Since early January, President Trump has committed several times to intervening in Iran should its regime violently repress domestic protests, explaining that the US was “locked and loaded and ready to go,” and that Tehran would “get hit very hard.”
Trump made similar threats before. But the coup that Washington launched on January 3 to depose Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro suggests he may be serious about conducting regime change in Iran. That would be a colossal mistake. Though the US could still get entangled in Venezuela, Iran is a much larger country, far from Washington’s “backyard,” and in a deeply unstable region.
Yet regime change has ardent supporters in America’s establishment. Israel also endorses the goal.
Since his return to power, Trump has intensified Washington’s sanctions. Despite reassuring intelligence estimates, he decided, right before new talks with Tehran, to join the strikes campaign that Israel had launched in mid-June last year against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
During that 12-day war, he portrayed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as an “easy target” and evoked regime change (although he backtracked later). In late December, he proclaimed that America and Israel would “knock [Iran] down” should it revive its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
The Israeli-US strikes made Tehran seem much more vulnerable. Although triggered by economic distress, ongoing protests have morphed into broader demands. Iran’s regional proxies have suffered resounding defeats in the last two years, compounding the regime’s sense of vulnerability.
Finally, Washington’s Venezuela operation has succeeded so far, at least tactically. Thus his threats against other states and territories—including Cuba, Mexico and Greenland—since then could signal an openly imperial turn.
Tehran’s regime is ruthless, has sponsored terrorism and could develop nuclear weapons. Yet, with a low GDP, a small military budget and a rough regional neighborhood, Iran’s threat to Washington is limited. More broadly, the Middle East is now seemingly secondary in strategic importance compared to the US homeland, the Americas and the Indo-Pacific.
An intervention in Iran would have significant consequences. Russia and China could feel much more threatened than after Maduro’s fall. Iran, for instance, is the only Middle Eastern state that could defy US orders to halt oil exports to Beijing. Despite a long-standing rivalry, the Arab states seem divided about Tehran.
Most importantly, as America’s horrendous record from Iraq to Afghanistan and Libya demonstrates, regime change is inherently problematic. Military occupations overlook post-war challenges, misunderstand local societies and galvanize nationalism, thereby entangling foreign powers and destabilizing entire regions.
Backing rebels and conducting assassinations rarely works. Moreover, regime change seldom improves relations with interveners, especially because new leaders often lack authority. Iran’s characteristics compound those issues. Its vastness, mountainous terrain and large population would pose far worse challenges to foreign interveners than Iraq ever did.
Iran’s regime counts one million troops, including 150,000 Revolutionary Guards. Its regional proxies are rebuilding their military, financial and ideological power, which the Shiite community’s fear of “marginalization and violence” facilitates. In any prolonged effort at US-imposed regime change, China and Russia could be expected to support Iran with advanced weapon systems.
Although domestic protests could grow, the regime has dedicated supporters. Exiled groups are unpopular, divided and have suffered from Tehran’s assassination campaigns. The 12-day war made Iran’s nuclear program more opaque. Domestic protests and talk of foreign-led regime change may further legitimize the bomb’s proponents.
More broadly, Iran’s nationalism runs high. Its civilization dates back millennia, but foreign aggressions have fueled a deep sense of humiliation. The US features there.
In 1953, Washington and London overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh after he nationalized Iran’s oil resources. The US backed the Shah’s autocracy, which inspired the Islamic Revolution (1979).
During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Washington supported Iraq and failed to condemn the use of Western-supplied chemical weapons against Iranian troops and civilians.
America’s inclusion of Iran in the “Axis of Evil,” attempts to derail its nuclear program, revocation of the 2015 nuclear deal and devastating economic sanctions have generated rally-around-the-flag effects benefiting Tehran’s regime.
Conflict in Iran could involve regional powers, create millions of refugees and inspire revolt across the Middle East. Shiites represent up to 70% of Bahrain’s population, and 25-30% of Saudi Arabia’s oil-producing eastern province. Given the Strait of Hormuz’s proximity, energy prices would soar, crippling the Global South and world economy.
Should Iran’s regime fall, its ethnic minorities could seek independence or “statelets,” incentivizing neighboring powers to intervene for geopolitical gains or to contain transnational violence.
Whatever its initial caution, the US would become embroiled. For example, Washington may be tempted to deploy more forces out of misplaced concerns about credibility, risking escalation while depleting scarce and expensive capabilities.
Escalation could become uncontrollable as Tehran may opt to exhaust its ballistic missile arsenal before being compromised, or as Israel makes aggressive moves without consulting Washington, as it recently did.
Pressure for a ground intervention may grow after realizing that air strikes are unviable, given that Iran’s targets are deep underground or could produce “a Chernobyl-like radiological plume.” Likewise, state collapse would require preventing its uranium stockpile from falling into hostile hands.
Washington has begun an intervention with no clear endgame in Venezuela. The last thing it needs is to start another one in the Middle East. The US should instead pursue diplomacy with all regional and major powers.
In exchange for robust Iranian concessions on nuclear matters and defanging its regional proxies, Washington would be wiser to offer sanctions relief and renounce US-led regime change.
Thomas P. Cavanna (Ph.D) is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and collaborating academic visitor at Lehigh University.