The Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA) has long epitomized the commitment of these three Southeast Asian nations to shared growth and regional integration.
Over two decades, the CLV-DTA has facilitated development projects and cross-border investments aimed at fostering mutual understanding and prosperity.
However, Cambodia’s recent decision to withdraw from the three-way initiative marks a pivotal turning point, signaling a move toward greater strategic autonomy in Phnom Penh. This move reflects Cambodia’s determination as a small state to reclaim its agency amidst complex regional dynamics and sensitivities.
The departure serves two primary purposes: enhancing domestic legitimacy for Prime Minister Hun Manet’s administration and signaling to the international community that Cambodia is opening a new era of independent foreign policy.
Vietnam-Cambodia relations are colored by a complicated history of colonialism, conflict and intervention. Vietnam’s military involvement in Cambodia from 1979 to 1989, which served to end the killer Khmer Rouge regime, engendered mixed feelings of gratitude and resentment among Cambodians.
This intervention established a paternalistic dynamic, with Vietnam seen as both liberator and overbearing protector. Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA can thus be interpreted as a vital step in reasserting its sovereignty and recalibrating this “brotherly” yet often one-sided relationship.
At the core of Cambodia’s decision lies the issue of domestic legitimacy. Rising nationalist sentiments and public pressure against perceived entrenched Vietnamese influence have intensified demands for greater autonomy.
With social media and grassroots activism amplifying these voices, Cambodians are increasingly vocal about reclaiming their sovereignty and resisting perceived Vietnamese dominance. For new Prime Minister Hun Manet, the withdrawal presents an opportunity to bolster his image as a strong leader responsive to public sentiment.
The move also reflects the Hun Manet government’s commitment to more self-led economic development. A public fundraising campaign for new border infrastructure, which has already garnered US$27 million in pledges, is answering rising calls for more domestic-driven investment.
If successful, these ventures promise to build Hun Manet’s image as a capable and responsive reformer.
Beyond domestic politics, the decision to withdraw also reveals a broader foreign policy dilemma: balancing the economic benefits of CLV-DTA participation with growing nationalist sentiments against Vietnamese influence in the Cambodian economy.
Cambodian diaspora protests against the CLV-DTA as a tool of Vietnamese hegemony have highlighted these anxieties, compelling the government to respond to calls for greater autonomy. Critics within Cambodia have asserted that the CLV-DTA compromises national independence and facilitates Vietnamese encroachment on Cambodian territory.
This rising sentiment carries significant implications for Cambodia’s foreign policy strategy and its approach to regional partnerships and cooperation frameworks. In this context, Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA can be viewed as a “smart hedger.”
As a smart hedger, Cambodia seeks to balance relationships with multiple powers to optimize its interests while mitigating risks. By distancing itself from a Vietnam-dominated framework, Cambodia is actively exploring closer ties with major powers and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, thereby reducing overreliance on any single power.
This shift enables the country to manage its national interests with greater flexibility, reflecting a domestic political maneuver aimed at both quelling internal dissent and reinforcing the government’s position – as articulated by former Prime Minister Hun Sen – to “disarm the oppositions.”
This strategic pivot is exemplified by Cambodia’s increasing investment in projects like the China-backed Funan Techo Canal, which has significant implications for Cambodia’s economy and relationship with Vietnam.
While designed to enhance trade routes and reduce Cambodia’s dependence on Vietnamese southern ports for its trade, the canal symbolizes a crucial shift in Cambodia’s assertiveness to drive its own development path, albeit in this instance with Chinese backing.
In this context, the proclaimed “ironclad friendship” with China can be seen as a cultivated effort to enhance strategic autonomy as a small state and redefine its economic relationship with the wider region in pursuit of upper-middle-income status by 2030 and high-income status by 2050.
The question now is: what lies ahead after CLV-DTA withdrawal? For one, the prevailing argument that Cambodia-China relations will come at the expense of Vietnam may be overblown. Protecting sovereignty and peaceful coexistence with neighboring countries are core values in Cambodia’s foreign policy.
Rather than seeking to undermine Vietnam, Cambodia is committed to a diplomatic approach that emphasizes mutual respect and cooperation. This is evident in Phnom Penh’s soft approach to neighborhood diplomacy, which prioritizes dialogue and understanding over confrontation.
The recent Greater Mekong Subregion Summit, where both Cambodia and Vietnam actively participated, underscores the fact that Cambodia and Vietnam continue to cooperate within broader regional frameworks.
Indeed, Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA does not intend to downgrade relations with Vietnam, but rather reflects a broader diversification of its foreign policy strategy.
This diversification allows Cambodia to strengthen existing partnerships, including with Vietnam, while consolidating ties—notably with China, the US, Japan, Australia, South Korea—in line with its “strengthening old friends, making new friends” approach.
Moreover, the CLV-DTA countries have agreed to meet on the sidelines of high-level multilateral meetings such as ASEAN summits and other multilateral forums.
This will provide a platform for the three neighbors to continue collaborating on mutual interests, ensuring that their partnership remains strong despite evolving individual foreign policy dynamics.
In this direction, Cambodian leaders have also consistently reassured their Vietnamese counterparts about development projects that have caused concern, including not least the China-backed canal. This gesture reflects Cambodia’s aim to calm any potential tensions that may unnecessarily arise from mismanaged nationalist sentiments.
After all, Vietnam remains one of Cambodia’s top five foreign direct investors, with Vietnamese enterprises holding 205 active projects in the country and a total registered capital of $2.94 billion. Cambodia ranks second among the countries and territories where Vietnam invests, while Vietnam is Cambodia’s second-largest export destination, following the United States.
Ultimately, Cambodia’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and its legitimate development rights deserve respect and recognition. As noted by one prominent Vietnamese scholar, the strategic autonomy of individual states is essential for fostering peaceful coexistence in the Indochina sub-region, especially in a rapidly evolving regional landscape.
Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA crystallizes Prime Minister Hun Manet’s rhetoric of “breathing through our own nose” while showcasing his recalibrated foreign policy. As a smart hedger, Cambodia aims to reduce dependence on any single neighbor, particularly one that could be perceived as a potential threat.
Guided by the legacies of former Prime Minister Hun Sen and the aspirations of Hun Manet, this move effectively strengthens domestic legitimacy while affirming foreign policy autonomy.
By prioritizing national interests and responding to domestic sentiments, Cambodia asserts itself as a sovereign actor, shaping its own path toward development and regional cooperation.
Dr. Chandarith Neak is the director of Institute for International Studies and Public Policy (IISPP) of Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP).
Chhay Lim is a Monbukagakusho-MEXT scholar at Ritsumeikan University in Japan. He is concurrently serving as a visiting fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies of the Royal University of Phnom Penh in Cambodia and as a young leader at Pacific Forum, a think tank based in Hawaii, United States.