Myanmar’s ‘fragmentation’ is a myth—and China’s greatest asset

A narrative has taken hold in foreign capitals that Myanmar is on the verge of collapsing into a failed state.

The military junta and its supporters warn that the fall of the regime would unleash a chaotic “Balkanization” of warring ethnic groups. International actors, fearing a power vacuum, have hesitated to fully back the country’s pro-democracy revolution.

This narrative is a strategic deception.

Two major events this week prove that the opposite is true. On December 15, nineteen of Myanmar’s most significant armed resistance groups formed the Spring Revolution Alliance (SRA). This followed a December 14 statement from the powerful United League of Arakan (ULA) outlining a practical framework for federal cooperation.

These developments are not random; they are a direct, coordinated response to the junta’s upcoming “sham elections.” By consolidating military command and political strategy now, the people of Myanmar are preemptively rejecting the military’s attempt to stage a fraudulent vote.

They are demonstrating that while the junta plans political theater, the resistance is building a functioning federal state.

Myanmar is already fragmented—and the junta is to blame

The fear that Myanmar might fragment obscures the reality that the country is already fragmented, and the military junta is the cause. As of late 2025, the junta retains stable control over a mere 21% of the country.

The rest is either administered by resistance forces or actively contested. The military is not a guarantor of unity; it is a garrison state clinging to power while ruling over a minority of the population.

This vacuum of decisive international support, born from the West’s fear of state collapse, has been expertly exploited by a single external power: China. The resulting state of division is sustained by a cynical strategy that serves Beijing’s interests.

Fearing a unified, democratic Myanmar aligned with Western interests, China has settled on a policy of “managed chaos”—providing the junta with enough support to prevent its collapse but not enough to win.

SRA strategic encirclement

The formation of the SRA is not merely a political declaration; it is a reshaping of the battlefield. By analyzing the geography of its 19 member groups, a clear military strategy emerges: a “constrictor” alliance that links the battle-hardened ethnic periphery with the manpower-rich Bamar heartland.

1. The Eastern Flank (Karenni & Shan States):
The alliance includes the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), widely considered one of the most effective fighting forces in the country, alongside the Pa-O People’s Defense Force, Pa-O National Defense Force, and Danu People Liberation Front.

• Battlefield Role: These groups control the strategic hills east of the capital, Naypyitaw. The KNDF brings urban warfare expertise from Loikaw, while the Pa-O and Danu forces sever the junta’s access to the trade-rich Shan plateau.

2. The Western Corridor (Chin & Sagaing Border):
The inclusion of the Chin Brotherhood and the Kalay Revolution Force (KRF) secures the vital western approaches.

• Battlefield Role: This bloc controls the mountainous supply lines to the Indian border. Their integration ensures that the resistance in the central plains cannot be starved of logistics, creating a protected corridor that runs from the Indian border deep into the Bamar heartland.

3. The Heartland Anvil (Sagaing, Magway & Yaw):
The core of the alliance lies in the Bamar-majority Dry Zone, featuring the 96 Soldier PDF, Magway PDF, Sagaing PDF, Yaw Army, Yaw Defense Force, Student Armed Force (SAF), Generation Z Army (GZA), Bamar Army (BA), BLDF, FFD and PIA.

• Battlefield Role: These groups deny the junta control of the country’s agricultural and population center. By combining forces, they transform scattered guerrilla bands into a territorial army capable of holding towns and cutting the junta’s north-south supply arteries (the Chindwin and Irrawaddy rivers).

4. The Southern Reach (Mon State):
The Mon State Revolutionary Force (MSRF) extends the alliance’s reach to the southern coast.

• Battlefield Role: This stretches the junta’s overextended forces toward the Andaman Sea, preventing the military from concentrating all its resources on the north.

5. The Cross-Regional Glue:
Perhaps most significantly, the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) acts as a mobile bridge. Having trained in the east with ethnic allies and fighting now in the center and north, they symbolize the operational unity of the SRA.

Beyond the battlefield, the resistance is building the infrastructure of a state. In resistance‑held parts of Sagaing and Magway, the Sagaing Forum and Magway Forum bring together PDFs, civil servants, CSOs and community leaders to coordinate taxation, justice, health and education. These bodies are effectively functioning as proto‑state assemblies.

From these forums have emerged “federal units”—joint civil–military structures that run schools, mobile clinics, IDP support, and local policing. This governance persists even in contested zones where junta airstrikes, such as the recent bombing of the hospital in Mrauk U, are designed to destroy exactly these kinds of alternative public services.

NUG’s evolving federal role

As these regional forums and alliances gain capacity, the National Unity Government (NUG) is pivoting to a new role. It is increasingly acting as a federal coordinator rather than a top‑down commander—channeling diplomatic recognition, humanitarian aid and broad policy frameworks to these actors instead of micromanaging their operations.

Both the ULA’s recent “State‑to‑Union” approach and the SRA’s collective posture assume such a role for a future union government, treating the center as a political and logistical hub that legitimizes and links autonomous units into a coherent federal system.

Finally, the emergence of this federal security architecture offers the United States and the international community a capable partner in combating the transnational crime waves radiating from Myanmar.

The military junta and its allied Border Guard Forces have turned the country’s periphery into a haven for multi-billion dollar “scam centers,” human trafficking rings, and cyber-fraud operations that target victims globally, including in the US.

The resistance, by contrast, relies on international legitimacy and rule of law for its survival. As the SRA and federal units establish policing in liberated territories, they are the only force with the incentive and the capacity to dismantle these criminal enclaves. While the junta profits from the chaos, the resistance is building the governance needed to end it.

Conclusion

The junta amplifies the “fragmentation” narrative to paralyze international support. But the SRA and the federal forums prove that the primary threat to Myanmar’s unity is not the diverse coalition fighting for democracy.

The threat is the military that shattered the country and the external power that profits from keeping it broken. For any power seeking stability in Southeast Asia, the “realist” choice is no longer to prop up a failed military, but to formally engage the federal order that is rising to replace it.

James Shwe is a semi-retired professional engineer based in Los Angeles who has for years worked to inform the Myanmar and diaspora communities about the importance of grassroots advocacy in the United States, particularly in Congress and at the state level.

He is a regular contributor to the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), Mizzima, The Irrawaddy and Eurasia Review, and focuses on raising awareness of developments in Myanmar and sharing the perspectives of its people with both American audiences and the broader international community.