American President Donald Trump’s military operation in Venezuela on January 3, 2026 — Operation Absolute Resolve — has been presented as a necessary and proportionate response to “narcotics trafficking” and “state criminality” by the Trump administration. Framed as a success of the “America First” policy, the invasion is defended as a limited, targeted use of force that incurred nominal American casualties while achieving “important national security interests.”

Yet, from the standpoint of international law and global governance, the operation represents a far more consequential development: a direct challenge to the normative and legal constraints that have underpinned the international order established by US leadership after World War II. It forces a fundamental question: Is the rules-based system a binding framework for all states, or merely a rhetorical convenience for the powerful?

The legal framework: clear rules, contested application

At the heart of the controversy lies the United Nations Charter, the foundational treaty of modern international law, adopted by the United States at the San Francisco Conference. Article 2(4) explicitly prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The Charter permits only two narrow exceptions: self-defense against an armed attack (Article 51), and collective security action authorized by the UN Security Council on humanitarian grounds.

Operation Absolute Resolve clearly fits neither category. No armed attack from Venezuela targeted the US. The Security Council did not authorize. The US did not seek a Security Council resolution, which would have been virtually certain to face a Russian or Chinese veto. The Trump administration’s invocation of “narco-terrorism” and “transnational crime” offers no recognized legal basis for unilateral military intervention under established laws governing the use of force.

This is not a test of legal ambiguity. It is a blatant disregard for international law. Major powers – such as the US, Russia, China and India – brazenly use creative justifications like “humanitarian intervention” and “protection of citizens” to bypass the UN system whenever it suits their aims.

Foundational principles under strain

Beyond the UN Charter, the operation strikes at the core principles of customary international law.

First, sovereign equality: All states, regardless of size or power, possess equal sovereignty. This principle is the cornerstone of the UN system. Any unilateral military overthrow of a government, regardless of its domestic legitimacy, is a direct assault on this principle. It sends an unmistakable message: for small and weak states, sovereignty is conditional, not absolute or equal.

Second, non-intervention: This corollary to sovereignty is unmistakably codified in the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which includes both the United States and Venezuela as member states. The operation blatantly disregarded this principle, failing to seek from the OAS either mediation or approval. This action reignites deep anxieties across Latin America about “yankee imperialism” and external interference.

Third, head-of-state immunity: Detaining and transferring Venezuela’s political leadership raises a distinct legal issue. International law generally shields sitting heads of state from arrest and prosecution by foreign authorities. Ignoring this norm creates a dangerous precedent, politicizing how powerful nations treat opposing leaders.

The precedent problem and the multipolarity

International law works through enforcement, precedent, and state practice. Each time a major power acts alone, it weakens expectations that others will follow the rules. When the US, the main architect and voice of the “rules-based order,” acts outside it, that encourages others to do the same.

Russia, China, India, Iran and other regional powers do not need new justifications for future interventions. They can simply point to the precedent set in Venezuela. This “precedent cascade” is especially dangerous in today’s multipolar and adversarial world. Geopolitical rivalry is already straining institutions for cooperation and development. The action risks accelerating a retreat into spheres of influence and “might-makes-right” regional security architectures.

Regional fallout and institutional erosion

Within Latin America, the intervention is profoundly destabilizing. It has sparked immediate condemnation from regional powers such as Brazil and Mexico, while drawing mostly support from a handful of ideologically aligned governments. By sidelining the OAS and other regional diplomacy mechanisms, Washington has undermined the very institutions created to manage hemispheric crises peacefully.

Likely consequences include greater instability in Venezuela, more refugees and division in the region between pro- and anti-intervention camps. These outcomes harm long-term US interests in a stable neighborhood. Tactical gains may lead to long-term strategic losses.

The logic of power versus the logic of law

Political philosophers have long warned against systems ruled by raw power instead of shared norms. Kautilya’s concept of Matsya Nyaya – the “law of the fish,” equivalent of “law of the jungle” in English, where big fish devour the small – captures the alternative to a rules-based order. This order is summed up by the idea that the strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must. Despite its flaws and selective application, the post-1945 system was designed to transcend this logic and has helped prevent great-power war for over 75 years.

Actions like the Venezuela intervention risk undoing this progress by legitimizing unilateral force – the very logic the system was meant to restrain. Such actions also point to a world in which legal arguments come after, with decisions mainly justified by a powerful nation’s interests.

Domestic authority and international legitimacy

The legitimacy crisis is not just international. In the US, the operation raises major concerns about constitutional war powers. Congress did not explicitly authorize this large-scale offensive operation, which violates the 1973 War Powers Resolution. This continues the executive branch’s decades-long trend of reducing legislative oversight of war and peace.

Eroding checks and balances at home is closely tied to losing international legitimacy for the US. Actions taken without proper democratic authorization at home are weaker and are more easily seen as illegitimate abroad. When unilateralism appears at home and abroad, it profoundly affects democratic governance and the United States’ ability to maintain a sustainable foreign policy.

A pyrrhic victory?

Supporters of the operation will point to tactical outcomes: few US casualties, disrupted “criminal networks” and a show of resolve. But international leadership is built on long-term credibility and trust, not short-term gains.

What’s being depleted is harder to quantify but is undeniably vital: trust in the United States’ commitments, faith in its restraint and the country’s authority as a steward of global norms. For allies, it decisively raises doubts about US reliability; for “America’s adversaries”, it’s a handover of justification for their own actions; for the Global South, it unmistakably reinforces suspicions of Western double standards.

The Venezuela intervention exposes a central, unyielding challenge of 21st-century geopolitics: Will power remain subject to law, or will law capitulate to power? The rules-based order survives only if its core prohibitions, especially against aggressive war, are enforced unequivocally, for every state – weak or strong, big or small. Its ultimate test is the compliance of the most powerful. If the system’s principal architects disregard these obligations, its erosion is not just likely – it is certain. The decline of the American-designed world order, then, becomes inevitable.

In this sense, Venezuela is more than a regional crisis. It is a stress test for the entire international system. The aftermath will show if the norms set after the Second World War still bind us, or if a new, more anarchic order is emerging, where strength alone rules.

The world is watching, and the precedent now set will resonate far beyond the Caribbean.

Bhim Bhurtel is on X at @BhimBhurtel 

Bhim Bhurtel teaches Development Economics and Global Political Economy in the Master's program at Nepal Open University. He was the executive director of the Nepal South Asia Center (2009-14), a Kathmandu-based South Asian development think-tank. Bhurtel can be reached at bhim.bhurtel@gmail.com.

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2 Comments

  1. I’m confused, didn’t U.S. did the same thing to Panama in 1989 to kidnap their President?

    How come international law and world order didn’t collapse after that?