Shared energy stakes call for greater China-India cooperation

Speaking in Beijing on March 26, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of “immeasurably serious consequences” if energy and nuclear facilities are targeted amid the expanding Middle East conflict.

The warning echoes Wang’s March 8 message at the 14th National People’s Congress: China and India should view each other “as partners rather than rivals, and as opportunities rather than threats” — a message that resonates as energy security becomes a shared concern for the two largest developing economies.

Energy security has emerged as a defining priority for both nations. India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal recently emphasized that safeguarding reliable supplies for 1.4 billion citizens remains New Delhi’s foremost concern, noting that “diversifying energy sourcing in line with market conditions and evolving international dynamics is at the core of our strategy.”

Together, these positions reveal a convergence of interests often overlooked in mainstream strategic discourse, which tends to focus narrowly on rivalry. As tensions spread across the Middle East and risks rise around the Strait of Hormuz, both nations share a substantial stake in global energy stability.

The widening conflict in West Asia is already shaking the global energy system. Tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — the corridor for roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day and nearly one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade — has slowed amid security warnings and rising insurance costs.

Several LNG carriers and oil tankers have altered routes, paused voyages, or waited outside the Gulf following strikes on Iran and retaliatory attacks on energy infrastructure. For major importers such as China, disruptions to discounted crude flows underline the fragility of supply arrangements and the limits of strategic buffering.

Oil markets reacted sharply: Brent crude briefly surged above $110 per barrel, while West Texas Intermediate reached $100. European natural gas prices jumped roughly 60% after Qatar announced a halt in LNG shipments.

For Asia, the implications are profound. China and India together account for more than one-third of global energy demand growth and remain heavily dependent on imported hydrocarbons, particularly from the Middle East.

China is the world’s largest crude importer; India ranks third in oil consumption. Any disruption in Gulf shipping lanes reverberates across Asian economies, affecting energy prices, inflation, industrial output, and broader macroeconomic stability.

The vulnerability is particularly acute when examining dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. About 45% of China’s oil imports — roughly 5 million to 6 million barrels per day — and around 50% of India’s imports — about 2.5 million to 2.7 million barrels per day — pass through the strait.

While Japan and South Korea are proportionally more dependent, China’s larger import volumes mean it would face the greatest disruption, with India also highly exposed. Yet shared vulnerability also presents opportunity.

Rather than framing relations solely as rivalry, Beijing and New Delhi have growing incentives to cooperate as major energy buyers in a volatile global market. Pragmatic coordination need not dilute strategic competition; it can focus on areas where interests converge.

One opportunity lies in strategic market coordination. As two of the world’s largest energy consumers, China and India wield considerable purchasing power. Greater transparency in procurement strategies, coordinated responses to supply disruptions, and joint participation in long-term supply arrangements could stabilize prices and strengthen bargaining leverage.

Even limited coordination could reduce volatility and improve outcomes. Collaboration on strategic petroleum reserves and emergency supply mechanisms could further cushion shocks during geopolitical stress.

Maritime stability is another domain for cooperation. Both nations rely on secure sea lanes from the Persian Gulf across the Indian Ocean to East Asia. Enhancing dialogue on maritime security, shipping safety, and crisis management could safeguard these routes. Incremental engagement would signal a shared commitment to protecting critical trade arteries.

Beyond crisis management, collaboration could extend to the energy transition. China and India are global leaders in renewable energy, electric mobility and clean-technology manufacturing.

Joint research, technology partnerships, and expanded regional supply chains for solar, wind, and battery technologies could accelerate Asia’s shift toward a more diversified and resilient energy mix.

This does not suggest that longstanding political differences will disappear overnight. Border tensions and strategic mistrust have shaped bilateral relations for decades. Yet history shows that global disruptions can create openings for pragmatic recalibration, and the current turbulence in West Asia may represent one such inflection point.

For both Beijing and New Delhi, the central challenge is clear: the energy security — and the economic well-being of nearly 3 billion people — depends increasingly on their ability to cooperate where interests align.

As the global energy map evolves under conflict, market volatility, and technological transition, China and India face a choice: remain locked in patterns of strategic suspicion, or recognize that cooperation between Asia’s two largest energy consumers may be not only desirable but necessary.

Dr. Hriday Sarma is an advocate at the Supreme Court of India and a senior fellow at the South Asia Democratic Forum in Brussels.