The Board of Peace, established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803, represents a novel—and contentious—experiment in international peacemaking that goes far beyond stabilizing and rebuilding Gaza.
Its membership, which includes the United Arab Emirates, Hungary, Pakistan, Israel, Turkey, Qatar and others, reflects an eclectic coalition that prioritizes pragmatic deal-making over traditional multilateral consensus.
Critics have raised alarms that the body could undermine the United Nations by creating a parallel structure that eclipses the Security Council’s authority. Yet the more compelling case is that the Board could serve as a valuable complement to the UNSC rather than a rival.
Its nimble structure, diverse composition and emphasis on on-the-ground implementation could address some of the UN’s longstanding shortcomings in its approach to conflict resolution — without displacing the Council’s primacy under the UN Charter.
Repeated crises in Ukraine, Syria and the Gaza war aftermath have demonstrated how veto power can paralyze the Council precisely when swift action is essential.
In such circumstances, the Board of Peace offers a more agile alternative. Free from the risk of vetoes, it could convene at short notice to address emerging flashpoints and provide recommendations to the Council.
This advisory function would not encroach on the UNSC’s authority. Instead, it would enrich deliberations with perspectives from a broader — or simply different — array of states, thereby fostering a more inclusive dialogue on global stability.
The Board’s greatest potential lies in preventive diplomacy and mediation—areas where the Council often struggles. The Council is well equipped for crisis response, including deploying troops, enforcing arms embargoes and imposing sanctions.
Yet its bureaucracy and complex politics frequently slow or block early action, allowing tensions to escalate into larger crises.
This is exactly where the Board could make a real difference. Its layered committee structure gives it the speed and flexibility the Council so often lacks in conducting nimble diplomacy.
The Board could act rapidly by sending envoys to shuttle between parties unwilling to meet face-to-face, quietly managing back-channel talks or engaging rivals at the earliest signs of tension.
By feeding frontline insights and practical recommendations straight to the Security Council, the Board could act as a credible early-warning system — spotting risks and proposing concrete steps to de-escalate long before a crisis spins out of control.
That role would align neatly with the United Nations’ repeated calls for stronger conflict prevention, shifting the focus from merely reacting to crises to preventing them from igniting in the first place. In practice, this could mean containing minor disputes or flare-ups before they escalate into wider, more destructive confrontations.
The Board is already collaborating with the High Representative and the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza to restore infrastructure, education and governance — tasks that UN missions have too often left under-resourced.
The Board also brings much-needed new voices to a system whose core architecture has remained essentially unchanged since 1945. With members spanning the Middle East, Europe, Asia and beyond, it can incorporate input from civil society, the private sector actors and even technologists.
Skeptics caution that the Board may fragment global governance or weaken UN authority. This concern is not new. The Council has long delegated operational responsibilities to regional organizations, and a comparable partnership with the Board — particularly where consensus in the Council remains elusive — would fit comfortably within established practice while helping to avoid overlap.
The Board’s ambitions already extend beyond Gaza. It positions itself as a specialized partner to the Council, not a competitor. In climate-related conflicts — an increasingly urgent Council priority — the Board could lead targeted, on-the-ground adaptation efforts, translating high-level resolutions into tangible outcomes.
To be sure, challenges abound. Transparency and robust accountability mechanisms are non-negotiable to address concerns about undue influence—particularly by the United States.
Another challenge will be securing sustainable funding, which can conceivably be addressed through hybrid financing that blends voluntary contributions from member states to the UN’s peacekeeping budget.
Above all, the Board must open its doors wider to voices from the Global South. Without meaningful participation from Africa, Latin America and South Asia, it risks being seen — and dismissed — as yet another imperial initiative dressed up in multilateral clothing.
Handled with care, however, the Board could breathe new life into a collective security system that historically has too often stalled.
Eric Alter is dean of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy (Abu Dhabi), non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former UN civil servant.