Iran war could ultimately weaken US and benefit China

The widening conflict between the United States and Iran is already reshaping the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape. Supporters of Washington’s military campaign argue that weakening Tehran will restore deterrence and protect regional allies.

Yet the broader strategic consequences of the war may ultimately undermine American power rather than strengthen it. Military campaigns can degrade an adversary’s capabilities in the short term, but they can also generate wider instability and strategic trade-offs that weaken the position of the state launching them.

One immediate concern for the US is the strain such a conflict places on American resources and strategic attention. In recent years, Washington’s national security strategy has increasingly emphasized competition among major powers, particularly with China in the Indo-Pacific.

Yet a prolonged confrontation with Iran risks drawing the US back into the kind of large-scale Middle Eastern military commitments that American policymakers have spent more than a decade attempting to reduce.

Military resources are finite. Air defense systems, intelligence assets and precision munitions used in the Iran campaign are among the same capabilities the US would rely on in a potential high-intensity conflict elsewhere.

Even a limited war can consume large quantities of expensive weapons and divert attention from other strategic priorities. If the conflict expands or drags on, the US may find itself once again heavily absorbed in Middle Eastern security management at the expense of its broader geopolitical goals.

The economic implications are also significant. According to the Penn Wharton Budget Model, the strikes on Iran could cost the American economy up to US$210 billion, depending on the scale and duration of the conflict.

That comes at a time when the US already faces large federal deficits and rising interest payments on the national debt, now nearing $39 trillion.

Another strategic challenge involves the credibility of American deterrence in the Gulf. The US maintains a network of military bases across the region to reassure its partners and deter potential adversaries. Countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates host major American facilities intended to signal Washington’s commitment to regional security.

However, if attacks on Gulf states hosting American forces continue despite this military presence, the perception of deterrence may weaken. When partners remain vulnerable to missile or drone strikes even while hosting US bases, it inevitably raises questions about the reliability of security guarantees.

This does not mean that regional states would abruptly abandon their relationships with Washington. But uncertainty can encourage governments to hedge their strategic positions.

In an increasingly multipolar international system, countries may seek to diversify their diplomatic and economic partnerships rather than rely exclusively on a single security patron.

China, for example, has developed close economic relationships with many Middle Eastern countries. As tensions rise, Beijing has increasingly emphasized diplomatic engagement and called for de-escalation. In a crisis environment where stability and economic continuity are priorities for regional governments, this approach can enhance China’s diplomatic profile.

At the same time, conflicts involving major military powers inevitably provide opportunities for other states to observe and learn. Military operations generate valuable information about tactics, technologies and logistical systems.

For countries studying the evolution of modern warfare, observing how advanced weapons systems are deployed in real conflicts offers insights that cannot be replicated through exercises alone.

None of this suggests that China benefits economically from instability in the Middle East. As one of the world’s largest energy importers, Beijing is exposed to rising oil prices and supply disruptions. But geopolitically, prolonged US military engagement in the region can create strategic space for other powers to expand their diplomatic influence.

Beyond great-power competition, the war also raises the risk of deeper regional instability. With a population of more than 90 million people and significant ethnic diversity, Iran is one of the largest states in the Middle East. Severe internal destabilization could produce unpredictable consequences.

Recent history offers cautionary examples. The collapse of state authority in Iraq after 2003 created the conditions for sectarian conflict and the rise of extremist groups.

Libya’s fragmentation following the 2011 intervention left the country divided between rival governments and militias. Syria’s civil war transformed a once-stable state into a prolonged regional crisis.

A deeply destabilized Iran could produce similar dynamics on a far larger scale. Internal fragmentation could create opportunities for militant groups and regional militias to expand their activities, increasing instability across the Middle East.

There is also the longer-term issue of nuclear proliferation. When non-nuclear states observe that countries such as Iraq, Libya and now Iran become targets of military intervention, some may conclude that nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent against external attack.

If more states begin reconsidering their nuclear options, the result could be a far more dangerous regional security environment. For the US, the challenge is to ensure that actions intended to enhance security do not inadvertently create new risks that prove more difficult to manage.

History shows that wars often produce consequences far beyond their initial objectives. If the conflict with Iran leads to prolonged regional instability, rising energy prices and shifting geopolitical alignments, the ultimate effect may be to weaken rather than strengthen US strategic influence in the Middle East.

Alexander Clackson is founder and director of the Global Political Research Center in London, political advisor, and a researcher at Lancaster University in the United Kingdom. His articles have been published in the South China Morning Post, Financial Times, The Hill, The National Interest, Jerusalem Post and Al Jazeera, among other global media outlets.