The US land-based nuclear arsenal relies on an aging missile and a struggling successor as it attempts to extend the life of the 1970s Minuteman III into the 2050s, while costs and delays for the Sentinel program increase.
This month, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the US is preparing to extend the life of its aging Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system into the 2050s amid significant delays and cost overruns in fielding its replacement, the Sentinel.
The Minuteman III, first deployed in 1970 with an intended 10-year service life, now forms the land-based leg of the US nuclear triad across 450 silos in five states. The US Department of Defense (DoD) certified Sentinel to continue after a 2024 cost breach but ordered a restructuring, forcing the US Air Force to reassess all transition plans.
With Sentinel’s delivery years behind schedule, the US Air Force and US Strategic Command are evaluating options to sustain Minuteman III through 2050. However, officials warn of mounting risks, including obsolete parts, limited supply chains, and the challenge of maintaining operational test launches.
The GAO found the US Air Force has yet to develop a risk management plan for the transition, leaving sustainment vulnerabilities unaddressed. The watchdog urged the service to produce such a plan, establish a schedule for a Sentinel test facility, and prepare workforce and materiel contingencies to ensure deterrent requirements are met as the US operates two nuclear systems side by side.
Sentinel’s rising costs and infrastructure failures have forced the US to extend Minuteman III into the 2050s, making sustainment a strategic need. This situation prompts a debate: can targeted Minuteman III upgrades sustain deterrence affordably, or is a complete rebuild with Sentinel necessary for long-term US nuclear deterrence?
Matt Korda and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle mention in a June 2025 article for the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) that the Sentinel ICBM program has unraveled under the weight of flawed assumptions and systemic mismanagement.
Korda and Knight-Boyle note that while Minuteman III was once deemed impossible to refurbish, it is now being sustained as Sentinel has unraveled under flawed assumptions and delays.
They highlight how the US Air Force’s mistaken belief that existing silos could be reused—only to confront asbestos, lead paint, and design incompatibilities—necessitated the construction of 450 new silos.
Combined with the need to replace 12,000 kilometers of buried cabling, poor contractor coordination, and immature technologies, they say these missteps have made Minuteman III’s extension a strategic necessity.
Furthermore, Stephen Cimbala and Lawrence Korb mention in an August 2024 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that modernizing the Minuteman III force would be significantly cheaper than proceeding with Sentinel development, while still fulfilling core deterrence functions.
Cimbala and Korb argue that modernizing Minuteman III avoids the massive infrastructure overhaul required by Sentinel and preserves the land-based leg of the nuclear triad. However, they say critics, including the US Air Force, contend that Minuteman III has exceeded its reliable service life and that only a systems-wide upgrade can preserve deterrence.
Nevertheless, the decision to keep the Minuteman III in service reflects the US belief in the enduring value of a silo-based nuclear deterrent, despite debates surrounding its necessity.
Critics calling for the disbanding of the US ICBM force, such as Robert Redwine and Jonathan King, argue that a disarming nuclear first strike on US ICBM silos would undoubtedly trigger a nuclear response, with possibly catastrophic consequences.
Redwine and King mention that because the locations of US ICBM silos are well-known to potential adversaries, unlike those of nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and strategic bombers, they are attractive targets.
They argue that the US “launch-on-warning” posture when it comes to silo-based ICBMs to prevent their destruction from a disarming first strike may be vulnerable to cyberattacks on early warning systems.
In addition, they state that silo-based ICBMs’ lack of mobility forces them to overfly Russia to hit China and North Korea, creating a separate problem. They point out that in practice, US deterrence against the latter two relies only on SSBNs and strategic bombers.
Supporters of keeping ICBMs, however, counter this line of criticism. Doug Lamborne and Robert Peters argue in a March 2024 Heritage Foundation article that eliminating the ICBM force would free up more adversary missiles to target US military bases and even cities. Their position emphasizes the “missile sponge” function of the ICBM force, as it takes two nuclear strikes to destroy a silo-based missile, diverting potential strikes from critical targets.
They also note that the SSBN force cannot yet replace ICBM capacity, with shipbuilding limitations meaning that the US Navy could not compensate for a retired ICBM force until the 2040s. This capability gap feeds into broader questions about the long-term future of the land-based deterrent.
Nevertheless, these debates highlight unresolved dilemmas regarding the future of the US land-based nuclear deterrent. In a September 2022 article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), Toby Dalton and others argue that while improvements in Russian and Chinese missile defense capabilities make ongoing enhancements to the US land-based nuclear arsenal essential, it remains uncertain whether their missile defenses could develop to a point where they could render Minuteman III ineffective.
Dalton and others warn that hypersonic weapons could render US ICBM silos vulnerable to conventional attack by 2075, raising dilemmas over launch-on-warning or retaliation with other nuclear systems. They add that even if the US developed conventional means to strike adversary silos, its silos would remain inherently exposed to attack.
While modernization of Minuteman III is more practical and cost-effective, Dalton and others suggest that alternative basing modes—such as mobile launchers or deep mountain silos—may ultimately be required to ensure survivability.
However, a mobile approach raises challenges with respect to road and rail traffic management, alongside requiring specialized equipment. Deep mountain basing requires enduring command and control (C2) in the aftermath of an attack that takes out large parts of the US nuclear command and control (NC2) system.
More tellingly, Dalton and others say that at present, Minuteman III missiles are loaded with one warhead, reflecting Cold War-era arms control agreements. While they state that configuration was initially stabilizing, the expiry of the New Strategic Arms Control Treaty (New START) in February 2026 and the growth of China’s nuclear arsenal may necessitate loading Minuteman III or its Sentinel with up to three multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
Aside from incentivizing a disarming first strike, this configuration, they say, could raise nuclear tensions with Russia and China, absent new arms control approaches. Whether through rethinking the Sentinel program or soldiering on with Minuteman III, the US land-based nuclear deterrent now stands at a crossroads that will shape the future balance of power.
Minuteman length: 59.9 feet. DF 5C: 107 feet. Minuteman diameter: 5.5 to 6 feet. DF 5C: 11 feet.
The minute man. What a dinosaur.
Larger than chinese weapons
So were the microwave ovens of the ‘70s, but technology has moved on.
Microwave ovens in the 70’s?
Comrade, your handler needs to improve your history knowledge.
Dear little capon. Stop self-sounding your truncated urethra. It does not help.