A global ‘ChIndia’ imbroglio

It’s much ado about something. The Indian shift away from the US could be a significant setback for America. Although nothing is set in stone, the United States could pay a price. (Marco Mayer interviews Francesco Sisci, first published in the Italian magazine Starmag)

On the eve of a historic meeting in Beijing between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, the US-India imbroglio is in full swing, and it’s unclear whether it’ll be resolved and how.

It could have significant tectonic consequences or none at all, depending on how things develop over the next few days and weeks. Modi reportedly refused to answer Donald Trump’s phone calls five times. Why?

First, we don’t know if it’s true: Indian diplomats deny it. The problem seems to have been the open American intrusion in India-Pakistan bilateral relations. India believes no one should openly interfere in this relationship, which it considers existential.

If Delhi were to declare that it cannot resolve bilateral problems publicly, it would almost demonstrate an inability to maintain its independence. However, beyond all this, the rumors and sentiments in Delhi and Washington suggest that something has gone awry.

What are the reasons for the friction?

The US has imposed worse tariffs on India than on China. Indian officials are expressing their country’s discontent with America and the Trump administration. India has 1.45 billion inhabitants; with Bangladesh, a country closely linked to it, the total population reaches 1.6 billion.

It is the most populous bloc in the world and one of the most dynamic. Delhi has an alliance with the US, the Quad, and has signed free trade agreements with the European Union and the United Kingdom. New Delhi believes it should be treated as a friendly country by the US with European-level tariffs, around 15%. There is a problem with buying and selling Russian oil, but India is hardly alone in this.

What does India blame the United States for?

India, rightly or wrongly, feels humiliated and offended by American “bullying.” This feeling has rekindled a thousand historical mechanisms. India still feels the legacy of British colonialism. During the Cold War, it remained non-aligned, but maintained a robust relationship with Russia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has gradually brought India closer to America over the past two decades, but the foundations of the alliance are different from those with other countries. India proudly proclaims itself second to none.

But weren’t relations between Modi and Trump good?

Modi had physically and intellectually embraced Trump. The tariffs and failed negotiations created a rift in the relationship. At this point, India began to look toward China to offset American pressure. The event could prove geopolitically monumental. A Russia-India-China bloc is emerging, which will then bring with it other countries (Bangladesh, the Central Asian states).

This prospect wasn’t even present during the Cold War, as India remained non-aligned. China, starting in the 1960s, faltered in its relationship with the USSR and subsequently aligned itself with the US from the 1970s onward. Unlike then, Asia is the most economically dynamic region in the world.

Why is India tying itself to China?

India evidently thinks: “We have rifts with China, but Beijing is consistent and coherent; we know how to move and plan. America changes too much, too often, and too quickly; it can’t be relied upon.” In other words, we don’t know what this rift with the US will lead to, but it has opened up—I fear—a potentially disturbing scenario for the US and all of America’s allies. It’s a time of great uncertainty. Of course, there’s also a geographical element.

Evidently, after the brief border clash between India and Pakistan, America chose to improve relations with Pakistan, which gives it territorial access to Central Asia, as it did during the Cold War. Central Asia rightly remains a sore point in America’s political and mental space. However, Pakistan has consistently proven to be a far less stable and more ambiguous state than India.

Choosing Pakistan over India today adds salt to the wounds of the insult perceived by America in India. Indeed, this short-term setback is an unexpected opportunity for Russia, providing it with more political room in the negotiations on Ukraine.

What will be the consequences?

The story of Trump’s five phone calls, on the other hand, also demonstrates that Trump appears to have realized he made a mistake, and thus different dynamics have been set in motion in America. The story, reported by the FT (see here), of an increase in technological and industrial (and therefore military) collaboration between the US and its allies suggests that America appears to be correcting course.

We don’t know if, how, or when this will happen. But the story is certainly not over or closed. On the contrary, this is America’s history: big mistakes and big corrections. Perhaps these phone calls indicate that Trump is reevaluating many things.

