The post-Cold War fantasy of a unipolar world order under American hegemony is definitively over.
What’s emerging in its place isn’t the neat bipolar rivalry between Washington and Beijing that many strategists anticipated, but rather a more chaotic multipolar system where middle powers are discovering they have more room to maneuver than at any time since the 1970s.
From Ankara to New Delhi, from Riyadh to Jakarta, governments that were once relegated to choosing sides in great power contests are now playing the field with remarkable dexterity.
This isn’t idealism—it’s cold calculation. These states recognize that American decline doesn’t automatically translate into Chinese dominance, and that the space between these poles offers opportunities for those shrewd enough to exploit them.
Consider Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, simultaneously a NATO member hosting Russian tourists, mediating between Moscow and Kyiv, while pursuing independent military adventures in Syria and Libya.
Or Saudi Arabia, the supposed American client state, now coordinating energy policy with Russia through OPEC+ and accepting Chinese mediation with Iran. India, meanwhile, maintains its strategic partnership with Washington while refusing to condemn Russia over Ukraine and deepening ties with Moscow on defense and energy.
This behavior infuriates policymakers in Washington who still think in terms of “with us or against us.” But middle powers are doing what states have always done when great power constraints loosen—pursuing their particular national interests without subordinating themselves to anyone’s grand strategic vision.
The current moment resembles less the Cold War and more the Concert of Europe’s later period, when medium-sized powers like Italy and the Ottoman Empire could shift alignments and pursue regional ambitions. The difference is that today’s middle powers often possess significant military capabilities, large economies and, in some cases, nuclear weapons.
What does this mean for American foreign policy? First, accept that hectoring these states about “shared values” while simultaneously reducing the security guarantees and economic benefits of alignment is a losing strategy.
Second, recognize that these powers will increasingly prioritize regional interests over global ideological contests. Third, understand that attempts to force binary choices will likely backfire, pushing fence-sitters toward alternative arrangements.
The smart play for Washington is to adopt a more transactional approach—offering concrete benefits for concrete cooperation on specific issues while accepting that these states will maintain diverse relationships.
The alternative is watching them build an entirely parallel international system where American influence is marginal.
The age of middle powers isn’t a problem to be solved. It’s a reality to be navigated. The sooner American strategists accept this, the better positioned they’ll be to protect vital interests in a world that no longer revolves around Washington’s preferences.
This article was originally published on Leon Hadar’s Global Zeitgeist and is republished with kind permission. Become a subscriber here.