Confucian peace myth: East Asia minus US risks disaster

Recently, several arguments have emerged suggesting that Korea, Japan and China could peacefully coexist without the US’s presence in Northeast Asia.

Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs recently argued that China has never invaded Japan in its entire history – aside from two failed attempts – and characterized Japan’s incursions into China as anomalies.

Citing Harvard sociologist Ezra Vogel, he claimed the two Confucian civilizations enjoyed nearly 2,000 years of relative peace – a striking contrast, he noted, to the near-constant wars between Britain and France.

Yonsei University professor Jeffrey Robertson added that, as “US attention drifts away from East Asia, the unthinkable becomes thinkable” – a region where Europe, Russia, India, and China balance each other imperfectly, but none dominates.

Political scientist John Mearsheimer also weighed in: “If I were the national security adviser to Deng Xiaoping – or Xi Jinping – and they asked me what I thought about the US military presence in East Asia, I’d say, ‘I want the Americans out. I don’t want them in our backyard.’”

This vision of a self-balancing Asia – shared by economists, sociologists, strategists and realists alike – assumes that history, culture and trust can fill the vacuum left by American power. But can it?

Confucian peace myth

Sachs’s notion of a historical “Confucian peace” collapses under scrutiny. In his speech, he conveniently omits Korea – arguably the most Confucian state in East Asia – which has frequently been at war with both China and Japan.

Consider Goguryeo, one of Korea’s ancient kingdoms. Confucianism had already been influential in the region for 400–500 years when Goguryeo emerged. Yet Goguryeo fought multiple wars against various Chinese dynasties: Han, Liaodong, Wei, Lelang, Yan, Sui and Tang.

While modern Chinese narratives frame Goguryeo as a tributary, historical records – marked by repeated wars and political stalemates – depict it as a rival power that directly contributed to the collapse of multiple Chinese dynasties.

As for Japan, the fact that typhoons thwarted China’s attempts to conquer it doesn’t mean those efforts lacked seriousness. On the contrary, China was determined.

After its initial invasion in 1274 – involving 900 ships and 40,000 troops – ended in failure, it doubled down. In 1281, it returned with 4,400 ships and 140,000 troops – the largest seaborne invasion force in world history before D-Day.

To claim that China “never invaded” simply because these attempts failed is nonsense. These were not theoretical plans – they were full-scale invasions, launched with overwhelming force and clear intent.

Typhoons may have stopped them, but they do not erase the historical fact of the invasions themselves.

Washington isn’t drifting – it’s doubling down

Robertson’s claim that the US is “drifting away” from East Asia is inaccurate. Washington isn’t pulling back – it’s doubling down. The goal is clear: contain China.

This has been official US policy since Hillary Clinton’s 2011 article, “America’s Pacific Century,” which outlined a strategic pivot to Asia as the cornerstone of US foreign policy.

The US may be distracted by Ukraine and Gaza, but its top strategic priority remains unchanged – and is, in fact, becoming more focused.

Washington has bolstered its Indo-Pacific posture through large-scale multinational exercises, such as the 40,000-strong Talisman Sabre in Australia, and expanded military deployments under AUKUS, rotations through Guam and greater access to bases in the Philippines through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

China’s problem isn’t just America

Mearsheimer says China wants the US out of East Asia. That may seem true on the surface – but the reality is more complicated. After World War II, China initially viewed US security treaties with Japan, Korea and Taiwan as part of a broader strategy to contain its rise.

In an October 1971 meeting with US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai accused Washington of using Taiwan and Korea as “two wings of outward expansion by Japanese expansionist policies.”

In response, Kissinger offered a candid and far-reaching explanation of why the US maintained its military presence in Japan.

“China,” he said, “has a universal outlook; Japan’s has had a tribal outlook.” More than cultural commentary, this was a strategic warning.

He argued that “the Japanese are capable of sudden and explosive changes. They went from feudalism to emperor worship in two to three years, and from emperor worship to democracy in three months.”

