Japan’s new F-35B fighters land with amphibious force

The Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) has just received its first three F-35B stealth fighter jets. Capable of short take-offs and vertical landings, they can operate off Japan’s converted aircraft carriers, and also ashore from small landing strips. The JSDF will eventually have 42 F-35Bs.

Sometimes a little history enriches one’s understanding of current events. When a few United States Marines and I, along with a small group of Japanese officers, set about putting together Japan’s amphibious force in late 2011, operating the F-35B from Japanese amphibious ships was one of the things we had in mind.

Japan had amphibious ships with large decks but called them “helicopter-carrier destroyers” – for political reasons since the word “amphibious” conjured up images of Japan’s disastrous World War II experience. But by any standard, these were “amphibious” ships. 

Having an amphibious force was useful in its own right. How else would an island nation like Japan defend its territory? Or conduct disaster relief missions from the sea? The inability to do so meant several thousand citizens died, who might otherwise have been saved, in the aftermath of the massive tsunami in northeast Japan in 2011.

But there was another crucial need. The JSDF’s component services – Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces – couldn’t operate effectively together. This lack of “jointness” was a severe shortcoming of the JSDF, making it less than the sum of its parts. It needed to be fixed.

Getting to ‘Jointness’

An amphibious force would force jointness on the Self-Defense Force. The army (GSDF) and navy (MSDF) would have to cooperate. GSDF and MSDF helicopters operating from navy ships could take care of some of the “air” piece of the amphibious puzzle. And they might provide limited fire support to the new “Japanese marines” fighting ashore. 

But fixed-wing fighters were needed for fire support and to protect the amphibious task force. That was going to take a while since the Air Self-Defense Force wasn’t much interested in that role.

And we had more in mind than just a new capability and some hardware.  Changing psychology was just as important.

An amphibious force tasked with defending Japan’s territory required — and even compelled — a change in mindset toward real warfighting. That thinking was rather scarce in the JSDF at the time. It wasn’t surprising, given the stifling control from Japan’s political class that handcuffed the JSDF from developing real capabilities. 

Indeed, the JSDF was better known for the Hokkaido Snow Festival than for its combat ability.

Many brave Japanese officers did their best under these limits, but speak too loudly about JSDF and “war” ー the idea of fighting and killing to defend Japan or to help the Americans ー and you’d be in trouble.

Not least, the powerful newspaper, the anti-military Asahi Shimbun, would demand your head.

Working through the challenges

The amphibious development effort provided some cover. Chinese pressure on Japan’s Senkaku Islands did that, as well.

The amphibious capability also had a ripple effect on the political class, building confidence in what Japan and its military were capable of once they became no longer pathologically dependent on the US forces.

That dependence endangered the entire bilateral relationship ー especially if the PRC sent its white lobbyists up to Capitol Hill claiming, “The Japanese expect you to do all the fighting and dying for them.” Not exactly a vote getter in Washington.

The amphibious force also helped break Japan’s self-imposed limitation of only dealing with US forces. There was no reason Japan’s amphibious unit couldn’t operate with those of other nations as well. Now, they have done so often.

And don’t forget that a more capable JSDF that saw fighting a war as part of the job description would force the rapidly expanding Chinese military, keen to teach the Japanese a lesson, to take pause.

This was all part of our thinking.

Landmark upgrades for the JSDF 

Things might have progressed faster, but before long the JSDF had a rudimentary amphibious capability ー formally launching the Ground Self-Defense Force’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade in 2018.

The MSDF spent scarce money to retrofit its ships to handle amphibious vehicles and to toughen up flight decks to someday operate F-35Bs. GSDF tilt-rotor Ospreys were introduced and began operating on Japanese ships. 

And now Japan’s own F-35Bs have arrived – along with a hidden benefit: Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force pilots will fly the F-35Bs (not the MSDF pilots). 

ASDF will thus need to cooperate with MSDF and GSDF even if, like most fighter pilots, they’d rather be up at 30,000 feet looking for a dogfight.

The JSDF and Japan have much to do before they’re ready to fight a war. However, Japan’s military and the nation’s attitude towards defense are unrecognizable compared with 2011. This shows what’s doable if you don’t ask permission.

If we had asked, USINDOPACOM would still be working on the PowerPoint slide deck. It also helped that HQMC had no idea either of what we were up to. Sometimes that’s how things get done.

Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the book “When China Attacks: A Warning To America.“

This article was first published by JAPAN Forward. It is republished with permission.