchase is driven less by platform performance than by a broader quest for strategic autonomy.
They point out that India seeks to diversify away from overreliance on Russia, prioritize politically reliable suppliers, and secure guarantees of spare parts and weapons in crises—criteria that France uniquely meets.
The writers add that Rafale purchases fit India’s aim to move beyond a buyer–seller relationship toward technology cooperation, co-development and co-production, strengthening indigenous capacity while avoiding dependence on any single great power.
More broadly, they argue that Rafale procurement supports India’s strategy of maintaining flexibility in a multipolar order while balancing ties with the US, Russia and Europe.
From France’s perspective, Gaspard Schnitzler writes in a September 2023 article for the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) that French arms exports, led by platforms like the Rafale, serve two core strategic purposes: sovereignty and influence.
First, Schnitzler notes that exports sustain France’s defense industrial and technological base, preserving critical skills, production lines, and strategic autonomy that domestic orders alone cannot support, while also lowering unit costs through higher volumes.
Second, he argues that arms sales are treated as political and diplomatic instruments, not merely commercial deals, and are typically accompanied by defense cooperation and strategic partnerships that extend French influence and promote interoperability.
Beyond France, Rafale sales to India could also be seen in the context of debates over European strategic autonomy.
Jacopo Barigazzi and other writers argue in a Politico article this month that while Europe can manufacture sophisticated weapons, it remains heavily dependent on the US for intelligence, logistics, communications, refueling, space assets, and command-and-control.
They note that European officials describe replacing these “strategic enablers” as a priority and a first step toward independence, but warn that the cost could reach around 10 percent of GDP and require massive investment in ISR, space and C2.
Building a stronger European defense industry, they argue, is necessary but insufficient on its own, because autonomy depends on creating integrated, high-end enabling capabilities rather than just producing more weapons.
Taken together, India’s Rafale expansion reflects a judgment that fixing force-structure gaps and building a resilient, networked airpower ecosystem matters more than