Pakistan’s peace play more about desperation than diplomacy

Has Pakistan genuinely become important on the global stage, or is it being strategically projected as such?

A closer look suggests that much of the current visibility around Pakistan is less about its rise in global influence or capabilities and more about a situational, strategic amplification — largely driven by Western interests amid the ongoing Middle Eastern conflict.

Pakistan is being portrayed as a potential mediator in the conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel. A recent meeting was held in Islamabad, but the actual parties to the conflict — Iran, the United States and Israel — were not present.

The meeting instead involved regional actors such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, serving a preparatory role aimed at exploring the possibility of future engagement rather than facilitating direct negotiations. This projection must be understood in the broader strategic context.

The war, initially expected by the US to be short and decisive, has instead proven far more complex and prolonged as it enters a second month. The assumption that limited bombardment would quickly stabilize the situation has proven wrong.

Iran’s response has been both unexpected and significant — targeting not only military installations but also commercial and energy interests, increasing the costs of war and escalating the conflict both horizontally and vertically.

The strategic implications are profound. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively blocked and global oil supplies disrupted, energy prices have surged. Nations across the world are feeling the impact, and the global economy is accelerating toward a potentially catastrophic recession.

The possibility of further escalation — including disruptions at Bab el-Mandeb — adds to the gravity of the situation, as the Houthis, Iran’s proxies in Yemen, have also entered the conflict this past weekend by bombing Israel.

In such a scenario, the US and its allies appear increasingly keen to find an exit, wary of being drawn into yet another prolonged war in the region. The US has a history of getting trapped in such conflicts, known widely as American “forever wars”, draining its resources and limiting its ability to focus on other strategic theaters, including the Indo-Pacific.

Many Gulf countries cannot play this mediating role. Countries such as Qatar, Oman and Bahrain are in fact parties to the conflict — Iran has carried out missile and drone strikes targeting their territory, including military bases and critical energy infrastructure. This makes them active stakeholders rather than neutral actors.

It is within this context that Pakistan is being brought in and projected as a mediator. The question is: why Pakistan? The answer lies not in Pakistan’s growing independent global stature but in a combination of strategic convenience and Pakistan’s own compulsions.

First, Pakistan has recently entered into a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia containing a NATO-like clause under which an attack on one is considered an attack on both.

If this war prolongs, Pakistan could be drawn into the conflict on Riyadh’s side. This creates urgency for Pakistan to prevent escalation, so that it does not have to join a conflict that would be extremely costly from every angle.

Second, Pakistan’s internal dynamics are highly sensitive. Significant sympathy for Iran exists among segments of its population, particularly within the Shia community. Pakistan has one of the largest Shia populations after Iran.

When Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed at the outset of the war, protests and domestic unrest erupted in Pakistan, with between 26 and 35 people killed across the country, including in sensitive regions such as Gilgit-Baltistan.

The state is wary of triggering sectarian tensions or further domestic unrest, which it can ill afford at a time of political and economic fragility.

At a gathering of Shia religious clerics, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir warned: “If you love Iran so much, why don’t you go to Iran,” adding that violence linked to developments abroad “will not be tolerated” in Pakistan. This reflects the state’s anxiety that if the conflict does not end, Pakistan could be drawn into it.

Third, Pakistan shares a long and sensitive border with Iran. Any instability on the Iranian side — especially in regions bordering Balochistan — could exacerbate Pakistan’s already severe insurgency challenges. A hostile or unstable Iran would directly threaten Pakistan’s internal security.

As Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center, noted: “At a moment when Pakistan is experiencing some of its most serious internal turmoil in years if not decades, the last thing it can afford is more escalations and a heightened risk of conflict with Iran. For Pakistan to be locked in serious tensions with not one or two but three neighbors — it’s a geopolitical worst-case scenario, bar none.”

Fourth, Pakistan’s economic vulnerability is a critical factor. The country is heavily dependent on external financial assistance, including IMF bailouts and support from Gulf states such as deferred oil payments from Saudi Arabia. Its economic condition has deteriorated significantly.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif recently announced restrictions resembling those of the Covid era, including curbs on public spending, the closure of educational institutions and cutbacks in national events — the government even canceled the Republic Day parade and limited the PSL cricket league to just two venues.

Sharif himself has acknowledged the depth of the crisis: “We feel ashamed when Field Marshal Asim Munir and I go around the world begging for money. Taking loans is a huge burden on our self-respect. Our heads bow down in shame.” In such circumstances, Pakistan has limited strategic autonomy and must carefully balance external pressures.

Fifth, Pakistan also fears that India may open an eastern front if it becomes bogged down in a West Asian conflict. Taken together, these factors explain why Pakistan is actively seeking to position itself as a mediator — a reflection of the pressures and constraints it faces, both external and internal.

The broader narrative of Pakistan’s growing role in global diplomacy, therefore, needs to be treated with caution. Visibility does not automatically translate into influence. Being in the limelight during a crisis is not the same as possessing sustained diplomatic weight or independent strategic agency.

One should not forget that Pakistan has often functioned as a close though subordinate ally of the US in pursuing regional objectives. Any assessment of its role must take this into account, as Pakistan has frequently operated within externally shaped frameworks — from Afghanistan to the broader West Asian landscape.

These current mediation efforts illustrate this dynamic. Tweets by Pakistani leaders, including Prime Minister Sharif and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, are being actively shared by Donald Trump on his Truth Social account — a relatively rare occurrence — signaling alignment with US objectives.

At the same time, while Pakistan speaks of mediation, it has not halted its military operations in Afghanistan, raising questions about its credibility. Recent strikes that reportedly hit civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, have resulted in more than 400 deaths, further complicating its claim to impartial mediation.

The amplification of Pakistan’s role by sections of Western and other media, often echoing Western strategic considerations, should be understood as part of a broader strategic communication effort to project Pakistan as a capable negotiator.

None of these rules out the possibility of a positive outcome. If Pakistan is able to contribute to de-escalation, it would benefit both the region and the wider international community. Yet it is essential to understand the motivations behind its actions.