What do you expect from the meeting between Modi and Shigeru Ishiba in Tokyo?

Japan’s role in this complex new dynamic between India and the United States is crucial: Japan is the cornerstone of the American alliance in Asia, but it is also the country in the region with the most substantial ties with India.

How are the relations between India and Japan?

Japan’s relations with India date back nearly a century, when Indian anti-colonialist nationalists found support in Japan in their struggle against British rule. At that time, Japan’s imperial dream was “Asia for Asians,” and thus dovetailed with India’s nationalist ambition to expel the British from the subcontinent.

Modi is a direct descendant of that ancient history. Therefore, the relationship between Delhi and Tokyo is special. There are also delicate and important intelligence-sharing agreements between Japan, India, and Vietnam. Japan is also highly concerned about China, in general, and specifically about its designs on Taiwan.

The meeting between Modi and Ishiba thus becomes a double signal to the United States and China. And it is a signal from both countries to both interlocutors. They are telling China that a strong relationship is in place to contain Beijing, and that cracks in relations between the United States and India, or even Japan, do not mean that India and Japan will supinely bow to Chinese demands.

And what is America doing?

This is also a signal to America that these major Asian countries can find a space to thrive politically and economically, even outside of America’s sphere of influence. It is a world, in other words, not divided into two but with an ever-increasing number of players, ever stronger and more dynamic, seeking their own space beyond American command. America currently enjoys vast military and technological advantages, but if these are not fully nurtured, the political coordination of countries that are not adversaries but potentially competitors, alone or together, can erode these advantages.

This suggests that America must rebuild a strong relationship of mutual trust with its allies in Asia, where concerns about the Chinese threat have, for many years, fueled defensive dynamics toward Russia that were lacking in Europe. Otherwise, Washington risks losing pieces of its long-standing alliance structure.

Its alliances become structurally weaker, not only because, as in NATO, member countries are uncertain about how much to rely on America, but also because America may be uncertain about how much to rely on its allies. The issue of American alliances is longstanding and complex for both America and its allies.

Certainly, however, today the US-India-Japan relationship is giving new dynamics to the relationship.

Did Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia get closer because of Trump?

They have drawn closer, both because of Trump and because America appears, from their perspective, confused in its relationship with China. It’s unclear whether America will make a deal with Beijing tomorrow and sell out its regional allies to Beijing.

In this confusing context, these countries are seeking alternatives that nominally take joint action toward China but also distance themselves from the United States. It risks creating a scenario in which America loses pieces of its system, the foundation of the entire world as we have known it for the last forty years. And America itself as a country risks paying the price. Trump is right to believe that the American alliance system is broken and malfunctioning and therefore needs to be fixed.

However, it’s like when old transistor televisions wouldn’t work. Punching them would sometimes bring back an image for a few seconds, but in the long run, it would permanently break the device. It takes technicians who know exactly where and how to put their hands and what kind of image to bring back; otherwise, the screen will break forever, and at that point, you’ll have to buy something new.

Furthermore, we must always keep in mind the paradox of power: it is composed of potential, which is progressively exhausted once it is used. Therefore, once used, power must be replenished; otherwise, it will run out. That is, the less power is exercised, the more it is available, and vice versa.

On the one hand, however, it must be used to demonstrate its existence; on the other, it must be increased and nourished. What we see today is an extensive use of American power, but this risks “exhausting the reserves” of power without increasing the “reserves” abroad. And then what do we do? What does America do?

What is China aiming for at this stage?

I believe that China’s current ambitions, from his perspective, are rightly modest, yet incredibly ambitious. They are modest because they simply aim to fill the gaps left open by the US. If China were to attempt to insert itself forcefully into these gaps, for example, between the US and India, there could be a pushback.

