In late October 2024, India and China began implementing what was touted as a landmark pact to de-escalate tensions along their disputed Himalayan border, a region known as the Line of Actual Control, or LAC.
The agreement, forged ahead of a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, marking the leaders’ first formal talks in five years, included provisions for troop pullbacks, dismantlement of temporary infrastructure and a return to 2020 patrolling patterns in contested areas such as Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh.
Though touted at the time as the biggest thaw in relations since deadly high-mountain clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020, months later, the agreement is proving more symbolic than substantive in addressing entrenched issues and ensuring meaningful implementation.
Beneath the surface of this diplomatic facade lies a glaring contradiction where, on one hand, both sides publicly advocate peace, and on the other hand, their actions reveal a steadfast commitment to military preparedness and geopolitical rivalry.
The stark disconnect between the rhetoric of de-escalation and the realities on the ground underscores the hollow nature of the supposed breakthrough agreement. Aggressive military buildups are still in full effect for both countries along the LAC.
Using its “dual-use” infrastructure strategy, China has been building new villages and military outposts near the contested border. These sites, concealed as civilian infrastructure, boost China’s capacity to quickly deploy forces and consolidate its control of contested territories.
At the same time, India has expedited its own infrastructure drive, including the construction of the Sela Tunnel, which ensures all-weather access to northeastern border regions. Far from a move toward genuine disengagement, this parallel buildup indicates that both sides are still preparing for the possibility of future confrontations.
Moreover, the so-called restoration of pre-2020 patrols raises doubts. India and China have fundamentally different interpretations of the LAC, and previous agreements to clarify the boundary have failed.
This ambiguity allows both nations to claim compliance while continuing to pursue their strategic objectives. Without a clear and enforceable mechanism to verify troop withdrawals and patrolling rights, the agreement has become an exercise in political theater rather than a genuine step toward resolution.
Similarly, China’s recently unveiled plan to build the world’s largest hydropower dam on the Brahmaputra River presents a strategic threat to India. Located near Arunachal Pradesh, once operational, the dam will enable China to control water flows critical to millions of people in India’s remote northeast, threatening agriculture, water security and hydropower. This leverage will exacerbate India’s vulnerabilities.
While India is monitoring the project and planning countermeasures, the growing geopolitical imbalance highlights China’s dominance in South Asia’s water politics. India also views China’s assertiveness in the Global South and Indo-Pacific with growing unease, while China is wary of India’s rising aspirations for global recognition and its deepening ties with the West.
These conflicting interests make a comprehensive Himalayan reconciliation unlikely, leaving the agreement as little more than a tactical pause in an enduring standoff that has badly damaged broad relations, including crucially at the commercial level.
Ultimately, The India-China border agreement is a case of diplomacy without commitment. Both nations continue to prepare for conflict even as they talk of peace, rendering the agreement a contradiction in itself.
It shows clearly that agreements like these cannot be mistaken for strategic resets. Genuine peace requires not just words but actions that address the deep-rooted mistrust and conflicting ambitions that drive the rivalry, dating back to a border war in 1962.
Until then, Asia’s two largest nations will remain locked in a precarious and uneasy coexistence, with agreements serving as temporary bandages rather than lasting solutions to problems with the potential to become major destabilizing flashpoints.
If the author’s statement is true, the big loser is India as it cannot truly face China in any field, such as economy, military, and geopolitics, it’ll remain simply as a pawn in the US’ hands in this latter’s confrontation against China.