Syrian President Ahmed “Jolani” al-Sharaa’s second trip to Moscow in several months was widely interpreted as relating to the future of Russia’s air and naval bases there.
That may be true, especially since they play a practically irreplaceable logistical role for Russia’s “Africa Corps” that’s active in several places across the continent, but its interests in Syria go far beyond that. As Sharaa himself emphasized during his first meeting with President Vladimir Putin, he envisions Russia helping to build the “New Syria.”
This grand goal was analyzed here at the time and can be summarized as a joint post-modern “nation-building mission” similar in spirit to the dozens that Russia’s Soviet predecessor undertook across the Global South during the Cold War.
Replicating this approach in today’s Syria advances several interconnected Russian interests, not least the preservation and expansion of its business activity there. This is of outsized significance nowadays given the US-led West’s anti-Russian sanctions.
Making money is important, but benefiting Syria and its people in the process would demonstrate that Russian businesses can be relied upon to assist other conflict-afflicted countries with reconstruction, thus deepening Russia’s ties with such states and ideally widening its range of partnerships.
This applies to the Central African Republic and the Alliance of Sahelian States, where Russia already enjoys such ties, and to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan, whose reconstruction it hopes to aid.
What is remarkable about Russia’s role in jointly building the “New Syria” is that many expected it to lose influence there shortly after President Bashar al-Assad’s downfall.
Sharaa’s partnership with Putin, therefore, serves as an example for other states where Russia might experience similar setbacks, such as post-Maduro Venezuela and possibly soon Iran, that they too can benefit by preserving and expanding Russian influence. The Syrian precedent shows the US will not always force such states to cut ties with Russia.
Post-Maduro Venezuela might be coerced into reducing those ties due to far greater US pressure driven by the “Donroe Doctrine” of dominating the Americas, but it is notable that Russia confirmed diplomatic ties remain intact and military-technical cooperation continues.
Newly US-aligned states that follow the pragmatic model pioneered by Sharaa can more effectively avert disproportionate dependence on the US and other patrons and maximize their political flexibility.
This demonstration effect is expected to appeal to many countries, both those in situations similar to Syria’s, whether newly US-aligned or conflict-afflicted, and those that are not, such as geopolitically neutral and relatively stable Global South countries.
This dynamic could aid Russia’s geopolitical balancing act. Russia’s soft power might also rise within the international Muslim community, or ummah, after state and non-state members witness mutually beneficial cooperation between Islamist-led Syria and Russia.
In sum, Russia’s role in jointly building the “New Syria” advances far more of its interests than merely retaining its military bases there, though those bases remain important.
Russia aims to preserve and expand its business activity in Syria, encourage a wide range of countries to partner with it by demonstrating the benefits its businesses can bring to newly US-aligned or conflict-afflicted states and strengthen its soft power in the ummah. These goals are reasonable and achievable.
A version of this article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished here with editing for clarity and fluency. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber here.