This is what happened with Europe. China attempted to insert itself into the Atlantic rifts, doing so tactlessly and with brutality. The result was a sudden rapprochement between Europe and the United States. Today, considering Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s trip to Delhi, India’s approach seems more cautious, also because Beijing is aware that behind Delhi, there is not only Washington but also Tokyo.

That said, the new relationship between China and India is fragile. It has already suffered two major ruptures. In 1962, there was a border war after a quasi-brotherly relationship in the previous decade, and since the late 1990s, India had sought a relationship with China, only to be rejected. Thus, Delhi and Beijing are seeking a new bilateral relationship, but the scope of their relationship remains unclear. It is not a casual meeting, nor a marriage rendezvous, not today, and perhaps not soon.

This doesn’t mean that a divorce with the United States couldn’t take place, particularly in light of this meeting. Alternatively, considering this meeting, the United States could explore ways to repair its relationship with India. Naturally, this repair would give India, as well as Japan and all of America’s Asian allies, a greater voice.

Without China, Russia would have already lost the war in Ukraine. Will Beijing’s support remain consistent in the long term?

It’s unclear: China is moving with great tactical caution. This tactical caution has increased in the last year or two. China will be closely watching the actions of the United States and India. In this case, Japan is equally concerned about Russia’s new aggressiveness. Tokyo has never signed a peace treaty with Moscow since the end of World War II.

Do you think Vladimir Putin has broken his isolation?

For Putin, the Indian situation is a significant success, and it’s a major success achieved without any specific Russian effort or strategy toward India. This could demonstrate to Russia that its long-term plan for Ukraine should be to wait for America’s mistakes. These mistakes are political and the result of internal American dynamics, not specific and targeted Russian pressure.

However, the prospect of American strategic confusion at this point could lead Putin to forgo seeking peace altogether, instead prolonging the war and possibly opening new fronts, always banking on American confusion.

What some Americans see as a strategic advantage—President Trump’s unpredictability—may be perceived by other countries as a US strategic weakness: confusion that breeds confusion, especially among American allies. The Indian case is one example, but to a lesser and more subtle extent, this problem exists with all American allies in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere. Therefore, Putin could attempt to wait and capitalize on the confusion generated by Trump’s new strategic unpredictability. Here, too, perhaps America should rethink a few things.

What is happening that America seems to lose focus on this critical Indian affair?

Here are two long-term American elements converging that have blurred the American vision. One is old – seeing things only from the American perspective. This leads to mistakes with anybody, but especially with large, proud countries. Some aspects of cultural anthropology are functional for practical purposes.

Thinking, as some of Trump’s officials argued, that democratic India shouldn’t get together with authoritarian China, maybe fails to see that democracy is an instrument of government, not a value. Moreover, for any state, realistic survival is more important than values. Pragmatic Trump should pragmatically deal with India; otherwise, the US could lose more than India.

There is also another long-term element. Trump is not an accident that will go away in three years. The US is undergoing a complex process and trial that affects the nation and the world. We all have an interest that the process is resolved and America finds a balance again. But some Americans believe that the US Res Publica, characterized by mutual respect and fair play between Democrats and Republicans, is broken, as Angelo Codevilla claimed a decade ago.

Trump is trying to rebuild it not through seeking a union of the separate parts, but by having one side defeat the other, almost like a civil war. Codevilla, in fact, argued that the Res Publica was gone, and the US would turn into an imperial form, just as it had in Rome 2,000 years ago. The former balance of the US Res Publica was achieved through the Cold War and World War II, that is under external threat. Currently, there is no immediate existential threat, although some may view China in this light.

Trump apparently adopted Democratic mechanisms and republican substance. However, the US has historically swung back and forth, which could result in a whiplash effect against Trumpism in the future. The USA never weighed too long on one side; you can’t kill all the people of the other side. Unless there is a dramatic change in politics, and someone will shut down all dissenting voices. However, it could be challenging, especially under the watch of an American Pope.

This interview first appeared on Starmag magazine and was republished by Appia Institute, which gave Asia Times permission to republish.