China’s Middle East billions still woefully reliant on US gunboats

China has staked roughly US$145 billion in investments and construction contracts across the Middle East, while Iranian oil alone accounts for 13–14% of its imports.

Yet Beijing maintains no permanent military presence in the volatile region, with its only overseas base in Djibouti, thousands of miles away. The result is a structural mismatch at the heart of Chinese foreign policy: economic ambitions that increasingly depend on a security architecture Beijing does not control.

Following US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil and gas normally passes — was effectively shut down. Iran’s blockade reduced traffic by more than 90% from normal levels, stranding over 600 vessels, including hundreds of tankers, inside the Gulf.

Tehran imposed a selective transit regime, granting passage to ships from favoured nations — including China, Russia and India — while barring vessels linked to the West. That de facto blockade or new toll regime will feature prominently in US-Iran negotiations on a peace deal in Pakistan.

China’s approach to the Middle East rests on two pillars: economic integration and diplomatic engagement.

On the economic side, Arab and Gulf states received roughly $39 billion in Chinese investment in 2024 alone. Chinese firms now operate ports, industrial zones and energy infrastructure across the region, embedding local economies within Chinese trade networks.

In Oman, the China–Oman Industrial Park at Duqm represents more than $10 billion in planned development; Chinese firms have also invested in refinery upgrades and energy infrastructure in Iran.

Alongside this economic expansion, China has sought to increase its diplomatic influence by positioning itself as a mediator in regional disputes — most notably by facilitating the 2023 rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Together, these two pillars have allowed China to expand its regional influence without direct confrontation. But they leave a critical gap. Missing from the strategy is a security component, long supplied by the United States through a network of military bases across the region and the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which, until the Iran war, secured maritime trade routes in the Persian Gulf.

Although this system primarily serves American interests, it also protects the maritime routes and energy flows on which China increasingly depends — embedding Beijing ever deeper in a security environment whose foundations it does not control.

For Beijing, the Iran crisis has delivered a sharp demonstration of its structural exposure. Chinese-flagged vessels were among those granted conditional passage — a concession from Tehran, not a guarantee — yet the disruption to energy markets was severe regardless.

Some European and Asian refiners were paying nearly $150 per barrel for certain crude grades, while the head of the International Energy Agency described Iran’s blockade as more consequential than the disruptions of 1973, 1979 and 2022 combined.

China’s access to the strait depended entirely on Iranian goodwill and its own diplomatic standing in Tehran — precisely the kind of fragile, contingent arrangement that underscores how far Beijing’s security capacity lags behind its economic exposure in the region.

The US is far less dependent on Middle Eastern crude than China, relying heavily on domestic production and imports from Canada and Mexico. China, by contrast, is the world’s largest crude importer and depends heavily on maritime supply routes.

American dependence on Gulf energy declines, Washington’s strategic incentives may not always align with Beijing’s growing need for regional stability.

Recent developments around Iran illustrate the divergence: the United States’ interest in stability tends to extend only as far as keeping energy flowing, while China’s broader exposure to infrastructure, supply chains and investment makes it more sensitive to wider disruptions.

Beijing is thus increasingly exposed to a system it neither controls nor can reliably depend on. The dilemma is clear: continue relying on external security provision, or assume a more direct role in protecting Chinese interests.

That choice is constrained by China’s own doctrine. A 2019 Chinese white paper describes the country’s approach as an “independent foreign policy of peace” (独立自主的和平外交政策), reflecting a deep resistance to formal military alliances.

President Xi Jinping has consistently emphasized strategic autonomy and self-reliance, and China’s Global Security Initiative explicitly criticizes military alliances and what it calls a “Cold War mentality.”

These constraints are not only doctrinal but reputational. Beijing has framed its rise around peaceful development and non-interference; a more assertive security role in the Middle East would risk undermining that positioning and complicating relations with host states.

Even if Beijing were willing to recalibrate, expanding a sustained military presence would likely prove politically difficult. The region is acutely sensitive to foreign basing and external intervention — a constraint reflected in analyses of China’s limited and cautious overseas basing record to date.

Together, these factors significantly narrow Beijing’s ability to translate economic influence into a corresponding security role. As China’s overseas footprint expands and American commitments grow less predictable, the costs of this arrangement are likely to intensify, increasing pressure on Beijing to reassess its approach.

Beijing is not currently signaling a strategic shift, but escalating risks to its overseas interests may force some adjustment. Any response is likely to take one of two forms: modest maritime expansion or greater reliance on host-state security arrangements.

Since 2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has maintained continuous anti-piracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden, conducting more than 1,600 escort missions for thousands of vessels. Extending such patrols toward the Arabian Sea or the Strait of Hormuz would allow China to play a more active role in securing key maritime routes.

This approach, however, remains limited in scope: anti-piracy operations can protect commercial shipping but fall well short of what is required to secure infrastructure or manage interstate conflict. This limitation suggests that more expansive approaches may eventually be required.

Extending the model would require a larger logistical footprint. Sustained operations deeper in the Gulf would require additional basing arrangements and host-nation support — yet even China’s existing base in Djibouti has generated friction with the US, underscoring the political sensitivity of any further expansion of its overseas military presence.

A limited increase in naval presence could nonetheless exert a modest deterrent effect, raising the political costs of attacks on Chinese shipping and creating a narrow “tripwire” dynamic in which escalation risks direct confrontation. Any expansion is therefore likely to remain gradual and insufficient to address the broader risks.

Maritime presence, in any case, does little to protect Chinese infrastructure located inland. This limitation points toward the second approach: strengthening host-state security arrangements. China has already pursued this model in Pakistan, where a dedicated force of roughly 15,000 troops was established to protect Chinese personnel and projects along the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Host-state forces can help secure specific projects and deter non-state threats, but they are far less effective against large-scale interstate conflict or regime instability. Even so, such arrangements allow China to reduce exposure at relatively low cost while remaining consistent with its non-interference doctrine.

Together, these approaches reflect a strategy of managing risk rather than resolving it. China is likely to continue expanding its economic presence while relying on incremental security measures — limiting exposure without assuming the broader responsibilities of a full security role.

The gap between China’s economic exposure and its security capacity is likely to widen. With roughly 70% of its oil imports passing through vulnerable chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, and hundreds of billions of dollars committed to infrastructure and energy projects across the Middle East, Beijing’s exposure is both deep and growing.

No rising power has sustained global economic reach without eventually assuming the security responsibilities that accompany it — and China is unlikely to be the first.

Zander Dumas is a master’s student in international relations and politics at SOAS, University of London, and is interning with a South Korea-based news outlet.