On February 17, the United States announced it would soon deploy additional advanced missiles to the northern Philippines, a part of the archipelago that faces Taiwan.
This decision, reflecting the Trump administration’s “iron-clad commitment” to Manila’s security, aims to deter Chinese aggression as Beijing expands its military power and gray-zone warfare in Southeast Asia.
However, given the region’s strategic realities, Washington’s move is both unnecessary and dangerous. China has repeatedly protested US deployment of the mid-range Typhon missile system in the Philippines in 2024 and of an anti-ship missile launcher last year. Beijing asserts such US weapons are aimed at containing its rise and threaten regional stability.
Washington and Manila have reiterated their commitment to freedom of navigation and strongly condemned what they describe as China’s “illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive activities” in the South China Sea, which accounts for nearly a quarter of global sea trade and 45% of global maritime oil flows.
US officials fear that if Beijing controlled that sea, it would threaten the Philippines and Taiwan, potentially allowing unfettered Chinese access beyond the First Island Chain. Washington calculates that its mobile, land-based missile assets, which are harder to detect than ships and aircraft, would complicate any local Chinese offensive.
Moreover, deploying these in the Philippines’ northern provinces would allow Washington to threaten southern China, prevent Beijing from fully encircling Taiwan and hinder its access to the Pacific Ocean. Supporters also claim that America’s assistance to Manila amounts to a fraction of the US military budget.
Washington’s bet on the Philippines may be only partially warranted. The archipelago’s geography is favorable to defensive weapon systems, making additional missiles of limited value for territorial security. Further, Manila’s defense budget is barely above 1% of GDP, so such military aid flows contradict the Trump administration’s “burden-sharing” agenda.
Likewise, Manila’s support during a US-China conflict would likely be limited. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr seeks to preserve economic relations with China and opposes any US use of Philippine military facilities for “offensive purposes.”
More broadly, Beijing’s many Filipino supporters could soon win power, thereby dramatically changing its current strategic orientation. The importance of the South China Sea to US security is questionable. China and the Philippines are disputing rocks and reefs. The sea’s fishery and natural resources are limited.
China knows that a local blockade would cripple its own trade and amount to a declaration of war on the US, thereby threatening its regime’s survival. Moreover, international trade flows could bypass the South China Sea at minimal cost.
The South China Sea’s connection to Taiwan’s security is equally overblown. The local artificial islands Beijing has militarized are far from Taiwan and could be easily destroyed by the US. Moreover, the prospects of a Chinese attack and the military implications of Taiwan’s fall (Washington’s core rationale) remain debated.
Most importantly, Washington’s policy toward the Philippines perpetuates an aggressive strategy. Besides upgraded missile exports, the Trump administration envisions expanded facilities and unprecedented “ammunition hub[s]” to ensure that Manila shifts from hedging to alignment with the US against China.
Washington’s involvement in the South China Sea reveals similar goals. The US, one of the few countries that hasn’t ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), conveniently overlooks that numerous similar disputes are unfolding elsewhere, including some involving America and its allies.
More broadly, those efforts aim to reinforce the First Island Chain, which Washington has used since the early Cold War to encircle China’s coastline with US assets, allies and partners.
Yet those dynamics are dangerous. Washington’s support has emboldened Manila in the South China Sea. It has neglected to consider how the South China Sea matters to China’s historical traumas, vital sea lanes, mainland security and second-strike nuclear capability.
America’s missile deployments in the Philippines, part of its post-INF Treaty buildup in Asia, have led Beijing to worry about potential attacks on its territory and efforts to neutralize the weapons systems it uses to limit US military incursions in its immediate vicinity.
More broadly, China fears Washington’s efforts to push the Philippines into a regional “bloc-like structure,” to expand its role in a hypothetical Taiwan crisis and to encourage the Philippines’ cooperation with allies such as Japan, with whom Manila signed a new defense pact in January.
As such, America’s policies significantly increase the risk of conflict, exposing Washington to entanglement under its defense treaty with Manila.
In fact, despite concerns about Washington’s relative military decline and President Trump’s transactional, coercive and unpredictable style, several Southeast Asian states view US assertiveness as the real cause of their region’s instability and as a threat to ASEAN’s diplomatic influence and economic progress.
Indeed, the real driver of China’s growing influence across Southeast Asia is the economy, an area the US has increasingly neglected.
All in all, Washington should refrain from deploying new missile capabilities in the Philippines. Although deterrence remains important, it should also curb its allies’ assertiveness and nudge Beijing and Manila toward a stable modus vivendi.
Thomas P. Cavanna is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and collaborating academic visitor at Lehigh University. Follow him on LinkedIn and X.