Emerging reports of Russian intelligence support to Iran in its war with the US and Israel are raising critical questions about the scope, credibility and strategic implications of deepening Russia–Iran military cooperation.
This month, reports citing US officials and sources familiar with intelligence assessments say Russia has provided Iran with targeting data on US troops, warships and aircraft in the Middle East, marking the first indication of Russia’s indirect involvement in the conflict.
The intelligence — reportedly including satellite imagery — has coincided with more precise Iranian strikes on US positions, embassies and regional infrastructure, including an attack in Kuwait that killed six US service members, although it remains unclear whether specific strikes can be directly attributed to Russian data.
US officials and analysts say the improved accuracy — particularly against radar systems and command infrastructure — suggests access to advanced ISR capabilities Iran does not possess independently, even as the US downplays the operational impact, claiming that Iranian retaliation appears to be declining.
At the tactical level, the key question is how far Russian ISR support could sharpen Iran’s ability to target US forces. Despite denials from Russia, sharing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) data with Iran is plausible in site of their deep military cooperation.
In December 2023, the US Department of Commerce (DoC) highlighted Russian-Iranian efforts to establish a Shahed-139 production facility at Yelabuga, Russia. Joseph Bermudez and other writers estimate in a Beyond Parallel report this month that the Yelabuga plant can produce 5,500 Shahed-139 drones per month, with Iran’s drone designs gaining real-world combat experience by observing what works and what doesn’t in Ukraine.
Beyond drones, the US DoD mentioned in September 2024 that Iran has supplied Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia, enabling Russia to conserve its longer-range missiles and deepen its munitions stockpiles.
This growing military integration extends beyond weapons transfers. It is reinforced by Russia’s space-based ISR capabilities, which—while limited—remain among the most capable available to Iran.
Michael Connell and other writers mention in a November 2023 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) report that as of May 2022, Russia had 172 satellites in orbit, including 73 military satellites; among those military systems were 20 earth-observation satellites: 3 electro-optical, 10 signals/electronic intelligence (SIGINT/ELINT), 2 synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and 5 early-warning satellites.
Connell and others note that Russia’s optical reconnaissance is particularly thin: just 2 Persona satellites and 1 EMKA satellite. According to them, Persona can image a 1,300-kilometer swath at roughly 0.5-0.3 meter resolution, while EMKA offers about 0.9 meter resolution; three EMKAs were launched, but only one remained functional.
They add that Russia also relied on low-resolution civilian Resurs and Kanopus satellites, whose revisit rates ranged from three to 15 days.
John Sheldon, in a December 2024 report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), says Iran uses dual-use satellite systems to strengthen military ISR, and that Russia signed space-cooperation agreements with Iran, built and launched a high-resolution Earth-observation satellite, Khayyam, for Iran, and that several others are in development.
In addition to Khayyam, Sheldon states that Iran launched its Pars-1 electro-optical Earth observation satellite from Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome in February 2024. Notably, the co-production of Iran’s Shahed-139 drones, Russia’s use of Fath-360 SRBMs and space cooperation integrate the two states’ military systems, potentially enabling ISR sharing.
At the operational level, these analyses support the idea that Russia-Iran ISR cooperation is real and meaningful, but specific operational claims are hard to verify. But given those limitations, Russia’s ISR assistance to Iran may not be sufficient to enable the latter to hit moving targets such as aircraft carriers in real time, but could be enough to enable strikes on large, static targets such as bases and airfields, such as Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
Iran’s attempted strike against the US Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean may offer a partial indication of how improved ISR could support Iranian strikes.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Iran used two intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to attack the facility, which is situated 4,000 kilometers away from Iran. The WSJ reports that one missile failed in flight and the other was intercepted by an SM-3 missile fired from a US warship, but it is unclear whether the interception was successful.
More significant than the strike’s outcome was its range, demonstrating Iran’s ability to reach targets far beyond its immediate region.
Diego Garcia is a critical US military operations hub in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, with runways capable of supporting strategic bombers and strategic airlifters and a deepwater port that can support large warships such as aircraft carriers and destroyers. Notably, the island base was used as a staging point for US air operations in the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 Invasion of Iraq.
Previous assessments noted that Iran’s longest-ranged missile was the Khorramshahr, with an estimated range of 3,000 kilometers – putting much of Southern and Eastern Europe within range. Even though the Diego Garcia attack failed, it underscored a strategic shift: Iran is no longer confined to regional strike envelopes.
Iran’s expanding missile range — potentially enhanced by Russian ISR — brings parts of Western Europe within range, partly explaining why countries such as Spain, the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands have shown caution toward US calls for military involvement in the Gulf, including Trump’s call for a coalition to unblock the Strait of Hormuz.
The strategic linkage between theaters is becoming explicit. Politico reported this month that Russia proposed halting intelligence-sharing with Iran — including targeting data on US assets — in exchange for the US cutting off intelligence support to Ukraine, an offer the US rejected.
According to the Politico report, the proposal, conveyed by envoy Kirill Dmitriev in talks in Miami, raised concerns among European diplomats despite Russian denials. The report says that while Dmitriev later disputed the claim, the reported offer is seen as an attempt to leverage the Iran conflict to influence US policy on Ukraine.
Even limited Russia–Iran ISR cooperation could expand Iran’s ability to threaten fixed US and allied targets while giving Russia additional leverage over both the US and Europe across the now-linked battlefields of Ukraine and the Middle East.