As I prepared the March issue of the Gulf Economic Diplomacy Update for the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi, I was reminded of a folk tale from my native Bulgaria, loosely translated as “The Hardship Lesson.”
Two young brothers must step in for their father, fetching wood with a cart. Before leaving, they ask him what to do if the cart breaks down, as it often does. He tells them simply to sit, call Hardship, and Hardship will come to fix it.
On their way back, the cart breaks, and they sit calling for Hardship for hours. Realizing that help will not come from elsewhere, they end up fixing the cart themselves.
It now seems that the Gulf countries are facing hardship and are determined to support one another. At the end of December 2025, relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE were strained – even cold – over Yemen.
Yet just a day after the first Iranian missile and drone attacks against its neighbors, both countries, together with Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, issued a joint statement strongly condemning these actions.
The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states underlined their right to “self-defense, individually and collectively.” Numerous bilateral and multilateral calls between leaders, ministers and senior officials since then have reinforced the view that solidarity is the only viable course of action in the face of unprecedented hardship.
Beyond rhetoric, GCC economies have swiftly devised mechanisms to support each other’s logistics hubs. By blocking the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has effectively deprived Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain of the ability to export oil, gas, fertilizers and other key products.
The UAE is using its bypass pipeline and the port of Fujairah on its east coast to partially circumvent the disruption, even though that port was also targeted. Only Oman and Saudi Arabia have remained relatively insulated from the interruption of traffic through the Strait, and both have stepped in to support the others.
On 14 March, Oman and the UAE activated a Green Corridor for sea and air cargo. Negotiated between the customs authorities of Dubai and Oman, the scheme enables fast and efficient transit through Oman of cargo containers destined for Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port or its airports, but diverted to Omani ports and airports due to the war.
On March 22, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced another trade bridge. The Saudi Ports Authority (Mawani) and UAE logistics operator Gulftainer launched a link between Sharjah’s Khorfakkan Commercial Terminal and the port of Dammam, passing through the Sajaa dry port.
The initiative aims to accelerate cargo transit, integrate road and maritime transport, optimize storage solutions, and ensure a more efficient flow of goods. On March 25, Emirati port operator DP World installed three new ultra-heavy-lift cranes at Jeddah Islamic Port in Saudi Arabia to support rising Red Sea cargo demand.
On the same day, Mawani also launched a maritime service known as Gulf Shuttle. Operated by the Swiss freight line MSC, the service connects King Abdulaziz Port in Dammam with Bahrain’s Khalifa Bin Salman Port. With a capacity of 3,000 containers, Gulf Shuttle facilitates trade flows to and from Bahrain while bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.
Throughout the month, Mawani also launched five additional maritime lines in partnership with major global shipping companies. The REDEX service connects Jeddah with Malta Freeport, Port Said and Alexandria in Egypt, and Aqaba in Jordan, operated by the French company CMA CGM.
The A19, SE4 and Jade services enable the Danish firm Maersk, the German shipping company Hapag-Lloyd and the Swiss operator MSC, respectively, to connect Jeddah Islamic Port with major Asian cargo hubs, including Shanghai, Ningbo, Qingdao, Xiamen, Yantian and Xingang in China; Busan in South Korea; Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia; and Singapore.
Via the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, some of these routes also extend to strategic Mediterranean hubs such as the Spanish port of Valencia. The Galex service adds similar connectivity between Dammam Port in Saudi Arabia, Sohar Port in Oman and Khorfakkan Port in the UAE, using Emirates Shipping Line to liaise with ports in China, South Korea and Malaysia.
Within the Gulf, Mawani is also connecting its Red Sea ports, including Jeddah Islamic Port, King Abdullah Port, Yanbu, NEOM and Jazan, by road to the other five GCC countries, thereby reducing trade dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.
The UAE’s Etihad Rail constitutes another key land-based component of these connectivity corridors. In the first two weeks of the war, it transported more than 8,000 containers and nearly half a million tons of cargo across more than 100 train journeys. Its planned cross-border rail corridor linking Abu Dhabi with Sohar in Oman, announced in October 2025, will further expand logistics options beyond the Strait of Hormuz.
On March 27, Saudi Arabia Railways launched an international logistics corridor connecting Saudi ports in Dammam, Yanbu and Jubail to Al-Haditha Port near the border with Jordan to facilitate container transport and reduce transit times.
These various connections not only support regional and international supply chains but also reflect deepening logistical integration among Gulf states. Transportation corridors are not hypothetical constructs; they are real lifelines when chokepoints threaten to deprive the economies of oxygen.
The Iranian attacks on Gulf infrastructure have, perhaps unintentionally, acted as a major catalyst for a new regional logistics architecture encompassing alternative corridors, multimodal integration and bilateral customs cooperation.
While elements of this architecture had been under development for some time, they are now being accelerated and are likely to remain in place well beyond the current crisis.
Damyana Bakardzhievais is senior research fellow of economic diplomacy at the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy.