An Air Force Global Strike Command unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during an operation test on February 23, 2021, at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Image: Brittany E N Murphy / Space Force

The world’s nuclear giants are flexing their muscles in new long-range missile tests as the high-stakes game of deterrence and dominance enters a dangerous New Cold War phase.  

The US, Russia and China recently showcased their nuclear capabilities in high-profile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches and strategic exercises, reflecting each nation’s ongoing efforts to modernize and improve their capabilities amid rising global tensions.

On November 5, the US Air Force launched a Minuteman III ICBM from Vandenberg Space Force Base, California, to test multi-warhead capabilities and nuclear deterrent reliability. The missile flew 6,700 kilometers to the Reagan Test Site and data derived from the test is expected to guide a transition to the upcoming LGM-35A Sentinel.

The US test follows Russia’s large-scale nuclear drill on October 29, overseen by President Vladimir Putin, who framed the exercise—featuring Yars ICBMs, nuclear submarines and Tu-95 bombers—as a simulation of retaliatory strikes in response to Western involvement in Ukraine. Putin stressed maintaining a ready, modern nuclear force.

Russia’s ICBM test was preceded by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force test on September 25, which launched an ICBM into the Pacific in a rare public demonstration. China’s test was seen as a message amid US missile defense upgrades, showcasing China’s growing nuclear arsenal.

As nuclear superpowers showcase their military capabilities and reassess their strategic positions, a new arms race is emerging. They compete to demonstrate their strength and deter potential threats in a rapidly changing global security landscape.

Asia Times mentioned in March 2024 that the US is considering rearming its ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in response to China’s rapid nuclear buildup, potentially breaching the New START arms control treaty with Russia.

US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has highlighted the need to revisit MIRV deployment to counter China’s expanding nuclear arsenal, which is projected to reach 1,000 warheads by 2030.

The LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBMs, currently equipped with a single warhead, have the capability for MIRV deployment. Future LGM-35A Sentinel ICBMs could be configured similarly.

As for Russia, Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a March 2024 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that Russia is nearing the completion of a decades-long effort to replace its Soviet-era nuclear systems with modern versions.

This effort is driven by a desire to maintain parity with the US, compensate for weaker conventional forces and counter perceived threats from US missile defenses.

Kristensen and others say Russia’s modernization includes the deployment of advanced ICBMs like the RS-28 Sarmat, which boasts a longer range and greater payload capacity.

They mention that despite setbacks, such as failed tests and delays, Russian officials assert that these new systems enhance national security and deterrence capabilities.

They point out that Russia’s suspension of participation in the New START treaty has further complicated transparency, making it challenging to verify the exact status of its nuclear arsenal.

Russia’s nuclear arsenal modernization, coupled with explicit nuclear threats amid the Ukraine war, has heightened global concerns about Russia’s long-term strategic intentions and the potential for an arms race.

Assessing China’s nuclear arsenal modernization, Hui Zhang mentions in an October 2024 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that China’s September ICBM test underscores its strategic motivations to bolster its nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Zhang says that the test, involving a DF-31AG missile launched from Hainan Island, marks China’s first full-trajectory ICBM test into international waters since 1980.

He mentions this move, billed as part of routine annual training, aims to demonstrate China’s operational and credible nuclear force amid recent internal challenges and external suspicions.

In terms of capability, he says the DF-31AG, a road-mobile missile with a range of up to 12,000 kilometers, enhances China’s ability to reach targets in the continental US, reinforcing its deterrence posture.

He notes that the public release of launch photos signifies a shift toward greater transparency and confidence in China’s military capabilities.

Zhang says the test is seen as a direct message to the US, emphasizing China’s readiness to counter any nuclear threats, particularly in the context of potential conflicts over Taiwan.

He notes that the strategic implications highlight China’s evolving nuclear strategy under President Xi Jinping, which focuses on maintaining a robust second-strike capability and deterring US nuclear use.

With nuclear arsenals expanding and competitive alliances tightening, a new era of multi-front nuclear deterrence is redefining global power dynamics.

In a June 2021 article in the peer-reviewed China International Strategy Review journal, Xi Luo analyzes the escalating nuclear dynamics among the US, Russia and China, underscoring a shift from a bipolar to a triadic nuclear power structure.

Luo says that as the US and Russia accelerate nuclear modernization—bolstering their arsenals with advanced technologies like low-yield warheads and hypersonic missiles—China has emerged as a significant nuclear player, albeit with a much smaller arsenal.

He points out these advancements coincide with the abandonment of several arms control treaties, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which previously helped curb missile proliferation.

Luo mentions China’s rise challenges the US-Russia nuclear balance, making for a complex trilateral relationship. Although the US has urged China to join arms control negotiations, the latter has declined, citing its comparatively modest nuclear stockpile and preference for multilateral disarmament discussions with the five permanent UN Security Council members.

Underscoring the need to move from previous Cold War-era nuclear deterrence frameworks, Kaye Jansen mentions in a February 2024 article for Joint Force Quarterly that the US has to modernize its strategic deterrence frameworks in response to the nuclear threat posed by China, Russia and other potential nuclear-armed adversaries.

Jansen says that as these near-peer adversaries and their partner nations expand their nuclear capabilities and deepen cooperation, the US faces unprecedented challenges in maintaining effective deterrence.

She says the US Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) are undertaking a comprehensive overhaul of the US nuclear arsenal and command infrastructure.

However, she emphasizes that intellectual revitalization is equally crucial, as decades of focusing on militarily inferior adversaries have eroded the strategic thinking necessary to effectively deter today’s nuclear-armed competitors.

Jansen points out that the complexity of modern threats requires new deterrence strategies that account for the interconnected and compounding nature of potential conflicts.

She advocates a holistic strategy that combines all national powers and stresses understanding adversaries’ strategic cultures to manage escalation and maintain credible deterrence amid great power competition.

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4 Comments

  1. Cui bono from “cold wars” and escalations? The people behind Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman etc, their investors and their lobbyists. That $1 trillion offense budget has to justify itself somehow.