As the US locks in the long-delayed F/A-XX, the program has become a test of whether its carrier airpower can avoid strategic erosion in a Pacific increasingly shaped by China’s scale, proximity and mass.
This month, the US Senate Committee on Appropriations moved to lock in the revival of the US Navy’s long-delayed F/A-XX next-generation carrier fighter, using the fiscal 2026 appropriations process to shield the program from further disruption and force accelerated progress.
The legislation directs the US Department of Defense (DoD) to obligate US Navy research, development, test and evaluation funds to execute the engineering and manufacturing development contract for the Next Generation Fighter aircraft, with the explicit goal of achieving an accelerated initial operational capability.
Lawmakers also prohibit using any fiscal 2026 or prior-year funds to pause, cancel or terminate the program, signaling Congressional frustration with years of uncertainty surrounding the US Navy’s future air wing.
The language effectively reverses earlier DoD hesitation and places the F/A-XX on firmer institutional footing, even as cost pressures and competing priorities weigh on US naval aviation.
By mandating continued funding flow and barring program stoppages, the US Congress is asserting direct oversight over the US Navy’s transition beyond the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, aiming to preserve carrier air superiority against increasingly capable Chinese and Russian air defenses.
The move underscores growing concern among US lawmakers that delays to F/A-XX could erode the long-term relevance of US aircraft carriers in high-end conflicts.
As to what significant improvement the F/A-XX brings over current US carrier-based fighters, Jon Harper mentions in an April 2025 Defense Scoop article that the F/A-XX will surpass existing US Navy fighters mainly through range, survivability and AI-enabled operations, with range described as a “core attribute.”
According to US Navy officials cited by Harper, the F/A-XX will have over 125% of the range of current carrier aircrafts – a core necessity given the “tyranny of distance” in the Pacific theater.
By comparison, Harper says that, according to the US Navy, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet has a “clean” – without external tanks or pods, carrying only two AIM-9 missiles – range of 2,360 kilometers, implying an inherent F/A-XX range of at least 2,945 kilometers before refueling.
US officials cited by Harper also note that with organic tanker support, the F/A-XX’s operational reach could be effectively indefinite. The same cited officials highlight enhanced stealth, penetration of post-2040 threat environments and AI-driven “man-on-the-loop” control, enabling close integration with unmanned systems.
Kris Osborne mentions in an October 2025 Warrior Maven article that the F/A-XX is the US Navy’s primary answer to China’s growing fleet of 5th and emerging 6th-generation fighters. Osborne argues that China’s large and expanding fleets of J-20 and carrier-capable J-35 fighters could overwhelm aging US carrier air wings through mass and proximity to China’s coasts.
Delving into the operational impact of the F/A-XX, Rebecca Grant mentions in a December 2025 Breaking Defense article that increasing the fighter combat radius from roughly 1,110 kilometers to more than 1,390 kilometers enables carriers to deliver effects 1,600–2,400 kilometers from the ship.
She notes that capability enables carriers to operate across a much wider maritime area, reducing exposure to Chinese missile threats while maintaining strike effectiveness.
She adds that the F/A-XX would restore the carrier air wing’s ability to conduct long-range, high-end operations against China in a highly contested Pacific battlespace.
Grant says that the F/A-XX enables the US Navy to engage Chinese fighters at extended distances and offset numerical inferiority through superior reach, survivability and advanced sensors.
Situating the F/A-XX in a larger operational picture, Bryan Clark and Timothy Walton mention in an April 2022 Hudson Institute report that the F/A-XX complements other forces by enabling carriers to remain mobile, survivable command-and-strike hubs rather than forward missile sponges.
Clark and Walton note that submarines and surface action groups (SAGs) conduct missile strikes closer to China. Still, they say these assets are constrained by reload cycles and survivability issues.
At the same time, they state the F/A-XX’s extended range allows carriers to stay significantly away from mainland China, preserving freedom of maneuver while still contributing sustained airpower.
Clark and Walton also say that land-based aircraft and space-based sensors provide wide-area intelligence, sensors, and reconnaissance (ISR), cueing F/A-XX strikes without exposing carriers or aircraft to dense PLA missile defenses.
Additionally, they state that unmanned systems such as MQ-25 tankers, ISR unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and communications relays extend reach, endurance and connectivity.
Clark and Walton say that this division of labor lets carriers exploit the sea as maneuver space, shifting position dynamically while remaining integrated into distributed, decision-centric operations against China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) networks.
But could the F/A-XX radically alter the airpower balance in the Pacific? Douglas Barrie and Ben Thornley mention in a May 2024 report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) that the airpower balance in the Pacific has shifted toward contested parity, as the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has narrowed the gap through large numbers of modern and advanced fighters.
Those include the J-20, and long-range air-to-air missiles that rival or exceed US systems, creating a real risk that the US could lose assured air superiority in a Taiwan contingency.
Barrie and Thornley link future US efforts to regain the balance to next-generation programs, which are explicitly shaped by Pacific operational demands and intended to restore qualitative advantages in range, survivability and counter-air performance.
However, they stress that next-gen programs alone cannot guarantee dominance; restoring the balance depends on numbers, weapons, integration, training and joint operations.
Also, fighter numbers may not be in favor of the US in the Pacific. John Venable and Joshua Baker mention in a September 2025 report for the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies that fighter numbers in a Taiwan conflict would favor China, not the US, especially in the early stages of a war.
Venable and Baker point out that today’s US Air Force has about 1,184 total fighters, compared with more than 4,500 Soviet fighters during the Cold War benchmark, while China’s PLAAF fields over 1,100 fighters, many concentrated near the Western Pacific.
In the theater, they state that the US Air Forces Pacific has roughly 140 fighters, versus China’s ability to mass hundreds of J-20s near Taiwan. They argue that the tyranny of distance, low readiness and limited sortie generation compound this numerical disadvantage, increasing the risk of parity or inferiority.
Ultimately, the F/A-XX is not about restoring dominance but about delaying erosion, buying US carrier airpower time and maneuver space in a Pacific fight that would be defined by distance, mass and endurance.