Such volatility, in Kissinger’s view, made a self-armed Japan a latent threat – not because of intent, but because of potential. “A Japan that defends itself with its own resources will be an objective danger to the region. The US alliance actually restrains it.”

He acknowledged the cynical alternative: “We could cut Japan loose and let it stand on its own. That would trigger tension with China and let us play the middleman.” But he dismissed that option as dangerously shortsighted: “Either you or we would end up the victim.”

Kissinger warned against romanticizing US withdrawal. “We didn’t fight World War II to stop Japan’s domination of Asia only to enable it 25 years later. If Japan truly wants us out, we’ll leave – but I don’t think you should rejoice when that day happens, because some day you may regret it,” he said.

The shift in Chinese thinking was so significant that Zhou began to question whether the US could truly restrain what he called the “wild horse” of Japan.

Chairman Mao even encouraged Kissinger to maintain good relations with Japan. “When you pass through Japan, you should perhaps talk a bit more with them.” On Kissinger’s most recent visit, Mao remarked, “You only talked with them for one day, and that isn’t very good for their face.”

The conversation took place in 1971, seven years after China had become a nuclear power and while Japan remained non-nuclear. Yet Beijing was still deeply uneasy about what a remilitarized Japan might do without US oversight.

That fear lingers to this day – not just in China, but across all the nations that clashed with Japan in the first half of the 20th century.

Japan’s trust deficit

Historian Kenneth Pyle distills Kissinger’s view in contemporary terms: The real issue is trust.

“Part of the answer” regarding the continued US presence in Japan, says Pyle, “lies in a fundamental, often unspoken question in the minds of US policymakers: Can Japan be trusted to participate responsibly in international security affairs?”

He continues, “This Japanese question is at the core of American thinking about its alliance with Japan and beclouds the issue of how Japan should contribute to the maintenance of the international order. Mindful of Japanese nationalism and militarism, world leaders are intensely ambivalent as to whether Japan should enlarge its security role.”

“Prompted by a fear of revived Japanese nationalism, US leaders are extremely circumspect toward Japan. This feeling recurs throughout Asia, in the Soviet Union, and in Europe – indeed, in Japan itself.”

“This concern must be resolved, for it is fundamental to the continued relationship between the United States and Japan and to the potential role of Japan in the changing pattern of international relations in East Asia.”

Perhaps the most surprising endorsement of US presence in East Asia comes from an extremely unlikely source – North Korea’s Kim Jong Un.

In 2022, Mike Pompeo, who had been US secretary of state during Donald Trump’s first presidential term, revealed: “As we developed our relationship more fully, what became very clear is he [Kim Jong Un] views the United States of America on the Korean Peninsula as a bulwark against his real threat, which came from Xi Jinping.”

Kim Jong Un rules over what was once the heartland of Goguryeo – and he knows who the real enemy is. He has reportedly told his aides in the past: “Japan is the 100-year enemy, but China is the 1,000-year enemy.”

Regional hegemony isn’t the endgame – it’s the beginning

The real question isn’t whether China becomes a hegemon in Asia. It’s what comes next.
That’s what most commentators overlook – yet it carries the gravest consequences. Once a regional power secures dominance, it no longer has to watch its flank – it becomes “free to roam.”

When China eventually pushes into the Western Hemisphere, it will challenge the Monroe Doctrine – Washington’s historical red line – for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The resulting showdown could rival, or even surpass, that Cold War standoff.

In comparison, current and potential proxy wars in Ukraine, the Middle East, Taiwan and Korea would look like child’s play.

Calls for an “Asia without America” might sound like peace. But remove the US and the ghosts of history come rushing in – from Goguryeo’s defiance to kamikaze invasions, from Japanese militarism to Cold War paranoia.

In Northeast Asia, peace without the US isn’t just unlikely – it’s historically unprecedented, strategically reckless and potentially catastrophic.

Hanjin Lew is a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs.