In 1958 Senator John F. Kennedy, getting ready for his upcoming presidential campaign, said the United States faced a serious and dangerous missile gap.
“The Soviet Union is rapidly building up a missile striking force that endangers our power to retaliate – and thus our survival itself,” the senator, later president, said. “We are moving into a period when the Soviet Union will be outproducing us two or three to one in the field of missiles.”
Today we once again have a missile gap.
The US does not have a significant inventory of missiles like China, Russia or Iran – nor does the US have enough missile interceptors to protect our allies and friends or even American military bases at home or abroad. The United States cannot remain a great power if the problem is not fixed.
The problem is our inability to manufacture enough missiles for missile defense systems, especially for Patriot. Patriot is the backbone of American air defenses against ballistic missiles.
Sure we have THAAD and the Ground Based Interceptor in Alaska, but only in very small numbers. We also have SM-3 on Arleigh Burke Destroyers and the remaining Ticonderoga class cruisers. But there are only 8 batteries of THAAD, and only one GBI in Alaska (which has around 44 interceptor missiles, some or all of which may not work).
The US has supplied Patriots to our allies around the world, but manufacturing has fallen far behind and the number of interceptor missiles has declined significantly. Things are so bad that America faces a crisis in supporting Ukraine, which relies on Patriot to knock out Russian missiles like Iskander, and stocks in the Middle East are starting to bottom out.
While the Department of Defense has asked US industry to accelerate manufacturing, it will take years to catch up unless major changes are made.
The truth is that America’s adversaries can produce ballistic missiles far faster and at much lower cost than the US can produce Patriot interceptors.
Iran is an example of the imbalance. Before the recent bombing campaign in Operation Epic Fury, Iran produced between 1,200 and 1,500 ballistic missiles each year, such as the Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar.
Lockheed Martin, the company that manufactures Patriot interceptors, manufactured around 650 interceptors in 2025-2026, far below Iran’s missile production.
It costs Iran around $100,000 to $300,000 for each ballistic missile it produces: it costs the United States between $4 million and $5 million for each interceptor.
The US produces Patriot interceptors in the United States and under license in Japan. Japan is producing only 60 PAC-3 interceptors annually, an increase over prior production of 30 interceptors annually. Right now 60 may be a ceiling, as both US and Japanese production depends on the availability of crucial seeker heads, which have been slowly coming off production lines at Boeing.
To try and retain enough interceptors the US has delayed shipments of complete systems and interceptors to Switzerland and Poland, and even asked Poland to supply Patriot interceptors from its inventory for the Middle East. Poland flatly refused.
Both the US and Israel have been trying to knock out missile launchers in Iran and destroy the industrial infrastructure for manufacturing missiles in that country. But, even if the ceasefire fails and this campaign upon resumption proves completely successful, Iran has alternatives.
Iran’s missiles are mostly variants of North Korean missiles such as the No Dong (Hwasong-7) series. North Korea stands to make a lot of money in future by becoming a major manufacturing center for Iran, just as it has become an important producer of artillery shells for Russia.
China and Russia have very large missile inventories.
While Japan, Taiwan and South Korea have Patriot systems, and Japan and the US have AEGIS ballistic missile interceptors, such as the SM-3, the total inventory of sea-based SM-3s is around 330 missiles (Combined Block IB and Block IIA), far below what might be required in the Pacific region. The SM-3 was used for missile defense in the Twelve-Day War (June 2025) in the Middle East, where 80 were fired. The stockpile is dangerously low.
In Operation Epic Fury around 100 to 150 “upper tier” interceptors were used by the United States, or about 25% of the total stockpile. Upper Tier means both SM-3 and THAAD. Writing in War on the Rocks, authors Christopher J. Watterson and Peter J. Dean say that in a Pacific conflict the US would run out of interceptors in twenty four hours.
Israel has a similar problem and is running short of Arrow-3 interceptors. For that reason, Israel has handed off part of its air defense to the system called David’s Sling. The difference is profound. While Arrow-3 intercepts missiles in the exoatmosphere, 100 km in altitude (62 miles), David’s Sling intercepts are at much lower altitude, between 7 to 15 km ( 4 to 9 miles), meaning that if a missile is hit, debris from the missiles, even its warhead, may survive and strike land targets.
Even more dangerous, it is around these altitudes that cluster-munition ballistic missiles release their submunitions, creating a complex intercept problem that current technology cannot overcome when the cluster submunitions are dispersed.
Israel’s missiles are manufactured in partnership with US companies and therefore can face some of the same bottlenecks and delays as US-only products. A significant complicating factor is that the call-up of Army reserves in Israel has reduced the critical home labor force needed by Israel’s defense industries.
The way ahead
There are other countries that manufacture missile defense systems including Eurosam (a consortia of MBDA and Thales) that produces SAMP/T which can defend against tactical ballistic missiles like Russia’s Iskander series, but the number of deployed systems is relatively small (around 20 units with two in Ukraine and two in Singapore). Eurosam current is producing around 100 interceptors in 2026, an increase over previous levels of around 60.
South Korea is also producing its own air defense hardware with at least three distinct systems under the banner of Korean Air and Missile Defenses (KAMD). L-SAM is the latest but while operating at a higher altitude of 50 to 60 km it won’t be available until 2027 at the earliest. Meanwhile a medium altitude system, M-SAM is deployed, and a lower altitude version (LAMD) is said to be like Israel’s Iron Dome. M-SAM achieved its first hit against Iranian missiles in Operation Epic Fury in the UAE in March.
Congress mandates some changes
The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act, which incorporates the SPEED Act, made a number of changes to accelerate weapons production, remove red tape in the procurement process, and seek standardization for some critical missile components.
One of the most consequential ideas was to seek a common foundation for missile seeker heads hardware and software. The basic idea is to use common hardware with software defined architecture, instead of different hardware and software for every missile system in the inventory. This is an important proposal provided it can be executed and defense companies cooperate to achieve it.
It may take a number of years to come up with a prototype that is sufficiently “plug and play” that the new hardware and software can be used to update existing missiles. The plan is to adapt this for all missiles, such as air to air missiles like Sidewinder (AIM-9), Javelin and SM-6.
A second plan is a push for electronics standardization called the SHIP program (State of the Art Heterogeneous Integrated Packaging). The idea is a common chipset (called a chiplet) that can be used in various systems instead of custom-designed chips for each system. Intel recently delivered SHIP Program Prototypes six quarters ahead of schedule. a promising development.
Congress also is mandating a common rocket motor program, at least for 21 inch diameter rockets that are used as second stage motors. Both Northrop Grumman and Raytheon have been awarded contracts to develop motors with the common motor footprint. The project is aimed at having a common motor that can be plugged into missile families such as SM-6 Block 1B and forthcoming hypersonic interceptors. Similarly, efforts are underway to standardize rocket ignition systems and thrust vector control interfaces for steering missiles.
Accelerated production of missiles
In the proposed Trump administration $1.5 trillion dollar defense plan, hefty production increases are in the works. The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), which replaces ATACMS and is fired by HIMARS and M270 launchers, production will be quadrupled from current levels if the funding is approved.
In FY2027 the US would manufacture 1,134 PrSMs at a cost of $1.7 million each. In the same plan, Tomahawk cruise missile production for the US Navy will get a 1200 percent increase. In 2026 only 58 Tomahawks were manufactured. The proposed procurement will raise the number to 785. The current Tomahawk inventory is under severe strain.
Meanwhile, The Pentagon, in partnership with Lockheed Martin and Boeing, is executing a seven-year plan to triple production of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) MSE missiles from roughly 600 annually to 2,000 by 2030. For SM-3, the U.S. Department of Defense is partnering with RTX (Raytheon) to significantly increase SM-3 (Block IB and IIA) production through 7-year framework agreements, aiming at two to four times output.
The plan includes investing in manufacturing capacity, accelerating production timelines, and increasing funding for FY2027, with a specific focus on boosting SM-3 IIA production for Japan and the U.S. Navy.
THAAD production will also be increased. Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon have finalized a plan to quadruple THAAD interceptor production, increasing output from 96 to 400 per year by 2026-2027. The effort includes building a new Munitions Acceleration Center in Arkansas to boost manufacturing capacity, modernizing facilities in several states, and accelerating supply chain production of components like seekers.
Israel has also approved plans to dramatically accelerate the production of Arrow interceptor missiles. According to Israel’s defense ministry, the agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries, “will enable a substantial increase in the production rate and quantity of Arrow interceptors.”
There was heavy criticism in Israel, despite war censorship, that a dispute between the Defense Ministry and its industry partner IAI, and a dispute over appointing a new head of IAI, delayed stepped up production of Arrow leading to reliance on less capable systems (David’s Sling) resulting in missile interception failures.
Solving the missile gap
Congress has moved ahead by mandating important changes to try and remove bottlenecks and promote standardization, but it has not made any reform of the actual defense manufacturing base. Whether the accelerated schedules can be met, relying on the existing infrastructure (even with new factories planned) remains an open question.
We know that not every “acceleration project” is successful. For example, because of Ukraine, the US took steps to accelerate the manufacture of 155mm artillery shells. It sponsored new production in Mesquite, Texas featuring rapid manufacturing expertise imported from Turkey.
But the new Army 155mm projectile facility, operated by General Dynamics (GD-OTS), has failed to meet production goals, jeopardizing the US Army’s target of 100,000 shells per month. As of early 2026, the facility was unable to produce operational shells, leading to delays and potential contract termination due to poor performance.
We will have to wait and see if the numerous accelerated procurement initiatives can meet their goals, and if the congressionally-mandated standardization steps actually are implemented fully.
If not, then the US may have to make more aggressive changes in consolidating common production of critical components to begin to match the output of potential adversaries such as Russia and China. In short, if current plans fall short, the US will need to make dramatic changes in the US defense industrial base and supply infrastructure.
Stephen Bryen is a former US deputy under secretary of defense. Read this article and many others on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Policy.