The letter landed within Dhaka’s already charged political atmosphere. Writing from abroad, ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina made her first formal appeal to Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), seeking to overturn the death sentence against her on the grounds that she had been denied a fair trial.
For the newly elected government led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) — the arch-rival of Hasina’s Awami League — the letter is a reminder that even in exile in Delhi, Hasina still casts a defining shadow over Bangladesh’s fraught transition.
In the letter sent to ICT on March 30, Hasina not only challenges the verdict as legally unsustainable but also urges the tribunal to set aside the sentence and halt any move towards execution, framing such steps as incompatible with international legal obligations. Her absence has apparently not diminished her relevance.
To understand why, one must return to the mass uprising that forced her to step down from power in August 2024.
Hasina’s fall from power followed a mass uprising that brought together opposition parties, civil society groups and a disaffected public after years of increasingly centralized rule — an episode she now recasts in her appeal in the language of state responsibility.
She argues that her government acted to preserve order and that any subsequent proceedings must meet “international standards of fairness”, including proper notice of charges and the opportunity for a full legal defense.
The uprising itself marked one of the most violent chapters in Bangladesh’s recent political history. What began as widespread demonstrations for the government’s job quota quickly escalated into a deadly confrontation between protestors and state forces.
Rights groups and independent observers have since estimated that around 1,400 people lost their lives during the 21-day uprising. The Hasina government’s response at the time drew sharp condemnation both domestically and internationally, forming the substantive backdrop to a case that Hasina now seeks to recast primarily as a failure of due process.
Subsequent investigations have further intensified scrutiny of Hasina’s role during those events. ICT proceedings have cited what it describes as conclusive evidence that directives to deploy lethal force against protestors came from the highest levels of political authority.
Prosecutors argue that such findings underpin the charges of abuse of power and political violence, framing the tribunal’s verdict as rooted not only in the outcome of the uprising but in the decisions that shaped its trajectory.
Facing mounting protests and a loss of institutional backing, Hasina fled the country and took refuge in neighboring India. The subsequent legal process moved rapidly. The ICT convicted her on charges tied to political violence and abuses of authority, handing down a death sentence that her supporters call politically driven and her opponents regard as overdue justice.
Her new appeal shifts, at least for now, the argument from politics to process. By stressing the lack of due process, she is appealing beyond Bangladesh’s borders, where concerns about capital punishment and judicial standards carry weight. For Bangladesh’s new government as well as the opposition parties, however, the issue is less legal than political.
Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s new government hasn’t shown any indication of lifting the ban on the Awami League, imposed by the erstwhile interim administration of Muhammad Yunus.
Also, the BNP came to power with support from groups that define themselves in opposition to Hasina’s rule. For them, her removal was a corrective moment for the nation. Any softening now would be seen as a retreat.
The Awami League’s organizational capacity has definitely been weakened, its leadership scattered and its public activity constrained. Yet it retains a durable support base, particularly among voters who associate its tenure with economic gains and infrastructure expansion. That residual strength makes it too significant to ignore, but too contentious to re-legitimize quickly.
The result is a political equilibrium that is stable but incomplete. The exclusion of the Awami League simplifies short-term governance but complicates long-term consolidation. Bangladesh’s history offers several examples of dominant parties returning after periods of repression. The current arrangement does not eliminate that possibility, rather, it postpones it.
Hasina’s own posture reinforces the impasse. Her public statements, including the latest appeal, focus narrowly on the fairness of the trial. There has been no acknowledgment of the grievances that drove the uprising or of the accusations of heavy-handed governance during her tenure. This is a deliberate choice.
Admitting fault would weaken her claim that the case against her is politically motivated. But the absence of any conciliatory signal reduces the scope for her eventual political rehabilitation.
For the government, this is convenient in the short term. A defiant Hasina is easier to exclude than a contrite one. But it also entrenches polarization. Without some form of narrative adjustment — either from Hasina or from her opponents — the political system risks hardening into the long-entrenched winner-takes-all structure with limited space for reintegration.
External factors add to the complexity. India, Hasina’s long-time ally, has little incentive to facilitate her return under current conditions. Extraditing a former prime minister to face execution would be politically and diplomatically costly.
At the same time, India has signaled that its broader relationship with Bangladesh will not hinge on her fate. This reduces Dhaka’s leverage while allowing both sides to compartmentalize the issue.
For Tarique Rahman, the calculation is therefore constrained on multiple fronts. Domestically, he must satisfy a coalition that expects accountability and exclusion. Internationally, he faces pressure to demonstrate adherence to legal norms and political pluralism. The Hasina case sits at the intersection of these demands.
Her letter to the tribunal sharpens that tension. Bangladesh’s transition has removed a dominant leader without resolving the question of her political constituency. As long as that constituency exists, and as long as Hasina continues to contest the legitimacy of the process against her, she remains a factor in the system.
In that sense, her role has shifted rather than disappeared. She is no longer the central actor, but she is still a strong reference point. The new government can proceed without her, but not beyond her.
Faisal Mahmud is a Dhaka-based journalist and analyst