Image: Economic Times

In the high-stakes world of trade diplomacy, agreements are usually forged quietly through painstaking negotiations behind closed doors, dense legal texts and carefully calibrated “reciprocity” and “give and take.”

The recently announced India-US “interim trade deal” departs radically from that tradition. It was unveiled not through a signed document or a jointly released legal framework but through a flurry of tweets, press briefings and selective leaks many days before formal texts were adopted.

What has been celebrated as a breakthrough in bilateral trade may, on closer look, turn out to be something far more troubling for India: a one-sided geoeconomic bargain, all give and no take dressed up as a strategic partnership.

The asymmetry was visible from the very beginning – not merely in substance, but also in the way public messaging was delivered. US President Donald Trump announced the deal with his characteristic bravado, amplified by White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, who spoke of India halting Russian oil purchases, slashing tariffs on American goods to zero, opening the agricultural market and committing to an eye-watering $500 billion in purchases and investments in US energy, aircraft and technology.

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer went farther, presenting the arrangement as a corrective measure to America’s trade deficit and a victory for US farmers and workers.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s response was notably reserved, reflecting damage control of his strongman image at home. His statement referenced only the reduction of US tariffs on Indian exports from 50% to 18%, omitting any mention of halting Russian oil, zero tariffs on US goods, agricultural market access or large investment commitments in the US.

This omission suggests a reluctance or inability to address the broader implications domestically. This difference in messaging highlights a key issue: India has made immediate, measurable commitments to the US, while the US has offered conditional, potentially reversible concessions. The US is to take more and give less to India.

Who gives more – upfront and irrevocably

India’s concessions are extensive and take effect immediately. New Delhi has agreed to eliminate or significantly reduce tariffs on all US industrial goods and various sensitive agricultural and food products, such as distillers’ dried grains, fruits, nuts, soybean oil, wine and spirits. India will also remove non-tariff barriers in US medical devices, information and communication technology goods and food standards, and will accept US or international testing and certification within six months.

India has also agreed to align with US positions on digital trade by removing “discriminatory or burdensome” practices, which are likely to include easing data localization rules, platform regulation and aspects of its digital industrial policy.

Additionally, India has committed to purchasing $500 billion in US energy, aircraft, technology products, metals and coal over five years. These actions collectively represent a significant opening of India’s markets and regulatory framework.

In contrast, the United States maintains its primary protectionist measures. It retains an 18 per cent reciprocal tariff on Indian exports, with removal contingent on the successful conclusion of the interim agreement and limited to products specified in annexes subject to US executive orders. Relief for aircraft parts is minimal, auto components are subject to tariff-rate quotas, and pharmaceuticals remain under Section 232 national security investigations. The US also reserves the right to reimpose tariffs as needed.

This arrangement does not reflect reciprocity in international trade, but rather an exercise of American leverage.

Table 1: Who gives what, and who benefits more

DimensionWhat India givesWhat the US GivesWho Benefits More
Tariff CommitmentsEliminates or sharply reduces tariffs on all the US industrial goods and a wide range of US agricultural and food productsRetains 18% reciprocal tariff on Indian goods; promises possible removal later, conditional on future stepsUS
Timing of ConcessionsImmediate and front-loadedDeferred and conditionalUS
Agriculture and FoodOpens politically sensitive sectors; addresses Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures(SPS) and non-tariff barriersNo explicit opening of THE US agriculture to Indian exportsUS (strongly)
Manufacturing and Industrial GoodsBroad market access for US manufacturersMaintains protection under executive authorityUS
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)Commits to remove NTBs in medical devices, ICT, food standardsNo parallel NTB commitmentsUS
Standards and CertificationAccepts THE US/international standards within 6 monthsNo obligation to recognize Indian standardsUSA
Pharmaceuticals and GenericsSubject to Section 232 investigations; outcomes uncertainRetains leverage via national security and regulatory toolsUS (strategically)
Digital Trade and DataAligns rules; eases data localization and platform regulationGains access for Big Tech, cloud, data centersUS
Energy and Capital GoodsCommits to $500 billion purchases over 5 years (LNG, aircraft, tech, metals, coal)Secures long-term export demand for the US firms (Boeing, LNG exporters, tech)US (big)
Automotive and MachineryAccepts tariff-rate quotas and conditional accessRetains discretion over scope and durationUS
Rules of OriginAccepts restrictive rules limiting third-country inputsAdvances the US de-risking and China-containment strategyUS
National Security ClausesAccepts broad the US security exceptionsRetains right to re-impose tariffs unilaterallyUS
Policy SovereigntyConstrains regulatory, digital, food, and industrial policy space of IndiaPreserves full policy flexibilityUS
Certainty of GainsMostly future, political, and non-guaranteed by the US.Immediate, commercial, and enforceableUS
Strategic OutcomeGains alignment status, not guaranteed market accessGains export markets + strategic leverageUS

Sectoral imbalances and disparate outcomes

Across sectors, the agreement favors the United States. Indian markets are widely open to US industrial goods, increasing competition for domestic manufacturers and micro, small and medium enterprises, while US protectionist measures largely remain in place. In the agriculture sector, India makes concessions in traditionally sensitive areas without gaining comparable access to the American market.

In the pharmaceuticals sector, India receives only general assurances of “negotiated outcomes” following security reviews, while the US maintains regulatory and political leverage over India’s generics industry. In technology and digital trade, US technology firms and cloud providers benefit from increased access to India’s data and digital markets as India relaxes its regulatory controls.

The $500 billion purchase commitment serves as an export stimulus for US LNG producers, aerospace companies, and technology suppliers. This move also increases India’s reliance on US-centric supply chains at a time when diversification is generally considered a strategic priority for India.

Rules, security, and the institutionalization of unilateral measures

The agreement on rules of origin ensures that benefits primarily accrue to the US and India, restricting third-country inputs, particularly from China, and aligning India with the US geoeconomic strategy. Frequent references to national security, executive authority and trade investigations reinforce US unilateralism while binding India to specific commitments.

This agreement eliminates the option of importing parts from China, carrying out final assembly in India with 20-30 per cent local value addition and then shipping the goods to the US market.

India’s gains are mostly intangible and deferred, including the symbolism of strategic partnership; potential future tariff relief for textiles, gems and machinery; and recognition as a “trusted partner” in global supply chains. These benefits are not guaranteed and depend on future negotiations, US domestic politics and executive decisions.

A circus of accountability

The announcement process has been as notable as the agreement itself. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, in Washington, stated the matter was “not directly with me.” Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal maintained that agriculture and dairy were “protected,” despite US officials indicating otherwise. The Ministry of External Affairs referenced “diversified energy sourcing” but did not confirm any binding commitment regarding halting Russian oil import.

This lack of clear communication suggests an attempt to avoid parliamentary scrutiny. Opposition parties have accused the Modi government of yielding to American pressure, while government supporters claim a diplomatic success, though specific details remain gravely limited.

Substance versus presentation

This episode illustrates how foreign economic policy can be used for domestic political purposes. For Trump, the announcement supports an “America First” policy by highlighting concessions and investment figures without binding commitments to India. For Modi, the tariff reduction provides short-term benefits for exporters and presents an image of strategic achievement during economic challenges at home.

Table 2: Overall assessment of Interim Trade Deal

CriterionAssessment
Balance of concessionsHighly asymmetric, skewed heavily to the US
Nature of agreementMarket access for India, leverage retention for the US
Trade vs strategyTrade deal subordinated India to the US geoeconomic strategic objectives
India’s roleThe US’s market and buyer of American goods, rules follower and strategic junior partner in Indo-pacific
The US’s roleRule-maker, exporter and security gatekeeper

However, the potential costs are significant. Zero or near-zero tariffs on US goods may impact domestic manufacturing, agricultural market openings could lead to farmer unrest and unclear energy commitments may weaken India’s strategic autonomy. Discounted Russian oil has been helping to control inflation and support energy security; altering this balance for symbolic alignment carries substantial de-stability risk to the Indian economy.

The US tariffs at 18 per cent remain well above the pre-escalation levels of 2-3%. The $500 billion import figure appears overstated, as India’s total imports from the US were approximately $80 billion before the deal. Increasing this volume significantly without affecting global supply chains would be challenging and risky for India.

Interim deal, permanent loss

This “interim deal” appears attractive at first glance, but does not withstand careful examination. This deal requires India to make immediate concessions for the US while American commitments are deferred, reinforcing an asymmetric economic relationship. Rather than a balanced trade agreement, it represents a US-led alignment in which India provides market access and policy flexibility in exchange for potential future benefits. It is an interim deal but a lasting loss for India.

In nutshell, India deserved a far better deal from the United States – and failed to secure one. Whether this reflects negotiating incompetence, strategic miscalculation or political vulnerability remains an open question. What is undeniable is that New Delhi entered talks with leverage—a vast market, geopolitical relevance, and supply-chain value—yet emerged conceding more than it gained.

The opacity fuels speculation. Is this the product of weak trade negotiators overwhelmed by American pressure?

Or is trade policy being subordinated to domestic political imperatives—shielding powerful business allies from US scrutiny, or avoiding discomforting questions that a transactional US presidency knows how to exploit? Trump’s style thrives on leverage and personal pressure; Modi’s silence suggests acquiescence rather than confidence.

Until India negotiates from strength rather than anxiety, “strategic partnership” will continue to mean asymmetric compromise rather than mutual respect.

Bhim Bhurtel is on X at @BhimBhurtel

Bhim Bhurtel teaches Development Economics and Global Political Economy in the Master's program at Nepal Open University. He was the executive director of the Nepal South Asia Center (2009-14), a Kathmandu-based South Asian development think-tank. Bhurtel can be reached at bhim.bhurtel@gmail.com.

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